POLITICS IN ISLAM.

BY

S. KHUDA BUKHSH.

(*Reprint from the Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee volumes.*)

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ESSAYS: INDIAN AND ISLAMIC. PROBSTHAIN, LONDON. 1912.

HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC PEOPLES. CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1914.

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FOREWORD.

"The great object in trying to understand history, political, religious, literary or scientific, is to get behind men and to grasp ideas. Ideas have a radiation and development, an ancestry and posterity of their own, in which men play the part of godfathers and godmothers more than that of legitimate parents."—*Lord Acton.**

Everywhere I notice a growing interest in Islam and Islamic studies. Islamic studies now find a definite place in the education imparted by Calcutta University and the other Universities of India—all of which are in many respects giving a lead to the world's older seats of learning. The interest aroused will, I trust, increase as the years go by. Yet not merely love of learning, for its own sake, but recent political events have quickened, widened, deepened this interest. There is, therefore, a need and a pressing need for a brief but exhaustive survey of the social, political and economic conditions of the Muslims under the Caliphate. Nay, the Caliphate itself calls for notice and attention. It is a subject of absorbing interest just now. Its meaning, its significance, its historical importance, its religious bearing—these require careful study. To understand the present we must know the past; for the present is a text, and the past is largely its interpretation.

We want no political pamphlet, no controversial monograph; but a sober, well-considered, well-weighed historical work. I can think of no such work in English; but in German there is certainly one which, in spite of the years that have passed since its publication, is still well-worthy of study and respect. It is the *Staatsidee des Islams* in *Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams.* It would be inaccurate to describe the pages lying before us as a mere translation of the *Staatsidee des Islams*, for I have incorporated into it the researches of Wellhausen, Goldziher and other English and Continental scholars. It is Von Kremer enlarged, amplified.

Here, in these pages, we have an account of those political and social questions which arose in, agitated and wrecked the Muslim Empire. Here we have an account of the strength and weaknesses of Islam, a

* Letters of Lord Acton, pp. 5, 6.

tribute to its inherent religious force and vitality, a hope and a prophecy. And here we have an illustration and commentary upon the words of John Henry Newman: "All things are double, one against another. Every power, every form of government, every influence, strong as it may be, has its natural remedy or match, by which it is prevented from doing all things at its will. In constitutional governments they appeal to the law; in absolute monarchies they rise; in military despotisms they assassinate. James the second is opposed by forms of law; Louis of France by Jacqueries; Paul of Russia is strangled."*

The political history of Islam is the history of shattered ideals. The system, founded by the Prophet and maintained by Abu Bakr and Omar, was a system impossible of complete realisation or of long endurance in a world of imperfect conditions. In these pages we see the slow and steady decline and eventual disappearance of that purely ideal system of love, brotherhood and equality, inaugurated by the genius of the Prophet and sustained by the unwavering loyalty of his two Successors.

Von Kremer is essentially a scholar of the highest mark and distinction. He weighs, sifts, criticises evidence, and then delivers judgment. Hence the weight and value of his pronouncements. I am confident this little book will supply a need long felt by students and the public alike. It will encourage Islamic studies and foster sympathy with Muslims. Further, it will enlarge the outlook on questions Islamic. There is no greater need of the times than mutual understanding and mutual sympathy, larger outlook and broader toleration.

Has not Goethe said: "Delight, pleasure, sympathy—this alone calls forth reality, all else is empty and vain."

I have to offer my most grateful thanks to Mr. H. Bruce Hannah (a thinker, whose recent work has caused a great stir in the historical world), and Mr. A. H. Harley, of the Calcutta Madrassah, for revising the proofs, and to Dr. Brühl for explaining to me passages in regard to which I sometimes felt doubt or difficulty.

S. KHUDA BUKHSH.

Bar Library, Calcutta,
July, 1920.

* Newman, Select Essays, p. 50.

POLITICS IN ISLAM.*

S. KHUDA BUKHSH.

I.—*The Patriarchal Epoch.*

Mohamed not only founded a new religion but established a new polity. By converting his countrymen to the faith in one God he destroyed the old constitution of his native town and in place of the old aristocratic tribal constitution, which meant conduct of public affairs by the ruling families, set up an out-and-out theocratic constitution, at the head of which he stood as the representative of God on earth. Even before his death almost the whole of Arabia—Arabia, which had never bent its neck to a prince or a ruler—lay, all of a sudden, at his feet, as a national unit, paying homage to the will of an absolute master. Out of a hundred struggling, warring tribes Mohamed created a nation. The idea of a common religion, with a common High Priest, welded the different tribes into one political organism which, with a marvellous rapidity, shaped its own peculiar form and system. Only a powerful idea could have attained this end. The tribe—the dominating factor of Arab heathenism—had to give way to the newly-born sense of religious unity. The great work had succeeded, and at the death of the Prophet, over by far the greatest part of Arabia reigned a peace and quiet such as the blood-thirsty, vengeance-seeking tribes had never known before. Religion hushed their disputes into silence and effected a reconciliation. And yet (as we shall learn in the sequel), though repressed by religion, and turned, for a time, into other channels, the old tribal and clannish spirit never actually and completely perished among them. In fact the subsequent history of the Arabs is the history of the collision and conflict of this very spirit which entirely swayed the Arab mind.

At the time of Mohamed's ministry the population of Arabia was composed of two distinct elements: namely, the North Arabs, Ishmailites, also called after their mythical ancestor Adnan, Adnanites, and South Arabs, Yoktanides. While the latter, the Yoktanides, had

* Alfred von Kremer, *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, pp. 309 *et sqq.*

attained, even in the remotest antiquity, a high stage of culture, the North Arabian tribes, living in Hejaz, Najd and Central Arabia, and gradually moving more and more towards south and south-east, lived completely in the primitive conditions of patriarchal times. The descendants of one common ancestor, together with their families, slaves and clients, constituted a clan, a self-sufficing little community independent of the rest of the world. At the head of each such group stood the most senior in age of the first and foremost family among them. But he exercised no other power than that which his word could command or enforce. His judicial pronouncements were respected, and at the deliberations of the tribal elders he held the chair. In war and predatory expeditions he took the lead. To him also fell the fourth of the booty; a practice which Mohamed, with a slight modification, incorporated into his law. (Mohamed claimed the fifth for the State.) As regards the *headship* there was no settled rule of succession. In the choice, seniority in age and popular esteem turned the scale. If a tribe became too large and unwieldy it was split up into several divisions; each carrying on under the common tribal name its own separate existence. The only tie that held them together—these smaller groups—was the tie of common descent. In case of common danger they united, and not infrequently they did so for a large campaign. Every such division, in process of time, split up into yet smaller groups and families, every one of which was a miniature of the tribe.

Though separate and isolated, the tribes nevertheless came frequently into contact with each other, through campaigns and predatory expeditions; through vengeance for bloodshed (blood-revenge), an institution of immemorial antiquity among them; and through the diversity and variety of tribal gods. Thus the tribes of Arabia offered a true picture of the first and the earliest human society.

While in the south great political communities came into existence under monarchical constitution; in the north there existed only independent tribes under the guidance of their ephemeral chiefs.

And yet even in very early times we catch a glimpse of permanent settlements. Thus Medina became the seat of a numerous Jewish colony; and Mekka itself, whose earliest history is wrapped in obscurity, became, possibly under the influence of foreigners, especially the Jewish immigrants, a meeting-place and a sanctuary for the nomad tribes

residing in the neighbourhood. At Dumat-ul-Juudal the South Arabian colonists established a settlement which soon, by its position, acquired great importance. In this way may have risen Hail in Yemama. Khaibar was a Jewish colony. Taif was an important seat of the tribe of Takyf. The need for exchange of goods and caravan-traffic promoted the growth of towns. Thus arose the annual market of Okaz, the market-place of the tribes, known under the common name of Kais Ailan and Takyf; Magannah in the neighbourhood of Mekka; Magaz in the land of the tribe of Hudail.* Hajar in Bahrain, and Oman in the district bearing the same name, were the chief centres of concourse in the East of the Arabian Peninsula. Among all the settlements in North Arabia Mekka and Medina held, undoubtedly, the most conspicuous place. Both of these towns lay on the great caravan-route which led from south Arabia to the north; on the one hand to Syria, across Hijr, the old rocky town of the Tamudites, to Tabuk and Ma'an; on the other to the north-west across Bada, an old Tamudite town, and Mijan to Ailah (the modern Akaba), whence the caravan started for Egypt and the shores of the Mediterranean.

An aristocracy of merchants, well cultivated and cultured by constant contact with Syria and Egypt, ruled Mekka—the tribe of Quraish predominating. The entire town lived upon caravan-trade and the income of the national sanctuary of the North Arabian tribes, the Ka'aba. This national sanctuary was under the care and supervision of the most respected Mekkan families. It secured for them great religious and political influence among the Beduin tribes of the surrounding country. In Medina lived the Aus and Khazraj, and a good many industrious and diligent Jews who gradually extended their colony into the neighbourhood. Here, among the Aus and Khazraj, Mohamed first found support and encouragement. Here he first won his easy victory over the rich but disunited and hence politically powerless Jews. We are not concerned at present with the history of the Prophet's successes. Suffice it to state that in the eighth year of the Hijra he victoriously entered Mekka at the head of an army of 10,000 men consisting mostly of the Beduin converts. Such a success Arabia had never seen. He crushed some of the opposing tribes, but the rest hastened to make their submission. To the most distant parts of the Peninsula, to Hadramaut and

* Sprenger, *Life of Mohamed* (Allahabad), p. 5.

Oman, the Prophet sent his vicegerents, calling upon the people to accept Islam and pay the poor-tax. This consisted in the payment of a tenth of the produce of the land. In many cases it was only half of the tenth.* This poor-tax, which was mostly paid in camels and sheep, along with the legal fifth of the war-booty, enabled the Prophet to pay the army, to help the poor, and to win over, by rich presents, the affection and loyalty of the influential chiefs. Thus, in his last years, Mohamed ruled over almost the whole of Arabia. There was, however, a difference in the political conditions of the different provinces. According to Sprenger we can divide these into two classes: direct provinces, and protectorates. In the first the Prophet caused the poor-tax to be collected by officers appointed by him; distributing a portion of the tax so collected among the poor of the province. The greater part, of course, made its way to Medina. In the latter—namely, lands under suzerainty, such as Yamamah, Oman, Yaman—the old princes of the land retained, by treaty, the right of collecting the tenth themselves. Only a portion of Yamamah, devoted to the false prophet, Maslamah, maintained its independence, and declined to acknowledge the Prophet until his death. Thus, in a few years, Mohamed settled the framework of the State machinery for the whole of Arabia. But at the root of the new political fabric lay the tie of common religion; the absolute cessation of hostilities among Muslims; in other words, the eternal Peace of God. This led gradually to the disappearance of blood-feud and the union of the tribes into one large body of Muslims.†

Before Islam every tribe had its own idols, its own sanctuary; and stood severely apart from the others, whom it looked upon as strangers and enemies. Once and for all Islam overthrew these artificial barriers by giving one and the same religion to all, and by bringing all under one and the same divine law. From the very first Mohamed recognized the importance of welding the tribes into one compact whole; and even if his success was not absolute, none can deny that in the face of that genuine Semitic tenacity with which the Arabs clung to their old traditions and practices he achieved marvellous results. He announced to his followers that Islam abrogated the obligations and duties of heathen days.‡ But quite as much as his preachings, if not

* Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, III, 339, 347, 350.

† Sprenger, III, 357.

‡ Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, 412. The Prophet said, "The tie of blood and the number of

more, his extraordinary successes, the eagerness for booty of the tribes who hastened to his banner from one expedition to another, the surest security offered by Islam against the operation of the principle of blood-revenge, still dominant among their heathen country folks, contributed to the triumph of the Prophet and his cause.* Such was the position of affairs when an event, never seriously considered by Muslims, occurred. On the 8th of June 632 A.D. the Prophet passed away, and Islam was bereft of its chief. Mohamed left no son, nor made any arrangements regarding his successor, but the most distinguished companions of the Prophet agreed upon the necessity of electing one. The nearest relatives of the Prophet were his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, two years younger than the Prophet; Othman, his son-in-law, five to ten years younger; Ali, his second son-in-law, about thirty years younger; Omar, the father-in-law of the Prophet, his trusted friend and counsellor, eighteen years younger.† We have purposely referred to these differences in age, for they were decisive in the choice of the first Caliphs. In the leadership of the tribe there was never acknowledged among the Beduin tribes a fixed order of hereditary succession. It was regarded as something extraordinary if the leadership of a tribe continued in one and the same family for four generations.‡ Seniority in age and popular esteem were the only determining factors in the choice of the tribal chief. Hence the term *Shaikh*, i.e. the aged one, was the term always applied to the head of the tribe. These were the determining considerations in the election of Abu Bakr for he undoubtedly was the most senior in age and the most respected of the family of the Prophet.

Omar succeeded Abu Bakr by virtue of an express arrangement made by the latter; an arrangement subsequently approved and confirmed by the community. Omar was the father-in-law of the Prophet; and, among his nearest relatives, he was, indeed, the oldest and the most

children will not avail you (on the Day of Judgment). He also declared that there was no right of inheritance between believers and unbelievers. Bukhari, 2206 (3).

* Bukhari 2212 (2). The Arabs made acceptance of Islam conditional on its success, and said: "Let him (Mohamed) come out successful and we will regard him as a true Prophet." When Mekka was taken all the tribes hastened to accept Islam.

† Mohamed's third son-in-law, Abul-Asi, was a heathen, and accepted Islam later. Sprenger, I, 201.

‡ Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 289. Freytag, *Einleitung in des Studium der arab. Sprache*, 337.

esteemed one. In the midst of his great organising activity he fell by the dagger of an assassin. To the last he retained consciousness. He knew Othman, and he knew Ali. He knew, too, that according to seniority it was their turn one after the other, but he considered them both equally unfit for the Caliphate. If the information handed down to us is correct he expressed himself about Ali as one who, though entitled by right to the Caliphate, was still too weak and unstable in character, and was liable to be easily led.* Of Othman he observed that he would, to be sure, favour his tribesmen above the others. He reckoned Talha, Zubair and Sa'ad equally unsuitable. On his death-bed (excluding his son) he appointed a Council of Regency consisting of six of the most esteemed and oldest of the companions of the Prophet. They were Ali, Othman, Talha, Zubair, Abdur Rahman Ibn Auf, Sa'ad Ibn Abi Waqqas. They were the earliest converts to Islam, and by their age and wealth held a distinguished position in Muslim society. The old Arab idea of a tribal chief asserted itself over the personal vanity of the members of the regency, and, after a series of party intrigues, the choice fell upon Othman. The idea of seniority doubtless contributed much to this result, and especially to it must be assigned the submissive attitude of Ali, who, apart from it, could have put forward the strongest claim to the Caliphate. As against the considerably older Othman Ali withdrew, in the hope that his turn would come next. But during the reign of Othman events happened which made this impossible, and Ali's effort, in spite of his good claim, called forth a fierce civil war which filled the Islamic countries with blood and horror and exercised a decisive influence on the Islamic civilisation for evermore. For, out of the path into which the Muslim mind then drifted, there was no turning back possible. But before we enquire into the intellectual basis of this movement we must needs have a clear and correct idea of the ways and means adopted by Abu Bakr and Omar in the fulfilment of their mission, and the principles which dominated their system of government. We must especially consider the fundamental ideas underlying their politics; how, on the one hand, these ideas were translated into fact, and what impression, on the other, they made on the great masses of the Muslims.

* Mawardi (Enger's ed.), p. 45. Compare the masterly sketch of Ali's character. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 396.

II.—The first two Caliphs.

When Abu Bakr became Caliph, he was chosen as the representative of the deceased Prophet, whom he had often, in his lifetime, represented as the leader of the public prayer.* This is the significance of the word "Calipha" which corresponds to the title "representative of God and Christ" which the XVIth council of Toleda gave to the kings of Spain.†

The most striking feature in the character of the Arabs is their nervous excitability; and the Arab character, accordingly, may be divided into two classes. In one the wild, unrestrained Beduin disposition shows itself. Its characteristics are greed, fondness for plunder, exceeding sensuality and an unrefined pride. In the more enlightened natures where these wild impulses were suppressed or controlled by a more highly-developed sense of morality, one finds a deep pervading melancholy, insensibly passing into religious fervour and ecstasy. This explains the character of people such as these: Naufal Ibn Waraqah, Omayyah Ibn Abi Salt, Zaid Ibn Amr, Othman Ibn Huwairith, who, even prior to Mohamed, meditated upon monotheism.‡ And even the personality of the Prophet and his entire mental attitude were the outcome of this very disposition § which, to this day, is the distinctive peculiarity of the Arabs. We notice the two aspects of the Arab character in the companions of the Prophet; just as we notice in the Prophet himself the dominant psychological characteristics of his countrymen. The majority of the companions fall under the first heading: gold and property were all in all to them. The most distinguished companions of the Prophet, especially those that were nominated by Omar to the Council of Regency, acquired immense wealth. Zubair left behind property worth 50 million Dirhams.|| Abdur Rahman Ibn Auf owned, when he died, 1,000 camels and so much in cash that every one of his four widows (according to another report, three), after the deduction of the share of the children, obtained 80 to 100,000 Dirhams. Sa'ad Ibn Abi Waqqas had a beautiful palace in the neighbourhood of Medina where he lived in comfort and peace. Talha left behind on his death 2,200,000 Dirhams and 200,000 Dinars in cash. His capital and landed properties were valued at 30 million Dirhams.¶

* Muatta, I, 311, 312. † Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, Vol. IV, 30, Note 6.

‡ Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 75-92.

§ Burton, *Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Mekkah*, II, 49, Note. || Bukhari.

¶ Sprenger, I, 382-386, 422. Cf. Masudi Apud Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 416. The Dirham was worth 65-72 centimes, Sprenger, III, 135.

But very different, indeed, was the character of Abu Bakr and Omar. Both were of a melancholy turn of mind, and, after the Prophet's death, tended and nursed Islam as before, with an unswerving love and loyalty. Of both might it be truly said that without them Islam would have perished with the Prophet. Not after worldly gain did they aspire. Religion was their absorbing passion, and the glory of Islam their one and only aim. Their life was exceedingly simple, and however much the anecdotes relating to them were coloured by imagination, they do prove beyond doubt that even in the first centuries of the Hijra their character was regarded in that light, and that the picture painted was not far removed from truth. There is no reason for assuming that their wealth and riches, if they had any, should remain unreported, while those of the other companions of the Prophet (mentioned above) should be made the subject of a detailed recital. We have, therefore, every reason to suppose that the account of the simple life of the first two Caliphs is historically sound and genuine.

Scarcely was Abu Bakr acknowledged Caliph in Medina when almost all the Arabian tribes rose, shaking off the yoke of Islam, to win back their earlier independence. Even in Medina an insurrection threatened to break out, but the activity of some of the noble Mekkans succeeded in checking the movement in its inception. Taif, the capital of the Hawazin tribes and the seat of the Takifites, remained loyal to the Caliph. But from all other parts of Arabia the missionaries or the tax-gatherers of the Prophet were expelled, and those adherents of the new religion who refused to renounce their faith fell victims to popular fury. Some tribes wavered and hesitated, and declared their readiness to keep to Islam, provided they had no poor-tax (Zakat) to pay. Medina itself was threatened by the Beduin hordes, at the head of which stood the powerful tribe of Ghatafan. In this highly perilous position Abu Bakr behaved in a manner which leaves us in no doubt of his character. He acted not as a circumspect statesman or a shrewd general would act; but his conduct was that of a devoted worshipper of the Prophet who, relying upon the supernatural power of Islam and the protection of God, despised all danger, and who, clinging with fanatical conviction to his principles, achieved extraordinary results.*

* Bukhari, 882.

Shortly before his death Mohamed had arranged for an expedition to the north. In spite of the threatened insurrections on all sides; in spite of the objections of the most influential Muslims, Abu Bakr insisted upon sending this expedition, for, said he, a command issued by the Prophet must be unconditionally carried out. Abu Bakr succeeded in winning some advantages over the undisciplined hordes. Reinforcements arrived both from Mekka and from the loyal Hejaz Beduins who stood too much under the influence of Mekka and Medina to carry on an independent political existence.* Even the troops sent to the north returned with large booty and without meeting any serious resistance.

From this moment the game was won; and, as great men are never wanting in great times, so Abu Bakr found a man whom he appointed as the leader of the troops against the insurgent tribes in the interior of Arabia; a man who, undoubtedly, must be reckoned as the greatest Arab general of all times. This was Khalid Ibn Walid. Before his conversion to Islam he was the leader of the Quraishite Cavalry and took part in all the wars against the Prophet. He accepted Islam and distinguished himself by his courage and military talents. He was at once brave and cruel, cautious and faithless, rapacious and voluptuous. He always remained a Muslim to outward seeming, but his deeds point to his fond devotion to the old inherited notions of Arab heathenism—to blood-revenge, to greed for booty, to the Arab method of warfare. Khalid conquered the apostate tribes; but Arabia, which had never up to now known anything except tribal feuds, he overwhelmed with a deluge of blood. Entire tribes were wiped out of existence; others were sold as slaves, or were robbed of their possessions. Flourishing provinces were laid waste. Never had Arabia seen such devastation. Islam was everywhere triumphant. To Medina the caravans wended their way loaded with booty of war, or with money paid in as taxes, or money paid in as tributes. Great enough were the direct successes of Islam, but greater still were the indirect ones. Apart from the extraordinary progress of the new religion which convinced the rude sons of the desert, more than anything else, of its truth, the religious war at home led to a complete transformation of the entire social conditions.

Great armies had never passed through the interior of Arabia, but

* These were the tribes of Muzainah, Ghifar, Juhainah, etc. Caussin de Perceval, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes*, III, 352.

often, under Khalid's banner, 10,000 Muslims fought. Of many of the Beduin tribes the only worldly possessions consisted of camels, horses, and sheep, and these fell as booty to the conquerors. Under these conditions the agricultural population suffered no less, and it can easily be shown that entire tribes were reduced to utter penury and privation. In the days of heathenism these would have repaired their fortune by predatory expeditions against the neighbouring tribes, but this was no longer possible, for Islam had spread the Peace of God among all its believers. To escape privation and misery no other alternative, then, was left to them than to emigrate to the north, where the rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian and Greek Empires offered an alluring prospect, or to enter the army of the Caliph and receive a regular pay from the State treasury.

The interior of Arabia, as the travels of Palgrave and Guarmani have shown, is anything but a desert. While the Nefud, like a broad stream of drift-sand, encircles Central Arabia, separating it from the Syrio-Mesopotamian desert; the desert of Dahana awaits the traveller towards the east in the direction of the Persian Gulf. But once these obstacles are overcome, there succeeds a fertile plateau in places thickly populated, which in antiquity was the seat of a far more numerous population than is the case at present. Here, in the heart of Arabia, there was always a thick population which, rolling over its frontier, poured into the neighbouring low-land like a devastating flood. Such a scene Europe witnessed last century in the conquering campaigns of the Wahabis; a thousand years ago a similar rôle was played by the Carmathians, and precisely the same thing happened in the beginning of Islam. Disturbed out of their wonted ways, and robbed of their belongings by the Islamic wars under Abu Bakr, the tribes of Central Arabia were set in motion. The rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian empire, lying this side of the Euphrates, attracted these hungry hordes separated from their home only by a desert. The one man who clearly read the signs of the times and who knew how to turn them to his own uses was the great Khalid —as eager, perhaps more than they, for booty. Thus was the first inroad of the Arab hordes effected in the country along the Euphrates, and it proved absolutely irresistible. A similar movement was launched from Arabia against Syria under the supervision of the Caliph Abu Bakr. Arabia, where Islam, establishing a religious brotherhood, had

put an end to strife and plunder, became too narrow for its population, and the Arabs therefore burst forth in all directions.

The expedition against Syria was organized at Medina. While the Yamamah tribes supplied the largest portion of the troops advancing towards the Euphrates, Yaman furnished the largest contingent for the Syrian army.* Not merely warriors composed the expedition. Entire tribes joined, with their women and children. It was, indeed, not a campaign but a *Völkerwanderung*.†

The two empires with which the Arabs came into collision had long passed their bloom. They no longer possessed sufficient power of resistance. Both had forfeited the love, loyalty and support of their subjects. Ecclesiastical disputes and controversies had shaken and enfeebled the Byzantine Empire. And court intrigues, disputed successions and insurrections, on the other hand, were painfully frequent in the Sassanide Empire. Thus the mighty flood that surged forth from Arabia could not be stemmed either by the Persian Chosroes or the Byzantine Caesar. Caravans laden with gold, silver, valuable utensils, troops of prisoners of war, droves of camels and horses, wended their way to Medina, either as the private property of the soldiers or as the fifth of the booty legally falling to the State. While, on the one hand, this encouraged increasing emigration to the North, and emigration meant reinforcement of the Arab army in Syria and Babylonia; on the other it enabled the State treasury in Medina to carry out the system of State annuity—foreshadowed by Mohamed—to the entire Muslim community. From the very beginning of his Caliphate Abu Bakr divided the State revenue among Muslims, following, doubtless, the example of the Prophet. Every Muslim received his share. True, in the beginning it was very small, for the progress of the Muslim arms was checked by troubles at home. In the first year to every Muslim fell 10; in the second 20 Dirhams. Men, women, children, even slaves, received a like share.‡ No difference was made between those who accepted Islam before or after the taking of Mekka. Omar, on the other hand, showed preference to those who accepted Islam prior to the

* Abu Ismail Azdi (ed. Nassau Lees), 112. The tribes of Rabiyah, Tamim and Asad proceeded to Iraq. To Syria chiefly the South Arabian tribes advanced.

† Abu ~~Ismail~~ Azdi, pp. 7, 20. The information of Azdi comes from the best source, as a comparison with Ibn Asakir clearly proves. The common source of both these authors is Saif Ibn Omar's work *Kitabul Futuh*.

‡ Ibn Saad in Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 409; see Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, Einleit., III, cxxi.

taking of Mekka. He placed them first. Then followed those who accepted Islam after the taking of Mekka. Then came the general Muslim population. The latter obtained an annuity varying from 3 to 400 Dirhams. Sucklings, at first, were not given an annuity until weaned, when they got 100 Dirhams each. Later Omar altered this arrangement, allowing to all children the same amount. According to another report he is said to have allowed to every child two *jaribs* (a certain measure of corn) of wheat, two *kists* of oil, one *kist* of vinegar, *per month*, in addition to the annual grant of 100 Dirhams.*

To introduce order and method in the distribution of the annuity Omar had a list of recipients prepared and kept in one of his offices (Diwan). For distinguished persons special arrangements were made. Thus the widows of the Prophet received an annuity of 12,000 Dirhams, and so did others who were closely associated with the Prophet. He divided the rest of the Muslims, as already mentioned, into three classes, which, according to Sprenger, were: †

(1) Veterans who had fought in the battle of Badr, annuity 5,000 Dirhams.

(2) Fugitives (Muhajir) and Ansar (helpers) who had accepted Islam before the battle of Badr but had not taken part in the battle, annuity 4,000. (Sons of fugitives and helpers received 2,000 Dirhams. The inhabitants of Mekka and some others received 800 each.)

(3) The rest of the Muslims received an annuity ranging from 600 to 400, or 300 to 200 Dirhams.‡

Omar wanted the entire Muslim population to receive the State annuity; but this, as Sprenger justly remarks, never really happened. The inhabitants of the two holy cities and the warriors absorbed the whole State revenue.

Next to the diffusion and propagation of Islam, which was the propelling force of the whole movement, was the idea of the Arab body-politic, as a vast Muslim brotherhood participating and sharing in the State revenue. It was conceived, so to speak, as a guild for organized robbery and plunder against people of other faiths; the consideration being the division of the proceeds among the members

* Siraj-ul-Muluk, fol. 132, 133. † Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, III, cxxii.

‡ Compare Caussin de Perceval, III, 504; Hammer, *Über die Ländverwaltung unter dem Chalifate* (1835), p. 137. Weil, *Gesch. d. Chal.*, I, 77, 78.

of the guild, and, indeed, something else besides, namely, the sure prospect of admission into paradise and enjoyment of eternal bliss. Some were induced by the former, some by the latter consideration: but, true enough, every one found what he wished for most. The balance of the first year shows the successful issue of these plunderings, and explains the rapid progress of Islam in such an incredibly short time. The Arab tribes soon discovered that it was far more profitable to present a united front against the common enemy, the foreigners, than to carry on an internecine feud in which they could not possibly hope to secure anything more valuable than camels, horses and sheep. They saw, on the other side of the desert, the rich and luxurious countries: Syria, Egypt and Babylon. They saw the treasures of the Byzantine Caesars and the Persian Chosroes lying temptingly before them.

Next to the system of annuity (Ata)—the development, if not the origin, of which is to be ascribed to Omar—he took an important step forward towards the establishment of a fixed system of administration, by introducing a methodical principle of taxation, and by assigning fixed salaries to government officers. Omar thus introduced the first element of order and method into the system of administration.* About this time arose the system of military stations, which gradually led to the formation of the standing army. The tribes which conquered Iraq and Syria formed military camps (*Amsar*) which in Syria were christened as *Jund* and in Iraq as *Askar*. Here lived the soldiers divided into regiments, or to be absolutely precise, into clans. They renounced their earlier occupation of agriculture and cattle-breeding, and exchanged it, only too willingly, for the military profession. They were religious soldiers. The State paid them a monthly salary, and the subject race supplied them with provisions. Thus arose

* Ibn Asakir in the *Tarikh Dimishq*, fol. 88, says: Omar, when he came to Syria, organised military stations and established permanent military cantonments. Cf. *Prolég.* of Ibn Khaldun, I, 273, where these Syrian cantonments are mentioned, namely, Damascus, Kinnisrin and Awasim. According to Abu Ismail-al-Azdi, p. 219, there were only four military stations in the beginning: Emessa, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin. Later a fifth one was added, namely Kinnisrin. The division of Syria into five military districts was probably in the mind of Ibn Wardy who in his book *Kharidat-ul-Ajaib*, drawn from older sources, says that Syria was divided into 5 districts: I, Ghaza, Ramla, Filistin, Ascalon, Jerusalem. II, Urdun, Tiberius, Ghur, Yarmuk, Baisan. III, Ghutah, Damascus along with the sea coast. IV, Emessa, Hamah, Kafrtab, Kinnesrin, Aleppo. V. Antioch, Awasim, Masysah, Tarsus; *Kharidat-ul-Ajaib* (Cairo ed.), p. 38.

in Iraq the military stations of Kufa and Basra, and in Syria those of Kinnisrin, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin.

The view has gained ground that even the first Caliphs granted lands to soldiers when they settled down, and established a sort of military colonies. This, undoubtedly, was so later. Under the first two Caliphs the very opposite was the case. Neither the soldier nor the private citizen was allowed to acquire land in conquered countries. Strange as this statement may seem, it comes from an incontestable source. But the question naturally suggests itself—what did the Muslims do with the immense territories which fell to them in the conquered countries? An enquiry into this subject—hitherto neglected—is all the more necessary for a complete understanding of the social conditions under the Caliphate. The lands in the conquered countries may be divided into two classes: (*a*) those whose inhabitants concluded a capitulation with Muslims and peacefully submitted to them; (*b*) those whose inhabitants were conquered by force of arms. As regards lands won by capitulation, these remained in the possession of the earlier proprietors who paid the capitation tax (Jaziya) and the land-tax (Khiraj). They had, moreover, to supply provisions free to Muslim soldiers; to maintain every Muslim for three days, and to provide a fixed quantity of linen for the use of the soldiery.* As against the fulfilment of these conditions, they remained in possession of their land. They were forbidden to alienate lands to Muslims. The land-tax, payable by them, was fixed once for all, no matter whether the actual produce of the land increased or decreased.

The second class of lands, namely, those that were conquered by force of arms, passed into the possession of the exchequer, and was administered for the common benefit of the Muslims. But political and economic conditions induced Omar not rigorously to enforce this rule in all cases. He therefore allowed the old proprietors to remain, wherever necessary, in possession of their lands. Thus did Omar deal with Sawad, which he declared to be crown-lands. That dealing was made into a precedent, often quoted by Arab jurists. Being crown-lands they could not be disposed of, for the simple reason that they were inalienable. In the conquered countries, therefore, there was not an inch of land, as a matter of fact, owned by Muslims. The whole belonged to all, but to no one in particular. They allowed the old

* Ibn Asakir, fol. 89.

inhabitants and the subject population peacefully to cultivate the land, but these had to pay heavy taxes, and were overburdened with payments in kind.

The State revenue went into the common chest of the Muslims—the Bait-ul-mal, the State treasury—and out of it was paid the State expenses, costs of the wars, pay of officers and annuity to Muslims. In contrast to the Muslims the native population were a sort of helots, whose chief function appears to have been to swell the treasury and maintain the Muslims. Their lands were expressly forbidden to be sold to the latter. In the event of any violation of this rule the land sold was returned to its owner, but the purchase-money was forfeited to the State. The reason for this rule, which both Abu Bakr and Omar so rigorously enforced, is obvious. The object was to hold together the Muslim troops, consisting as they did of different tribes, and to prevent them from drifting apart and degenerating into effeminate ways. Nothing could have more surely and swiftly contributed to these results than possession of landed properties. Hence the prohibition. Furthermore, this policy was best calculated to check the gradual emigration of Christian population. By declaring landed property inalienable the owners could not realize any money in case of sale, and had therefore no alternative left but to continue in possession of their lands.* This policy further saved agriculture from neglect and wreckage, and the need of agriculture was great for the maintenance of the troops. The original inhabitants devoted themselves to cultivation. Cases of extortion undoubtedly there were, for Omar issued a warning, and recommended kinder treatment of non-Muslims.†

The Muslim State of the first century was a purely military State, not unlike the old Sparta—only Islam recognised no aristocracy. The Muslims were a race of warriors to be maintained at the cost of the subject races.‡

* To this very policy Omar adhered in other conquered countries, especially in Egypt. When Amr built a house in Fustat, Omar administered a reprimand to him. Weil, *Gesch. d. Chalif.*, I, 117. Weil has not quite caught the point ; cf. Weil, I, 76, note. Omar did not allow Muslims to permanently settle in Egypt. Weil, I, 118. Ibn Asakir mentions a tradition which runs thus : Omar and the companions of the Prophet did not consider it permissible for a Muslim to purchase land from a Ra'ayyah, because it would interfere with his military duties.

† Tradition of Ibn Adi in Ibn Asakir, fol. 69. As regards the Ra'ayyah Omar wrote to the governors recommending remission of taxes to those who were unable to pay.

‡ Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, III, 164.

From what has been said, it is apparent that the dominating idea of Omar's government was the promotion of the military-religious development of Islam at the expense of the subject races. For this reason precisely he issued strict rules prohibiting Christians and people of other faith from having anything in common with the ruling race; for this reason precisely he decided to clear Arabia of the infidel, and gave Arabs the choice between Islam and expulsion from their native land. The prosperous and hard-working inhabitants of Najran who continued loyal to Christianity had, in consequence of this measure, to migrate to the country along the Euphrates.* He likewise expelled the Jews from Khaibar.† He governed the Muslim community with a firm and masterful hand. Under him was completed the conquest of Syria, Iraq and Persia up to the Oxus, and the frontiers of Hindustan were brought under Muslim sway. In the west Egypt rendered him homage, and his troops penetrated along the coast of North Africa as far as Tripoli. Everywhere he governed the subject races upon one and the same principle; everywhere he sought to keep the Arabs apart from the native population, and to maintain them as a military caste, and everywhere he forbade them from making a settlement or acquiring landed property. He kept his rapacious governors under strict control, and he himself, as the administrator of the common treasury of the Muslims, displayed spotless purity and irreproachable integrity. He confiscated half the wealth of Amr Ibn Asi, the conqueror of Egypt, and Khalid, the hero of Muta and the conqueror of Iraq and Syria, was similarly dealt with. He had to make over to the treasury a considerable portion of his wealth, acquired by plunder.‡

It is doubtful whether Omar could have long kept his system of government intact. Had all the Arabs been as unselfish as he, had all been fired by the same religious fervour as he, he might possibly have succeeded. But he did not reckon with one of the most powerful springs of human action—personal interest. True, the Arabs fought in honour of God and for Islam, but they had not thereby surrendered their greed for gold. They wanted wealth and riches. Omar's com-

* Sprenger, III, 504.

† Those that were expelled appear to have received compensation. According to Kodamah, cited in Sprenger, III, 277, they paid to the inhabitants of Fadak, who emigrated to Syria, half of the value of their immovable property.

‡ Weil, I, 127; Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Peoples*, pp. 57 *et sqq.*

munistic system of government, according to which all belonged to the State, did not quite suit them. Everyone sought to acquire and retain for himself. For this reason, indeed, as might have been anticipated, the exclusion of Muslims from landed properties in conquered countries could not long be maintained. It is equally clear that he failed to take into account another factor which thwarted his scheme. The people of other faiths in conquered countries were, as we have seen, reduced to the position of helots. They lived under fearful oppression. It might have been expected that this would lead, some time or other, to fierce collision and conflict. For the non-Muslims there were only two ways of escape from their rôle of slavery: conversion to Islam, or rebellion against Islamic rule. The road to conversion was made hard by the fact that the Christian who accepted Islam (receiving, indeed, equal civil rights with Muslims), had to give up his landed property, which immediateiy passed into the hands of his former co-religionists, who continued to pay the Khiraj (land-tax) on it as before. The numerous insurrections against the Muslim rule, even in the first years, prove that they looked upon armed rising against foreign rule as not altogether hopeless, and that so long as the memory of their former independence had not completely faded out of mind, the subject races found their lot intolerable. Oppressed nations often avenge themselves, when insurrections and rebellions fail, by attempts on the lives of those whom they look upon as their oppressors. To such an act of despair did Omar fall a victim. Feruz, a Persian, stabbed the Caliph when he, as was his practice, was about to lead the prayer at the mosque.

III.—The Anti-Islamic Reaction or the Civil War.

With the death of Omar ends the first and the most singular phase of the development of the Islamic State which we may describe as the Patriarchal phase. Two equally powerful motives, so long as they were operative, kept the balance even. One rested on the highest and noblest; the other on the lowest and vilest side of human nature. On the one hand were religious fervour and enthusiasm for the realisation of a great idea; namely, the union of the entire Arabs in complete equality before God, and the establishment of a religio-military community; and on the other, were the greed for plunder and lust of conquest, immeasurably heightened by unheard-of successes.

An Abdshamshite by family, Othman belonged to the old and proud aristocracy of Mekka. But, though powerful his connexion and noble his descent, he never gave any proof of courage or wisdom. In fact he was and remained to the last weak, vain, fond of money and splendour, and, what was worse still, entirely in the hands of his Mekkan kinsmen—the majority of whom were never really Muslims at heart, but were secret followers of the traditions and the ideals of the old Arab heathenism.* During his weak and inefficient administration the political institutions, laboriously built up by Omar, gradually fell to pieces. He could not restrain the rapacity of the governors, nor did he maintain intact that most important measure of the Caliph Omar, namely, the exclusion of Muslims from acquiring or owning landed property in conquered countries. In fact it soon became a dead letter. Muawiah, the governor of Syria and a cousin of Othman, to whom Omar refused such permission, coaxed the Caliph into granting his request. It happened thus. Muawiah wrote to Othman that his pay was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the numerous military officers and Greek envoys that were frequently at his court. He therefore begged the Caliph to grant ownerless lands (Almazari Assafiyah) to him to enable him to meet the calls upon his purse. In Syria there were many such lands; for the Greek patricians to whom they belonged had either been slain in battle or had abandoned them. These ownerless lands were considered as crown-lands (Safiyah) belonging to the entire Muslim community. They were leased out by the governor, and their rent was paid into the treasury.† For the grant of these lands Muawiah asked the Caliph and the Caliph consented.‡ And precisely in the same manner did Othman act in other provinces. Thus, in the Caliphate of Omar, Talha had purchased the estate of Nashtasag in Kufa. Omar had annulled the transaction, but Othman sanctioned it.§ Thus the Caliph lightly and carelessly dealt with lands

* Goldziher, *Muh. Studien*, Vol. I, Chap. I. Cf. the excellent character-sketch of Othman, Sprenger, I, 382.

† On the other meaning of the word *Kabalah*, cf. Kremer, *Aegypten*, Vol. I, 261, Hammer, *Über die Ländverwaltung unter dem Chalifate*, p. 193; and the excellent observations of Defrémery in the *Journal Asiatique* (1866), Oct.-Nov., 418-25. The French word *Gabelle* is derived from it.

‡ Ibn Asakir, fol. 97.

§ Murasid *sub voce*: Nashtasag on the authority of Waqidi. Talha, like Zubair, built a palace at Basra. From his landed property Talha drew a daily income of 1,000 Dillars. Masudi, IV, 253, 254.

which Muslims had been taught by Omar to regard as their common property. Othman, similarly, made a present of the estate of Fadak, State-property to Hakam Ibn Abi-l-Asi, a kinsman, who only under compulsion had accepted Islam and who, for betraying the Prophet, had been banished to Taif.* He likewise gave away the most important offices to his relatives, the Omayyads.† But what was especially offensive to Ali was the grant of enormous annuities to his kinsmen.‡

Thus all the favourites of the Caliph belonged to the Omayyad family. Between this family and the family to which the Prophet belonged, the Hashimite, there had been even in the days of Paganism, many disagreements and discords. When Mohamed began his mission, the hostility was deepened and intensified, and between them the most violent collisions took place. When, however, after the conquest of Mekka, the Omayyads accepted Islam their conversion was not genuine or sincere. They remained at heart true and loyal to the ideas of the old Arab heathenism. When, with the accession of Othman, they came to power and influence, they never made a secret of this fact. Walid Ibn Uqbah appeared drunk at the mosque. Another governor distinguished himself by wholesale extortion and embezzlement.§ Othman himself revived some of the heathen practices at the pilgrim ceremony at Mekka.|| But what seems to have aroused and embittered the genuine Muslims most against him was the unseemly levity with which he carried out the official redaction of the Qur'an, and the destruction of all copies differing from it.¶ Thus the Ansar, the old companions of Mohamed, who, in the lifetime of the Prophet, and still more so under Abu Bakr and Omar, had formed, so to speak, a hierarchichal aristocracy, found themselves suddenly supplanted by the Mekkan party who had joined Islam as a last resource, and, then only outwardly. Personal interest and religious zeal enkindled and fanned their wrath and bitterness more and more. The democrato-communistic principles which Omar had fashioned and championed were still full of life and

* Weil, I, 165, according to the *Kitabul Aghani*. † Weil, I, 156, 157, 172.

‡ Maqrizi, *Khittat*, II, 335. § Weil, I, 165, 171.

|| Weil, 167, Vol. I. Othman loved finery and even in the pilgrim's dress he could not do without it, though all finery was severely forbidden. We find in Muatta a reliable tradition which says: I saw Othman in Arg (a village three posts from Medina) on a hot summer day; he had his face covered in a purple *burnoose*.

¶ He entrusted the redaction of the Qur'an to Zaid Ibn Thabit and others devoted to him to the exclusion of the old companions of the Prophet such as Ibn Masud.

force, and the people therefore were not inclined to accept or to submit to the autocratic assertion of power with which Othman dealt with that which was regarded as Public Property. The gift to his cousin and to others set the people aflame.

Abu Darr Ghifari, one of the most pious Muslims of his time, urged upon the governor of Syria the view that the rich should be compelled to give a fraction of their wealth for the benefit of the poor. On this question a violent dispute arose between him and Muawiah, with the result that Muawiah sent him to the Caliph as a fomenter of discord and strife, and the Caliph banished him to the little village of Rabadah.*

Enthusiasts like Abu Darr were many in the days of early Islam. Thus the party of the discontented grew more and more. Ali, the most distinguished living member of the family, joined them, and with him went many of the war companions of the Prophet, such as Talha, Zubair, Ammar Ibn Yasir, and Abu Musa Ashari.†

Thus, while Islam was extending beyond the borders of Arabia, and was conquering fresh countries year by year, within its bosom sprang up the germs of eternal discord. Insurrection broke out almost simultaneously at the two opposite ends of the vast empire. In Kufa and Basra people rose against the governors appointed by Othman. In Egypt the same thing occurred. By timely concessions Othman quietened the rebels; but the discontent, tended and nursed by the distinguished companions of the Prophet, notably by Ali, Talha, Zubair (every one of whom was silently aiming at the Caliphate), increased in volume and intensity, and soon led to the catastrophe which resulted in the murder of the Caliph. From Egypt, where Ali had the largest following, came the chief impetus. Egypt formed the base of operation. From there the emissaries carried on their secret propaganda. In this Abdullah Ibn Saba, the Jew, distinguished himself most. He preached that every Prophet had a representative, and Ali was the legitimate representative of Mohamed, and that Othman had wrongly and unrighteously taken possession of the Caliphate.‡ Later, after the death

* Weil, I, 170. In the *Tazkirah* of Hamdun the following is related about Abu Darr: "When Muawiah built his green palace at Damascus he asked Abu Darr what he thought of it." He replied, "If thou hast built it with public money thou art a traitor, if with thy own thou art a squanderer. *Tazkirah*, I, fol. 21.

† For further information I must refer the reader to my translation of Weil's *Islamitische Völker* published by the Calcutta University under the title of *Islamic Peoples*.

‡ Maqrizi, *Khittat*, II, 334; Weil, I, 259, note (1).

of Ali, he went even still further, and making use of the Jewish idea of Messiah, asserted that Ali would some time in future return to the earth as Redeemer and fill it with justice. With this doctrine he, for the first time, introduced into Islam the idea of the Mahdi, the future Messiah.*

A distinguished Amir, placing himself at the head of the movement and driving away the governor of the Caliph, soon set insurrection on foot in Egypt. A body of 600 Egyptians, pure volunteers, started for Medina. On the way they were joined by the mutineers of Kufa and Basra. After a long negotiation with the Caliph (who was abandoned by his friends and shamefully betrayed by the Ansar and the hierarchichal coterie of Medina), the rebels stormed his house and killed the aged Caliph, who knew, if not how to live, at least, how to die with honour and dignity. With truth and justice the poet Hasan Ibn Thabit thus sang of Othman :—

The Ansar left him in the lurch when death appeared on the scene, though the Ansar had the power (to help him if they would). Who would acquit Talha and Zubair of complicity in this tragic affair? Mohamed, the son of Abu Bakr, appeared to be the ring-leader, and behind him stood Ammar Ibn Yasir.†

The old Arab clannish and tribal instinct completely swayed the government of Othman. As chief of the Omayyads he felt himself bound to lead his tribesmen to power and renown, and to make his family the ruling family in the land; and this, indeed, above everything else.

But this idea brought the Caliph not only into collision with the idea of equality and brotherhood of all Muslims, which developing under Omar's fostering care, had found wide acceptance among the masses of the Muslims, but also into collision with the Muhajirin and Ansar, who felt deeply and sorely aggrieved and injured by it. The Muhajirin and Ansar had fought the battles of Islam; they had shared the joys and sorrows of the Prophet—in fact, with their blood had Islam been securely and surely established. Now they had to retire into the background, and to see the Mekkans come to the fore-front—the very Mekkans who only under compulsion had acknowledged the Qur'an, and upon many of whom had rested the curses of the Prophet. Thus

* Shahrastani, I, 200; Ibn Qutaibah, 300.

† Masudi, IV. 284.

the hierarchichal clique of Medina came into fierce conflict with the aristocratic party of Mekka. This Medinite clique possessed immense wealth, and had the confidence of the masses, who were deeply imbued with religious ardour. At the head of this clique stood Ali. Hence the fall of Othman as soon as the latter withdrew his support from him.*

Thus was a long war begun between the ruling families, not only for religious leadership, but more so still for temporal power—for the Caliphate.

To judge accurately the reason for the stubbornness and tenacity with which this war was fought; for its long duration and the greatness of the sacrifice in men and money which it involved—we must try to form a correct idea of the great Arab families of the time.

IV.—The Family and Tribe in Arab Antiquity.

We notice in the first years of Islam a similar development of the tribal system as we find among the Romans, of whom we read that the Gens Claudia reckoned a thousand heads and the Gens Fabia supplied eight hundred fighting men. Oyainah Ibn Hisn, the chief of the Fazarah tribe, commanded over 10,000 lancers † and the chief of a Himyarite tribe, Dhul-Kala, who was one of the first to join the Syrian campaign, owned one thousand slaves.‡

The oldest forms of human association are the family and the tribe. In the earliest times every family existed for itself, and constituted a community closed to the outside world. But when the family grew, it was split up again into different branches. The older and the younger branches, owning one common tribal ancestor, felt bound by the common tie of descent. Such a union of several families made up a tribe which, as it grew, was again split up into various smaller units, sub-tribes or clans consisting of a larger or smaller number of individual families.§ The

* Cf. the interesting letters that passed between Ali and Muawiah in Kamil (Wright's ed.), pp. 184, 186. They are perhaps genuine.

† Muatta, IV. 89. ‡ Masudi, IV. 178.

§ A tribe was, says Robertson Smith, but a large family, the tribal name was the name or nickname of the common ancestor. In process of time it broke up into two or more tribes, each embracing the descendants of one of the great ancestor's sons and taking its name from him. These tribes were again divided and sub-divided on the same principle and so at length that extreme state of division was reached which we found in the peninsula at the time of the Prophet. Between a nation, a tribe, a sept or sub-tribe, and a family there is no difference, on this theory, except in size and distance from the common ancestor. As time rolls on the sons of a household become heads of separate

word "family" (*bait*, i.e. house, tent), in its widest sense, included a whole tribe; in its limited sense only the members of a family; that is to say, father, mother, sons, daughters, grandchildren and the nearest blood relations.

Every tribe, every sub-tribe, says Ibn Khaldun, formed a self-sufficient community, since all its members were the descendants of the same ancestor.* But, at the same time, within it were individual groups more closely bound to each other than the larger group constituting the tribe. The narrower group meant the actual family circle—closest blood relations. Bound by the tie of common descent, they could always count upon the help and protection of the tribe, but the help and protection received from the tribe was never so effective as the help and protection received from direct blood relations.†

But wherein resided the power, the strength? The wealth of the Arab chief lay in the number of sons, slaves, freedmen, droves of camels and horses; but the strength and power of the tribe depended upon the number of men capable of bearing arms. Polygamy, which prevailed among the Arabs, did not always quickly multiply a family and thereby bring it to or maintain it in importance. They had therefore to resort to an institution whose origin dates back to remote antiquity, and which aimed at rapidly swelling the tribe or the ruling family with free men capable of bearing arms. This was the institution of clientship.‡ We do not know how this institution came into existence in the Arab heathenism, but from the rules of Muslim law relating to the clients—rules, like so many others, resting on the customs current in Heathen days—we can form a fairly accurate idea of this institution, so exceedingly important for the social and political conditions of the East. There were different ways in which a slave could be manumitted.

families, the families grow into septs, and finally the septs become great tribes or even nations embracing several tribes; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage* (1907), p. 4.

* The real meaning of *áhl* is tent. It was applied to those who lived under one common tent. In Hebrew the word has preserved its original meaning which it has lost in Arabic. The abbreviation of *ahl* is *al* which also means a family.

† Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I. 276.

‡ See Coulanges, Ancient City (translated by W. Small), p. 151. "Clientship is an institution of the domestic law, and existed in families before there were cities." The permanent and hereditary dependents of a tribe other than slaves may be roughly classified as (*a*) freedmen, (*b*) refugees outlawed from their own tribe, (*c*) groups like the Jews at Medina who were not strong enough to stand by themselves. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 51.

By manumission he obtained freedom to this extent that he became master of his affairs and was allowed to acquire and bequeath property. Such a manumitted slave was called *atiq,* a freedman. Apparently the Arabs always deemed it a generous and meritorious act to grant freedom to slaves. But with freedom the bond between the manumitted slave and his master was not absolutely dissolved. The master—despite the manumission—continued to be his protector and defender; nay, indeed, his patron. As against protection and help, and especially the defence of his life and property, he was permanently bound to his *quondam* master and his family, and he was thenceforward known as the client of N.N or of the tribe of N.N. As such he participated in all the rights and duties of the tribe. If the client died without heirs his patron succeeded to his property. The status of a patron was a hereditary status. It descended to the children of the patron.* Patronage was an inalienable right. It could not be got rid of, either by gift or by sale.† Between the patron and the client there subsisted an indissoluble tie, which has been described with justice by Muslim jurists as a strong and powerful kinship.‡ Along with simple manumission there were other ways by which the slave became free. The most usual was self-redemption. The slave acquired his freedom by paying a fixed sum to his master within a fixed period.§ But as soon as he became free he entered into the relation of a client to his master. In the choice of his patron he had not the slightest freedom. He could become the client of no other than his old master. Another way in which a slave became free was, when he was promised freedom in the event of his master's death.|| Finally the heir often used to grant freedom to some of the slaves of the deceased for the salvation of his soul.¶

There was, however, one kind of manumission by which the client became absolutely free, with power of choosing his patron at will. It was when a slave was set free as *saibah*. This appears to have been a relic of heathenism, and early fell into disuse.**

The old Arab tribe, in its original composition, consisted of all the

* Muatta, III, 263, 273. † *Ibid.*, p 262. ‡ Ibn Adhari, I, 39, 40.

§ The jurists called this compact of self-redemption *mukatabah*.

|| *Tadbir*; such a slave was called *mudabbar*: Muatta, III, 277.

¶ *Ibid.*, III, 255.

** Malik says that he questioned Ibn Shihab as regards *saibah*. He replied: He as *saibah* may choose as his patron any one he pleases. But if he has no patron his inheritance,

families connected by common descent, the freedmen and the descendants of such freedmen, and finally the slaves. Besides these there were others—not connected by blood—who were admitted into the tribe. They were called *mulsaq* or *laziq* (adscripti), also *halif*. The rights of such strangers, received into the tribe, were perhaps not very different from those of the clients.

"The adoption of individual protégés to full tribesmanship must in later times have been very common, for *hilf* and *dai*, sworn ally and adopted son, are often taken as synonymous terms, (Nawawi; see also Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.*, I, 134-137). When a whole group was taken into dependent alliance the terms of alliance would naturally be governed by circumstances, and complete fusion would not be so easy, especially if there were religious differences, such as separated the worshippers of Al-Lat and Manat in Medina, the Aus Manat and the Taim al-Lat, from their Jewish *holafa*. Nevertheless the obligations that united protector and protected were not much less stringent, at least as regarded the duty of help against outsiders, than those which united full tribesmen. The Jews of Medina are said to be "between the backs" of the protecting clans, that is, could not be reached by a foe except over the bodies of their supporters. Protector and protected shared the risks and benefits of the blood-feud; the protector was bound to avenge his *halif's* blood, and he himself or any of his people was liable to be slain in the *halif's* quarrel, as the latter was in the quarrel of his protector (Ibn Hisham, p. 543). The only difference was that the blood-money for the death of a dependent was not so high as for a *sarih*. Further, in Medina, at least, the sworn ally had a claim on the inheritance of the protector. According to the commentators on Sura 4,37, a man's *holafa* took one-sixth of his estate. The covenant of alliance and protection was based upon an oath."*

Such was the line along which the Arab tribal system had developed for ages. History but partially lifts the veil. Its beginning goes back to remotest antiquity, indeed, to prehistoric times.

About the time when the Prophet was born this social system had

he belongs to the entire Muslim community (i.e. the state), and the community must pay the hush money for a murder committed by him. The learned commentator of Muatta adds that Malik disapproved of manumission known as *saib ah* because the word recalled a heathen practice and because that mode of manumission was no longer current. Muatta, III, 264.

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 54-56.

reached the highest stage of development of which it was capable, The tribe, which began in families, had grown into large communities. which, along with their entire suite of clients and slaves, numbered many thousands.

In consequence of the gradual increase of population, of lively commercial intercourse, of growing prosperity, the general * conditions of life had considerably changed, and the desire for association and co-operation began to grow, to deepen and to widen among the Arabs. Even before the Prophet instances are not wanting of tribes entering into offensive and defensive alliances. This desire, shall we say, this need for association, made Mekka the common sanctuary of the Beduin tribes of Hejaz. Similarly other tribes too had their sacred places. Thus several of the South Arabian tribes made a pilgrimage to their common sanctuary, Khalasah.†

From what we have said it is apparent that the old tribal system, in the then existing conditions of Arabian civilisation, was becoming more and more unsuited and out of place, and the need for a greater union made itself keenly and insistently felt. It is a phenomenon which frequently occurs in the life of nations, that, as soon as a nation is ready for a great social, political and religious revolution, men and means, necessary for carrying it through, never fail. Then the entire scaffolding upon which the old structure rested, gives way and a new one rises out of its ruins. A superficial view might suggest that national progress and development are by fits and starts; but it is an error, a grievous error. National development extends over a long period of time. It proceeds slowly and silently—one event connects with another; one chain links with another until the time is ripe and the moment opportune for revolution. It is prepared by years, even ages, of intellectual ferment. Then suddenly it bursts forth, not as the result of chance or accident, but of deep-laid causes and well-calculated reasons.

* Freytag: *Einleitung*, pp. 24, 25; Caussin de Perceval, I. 330; Sprenger, *Life of Mohamed*, p. 8. "Sharastani informs us that the Banu Katham and Daws formed, as late as 571 A.D., so powerful a state."

† Freytag: *Einleitung*, p. 365. "We should be under a great mistake, were we blindly to believe Mohammadan writers," says Sprenger, "who state that not only all the Arabs, but even the Persians performed pilgrimages to Mekka. Ibn Ishaq allows that there were several Taghuts (temples) in Arabia which were as sacred as the Ka'aba. Shahrastani informs us that the Banu Katham and Daws did not perform pilgrimages to the Ka'aba. They had a Taghut of their own": Sprenger, *Life of Mohamed*, p. 8.

Such was the position of the ancient world when the Sublime Teacher of Nazareth delivered His noble message unto mankind; a message which completely transformed the political and religious conditions of the world. Similar was the condition of Arabia when the Prophet Mohamed appeared on the scene. The dormant idea of the homogeneity of all tribes and of one supreme God—common to all mankind—found shape and expression in him; an idea which united the scattered Arabian tribes, ever at war with each other, into one vast and all-embracing brotherhood. In antiquity common worship always forged the strongest tie of love and mutual protection. Thus, in the sphere of religio-politics, Mohamed became the Cavour of Arabia. However momentary the success of the Prophet in reuniting the Arab tribes, through one common religion, into one compact whole, it was a great moral advance compared to the earlier Arab heathenism. It was, of course, too much to expect that the Prophet would, at one stroke, destroy the Arab tribal system root and branch. In fact he adopted most of the tribal institutions current among them; especially those relating to clientship and patronage. In fact, he most effectively encouraged the institution of clientship by declaring emancipation of slaves a pious and God-pleasing act; nay, even as expiation of many kinds of sin.*

The conquests of Abu Bakr and Omar brought in their train large crowds of captives to Arabia who were sold as slaves. The companions of the Prophet (of whom many, as already noticed, had amassed great wealth) and the rich Mekkans purchased thousands of such slaves. The majority of these, doubtless, were gradually emancipated and became clients. Thus the chiefs of the distinguished Mekkan and Medinate families were surrounded by a retinue of clients who numbered thousands.† But when the influence and importance of a family depends upon its numerical strength it is obvious that intelligent self-interest would at once lengthen out the chain and keep the feeling of kinship keenly alive. Of this the Arabic language offers the best and clearest proof, for it contains terms, to indicate different grades of kinship, which are not to be found in other languages; indeed, not even in

* Ibn Adhari, p. 17. Introduction.

† Musa Ibn Nusair, the conqueror of Africa, himself a freedman, mentions the number of his clients to be several thousands. Tarik Ibn Ziyad, the conqueror of Spain, was one of his clients. Ibn Adhari, II, 17, 18, 19.

other Semitic dialects. The Aryans, including Greeks and Romans, originally acknowledged only *agnatio*, relationship on the paternal side; not *cognatio*, that on the mother's side. The Arabs, on the contrary, held both of them in esteem and honour; but the former more than the latter.* Thus there are special terms in Arabic for uncles and aunts on the paternal and on the maternal side; for relations by marriage on the husband's and on the wife's side, for grandsons by sons, and those by daughters, and so on. Many later fell into disuse. They were not satisfied with kinship carried to its farthest point, but they even had recourse to fictitious ties. In this connexion the most remarkable is what the Arab jurists describe as *kinship by milk* or *milk-kinship*. It appears to have been a heathen custom which soon disappeared in Islam. To admit a stranger into the family circle they made him suck a few drops of milk at the breast of the lady of the house, or one of her sisters, or one of her nearest † female relatives, and with the milk thus drawn, the stranger became a member of the family‡. The result was so effective that a husband who had inadvertently drawn some drops of milk from the breast of his nursing wife, felt doubts about the validity of the marriage on the ground of near kinship and consulted Abu Musa Ashari, the governor of Kufa, on the subject. He told him that by reason of the kinship effected by *milk* it was not permissible for him to cohabit with his wife. Abdullah Ibn Masud took a contrary view. This incident related by Malik in his Muatta shows how widely-

* Freytag, *Einleitung*, 336, 337; Hamasah (Arab. Text), ed. Freytag, 359.

† Ibn Adhari, I, 21. We find among the Arabs a feeling about milk-kinship so well established that Mohamed's law of forbidden degrees gives it all the effects of blood-relationship as a bar to marriage, p. 176. The commingling of blood by which two men became brothers or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which a new tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of the tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship......... To us, who live under quite modern circumstances and have lost the tribal idea altogether, kinship is always a variable and measurable quantity. We have a strong sense of kindred duty towards parents or children, not quite so strong a one towards brothers, and a sense much less strong towards first cousins; while in the remoter degrees kinship has hardly any practical significance for us. Something of this sort, though not nearly so developed, is occasionally found in Arabia before Mohamed, when beyond question family feeling was getting the upper hand of tribal feeling (*The influence of the law of blood revenge in the disintegration of the Arab society*, pp. 62-63). See the observation of Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 63, 64, 65. Compare the observations of Ibn Khaldun quoted above.

‡ This practice still exists among the Barbers. Ibn Adhari, I, 21. It is not altogether unknown in India. I have personally witnessed one instance of this practice.

diffused and how powerfully effective was the idea of *kinship by milk* among the Arabs. Using this idea of kinship by milk Ayasha, the wife of the Prophet, admitted those into her presence whom she wanted to receive in her house. Thus she caused milk to be given to them by her sister, Umm Kulthum, or by the daughters of her brother, Abdur Rahman, and received them without the veil.*

Finally there was yet another way of establishing kinship; namely, by adoption†. It was common in the days of Arab heathenism, and Mohamed had confirmed it by adopting Zaid Ibn Harith. The adopted, by adoption, entered into all the rights and duties of a real son (Muatta, III, 91).

These observations suffice to show what a great Arab family of Mekka and Medina was like in the first years of Islam. It was a community by itself, an *imperium in imperio*, consisting of hundreds of near and distant relatives, of thousands of clients and slaves. All

* Muatta, III, 92; Bukhari, 70, where a marriage, at the command of the Prophet, was declared illegal by reason of milk relationship. Even for the different grades of milk-relationship they had different names. The Prophet himself decided that a marriage was dissolved on the ground of milk-relationship. Ayasha relates, "Aflah begged me to receive him. When I hesitated he sent word to me, How is it that you appear veiled in my presence, for, to be sure, am I not your uncle ?' When Ayasha took exception to this, he answered that the wife of his brother was Ayasha's nurse. Thereupon Ayasha questioned the Prophet and he said: "Aflah is right, receive him." Bukhari.

† Freedmen were often adopted by their patrons. The commonest case was no doubt that of which the poet Antara furnishes an illustration. Antara was the son of a black slave girl, and therefore, by the old law, was born a slave. But when he gave proof of prowess his father recognised him as his son and then he became a full tribesman. The right of adoption, however, was not limited to the legitimation of the offspring of a free tribesman by a slave girl. Mohamed, for example, adopted his freedman, Zaid, a lad of pure Arab blood who had become a slave through the fortune of war. Here, then, a man is incorporated by adoption into a group of alien blood; but we learn that to preserve the doctrine of tribal homogeneity it was feigned that the adopted son was veritably, and to all effects, of the blood of his new father. For when Mohamed married Zainab who had been Zaid's wife, it was objected, that by the Prophet's own law, laid down in the Quran, it was incest for a father to marry a woman who had been his son's wife, and a special revelation was required to explain that in Islam the Dāi or adopted son was no longer, as he had been in old Arabia, to be regarded as a son proper. As there was no difference between an adopted and real son before Islam, emancipated slaves appear in the genealogical lists without any note of explanation, just as if they had been pure Arabs. Dhakwan, for example, who is entered as son of Omayya, and whom the Omayyads themselves always called the son of Omayya, in spite of M.'s new law, was really, as the genealogist Daghfal reminded the Caliph Muawiya, the slave who used to lead Omayya by the hand in his blind old age. In like manner refugees were frequently admitted to the tribe of their protector by adoption. The relation of protector and protected was constituted by a solemn engagement and oath. Robertson Smith, pp. 52, 53.

these stood under the direct influence and command of the then head of the family, ready, at all times, to gather round him for purposes offensive and defensive.

V.—The Civil War.

Under Omar the very same spirit of complete equality and brotherhood prevailed among the faithful as it did under Abu Bakr, who would not deviate by a hair's breadth from the orders of the Prophet, and who, in spite of all the objections of the Ansar and Muhajirin, sent Osama Ibn Zaid, though a freedman, in command of a division of troops, because the Prophet had so arranged. Religious enthusiasm was still very active and keen, under Omar, and it succeeded, for a time, in checking tribal jealousies and family rivalries. But with Othman the Caliphate assumed a worldly tone and colour. The element of kingship supplanted the religious element in the Caliphate. Othman outrageously favoured his tribesmen, the Omayyads, and the Mekkan aristocracy connected by marriage with him, and thus he revived the old tribal spirit—by no means quite extinct among the Arabs. The distinguished men, specially Ali, Talha, Zubair, Amr Ibn Asi, Mohamed, son of Abu Bakr, who stood at the head of the great association of Arab families, fashioned in the old Arabian sense, would not tolerate the supremacy of the Omayyads, who still, in many of their ways, fondly clung to the ideas of the Arab heathenism. They silently encouraged the rebellion which ended in the murder of the Caliph. Ali had his supporters mostly in Egypt, Talha and Zubair in Kufa and Basra,* where, through relations and clients, they exercised great influence. In Syria, on the contrary, the Omayyads predominated. The Governor of the Province was Muawiah, an Omayyad, who was confirmed in his post by Othman, and was granted large landed properties. Omar was wont to banish to Syria all those with whom he was displeased. This information, proceeding as it does from a reliable source, leads us to the inference that Syria was the home of a large number of exiles who were not very well-disposed towards the Caliph †. Also some influential men, following the example of

* We know that Talha had a house in Basra. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, p. 439. Zubair had a house in Kufa, two in Basra, eleven in Medina, one in old Cairo. His property was worth more than 50 million Dirham. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, 475.

† Ibn Asakir, fol. 12. Tradition of Bhaghawi from Ali Ibn Al-jad, from Shubah, from Abi Sinam (i.e. Dirar Ibn Murrah), from Abdullah Ibn Ali Hudail.

Muawiah, and possibly encouraged and helped by him, had settled down there and had acquired landed property, in violation of the law laid down by Omar, that no Muslim was permitted to acquire landed property in conquered countries*. Nor must we forget that on the conquest of Syria the Arabs found there a large number of Arab tribes who were apparently Christians, but who readily accepted Islam, and who substantially contributed to the cause of Arab nationality and to the consolidation of the Muslim rule †.

Of this rich and fertile province the shrewd, ambitious, enterprising Muawiah was in possession. It stands to reason that he would use for his own benefit the events that were happening in Medina. There, at Medina, homage was done to Ali, undoubtedly the best and the rightful claimant to the Caliphate. But Talha and Zubair had only consented under threat and duress. They therefore left Medina at the earliest opportunity, hastened to Makka, and there declared the election of Ali invalid and illegal.

Without delay, Muawiah, in Syria, took up quite an independent attitude.‡ Directly after the murder of Othman, and even before the elevation of Ali to the Caliphate, many Omayyads left Medina. Some set out for Mekka and some for Syria to Muawiah who, on the death of Othman, stood at the head of the Association of the Omayyad families numbering many thousands, and at whose disposal lay the entire resources of a vast province.

Between these four men: Ali, Talha, Zubair and Muawiah, there now began the fight for the Caliphate. As the favourite and the son-in-law of the Prophet, Ali had the highest claim. Talha relied upon his position as one of the oldest and the most esteemed companions of the Prophet; upon his kinship with Abu Bakr who, like himself, belonged to the family of the Taimites §, upon his immense wealth, and upon the influence he wielded over his tribesmen ||. Zubair put forward his

* Amr Ibn Asi had a country estate at Sabo in Palestine. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, p. 72.

† The Arab tribes of Lakham, Judam, Kuda'ah, Tayy, etc., had emigrated to Syria before the Prophet and belonged to the sect of the *Hanifs*. Among them, in all probablity, the names Muslim and Islam were used before the Prophet. We find these appellations even before the Arab conquest among the Arab tribes settled down in Syria. Thus the Syrian Arabs are called in Abu Ismail Al Azdi: *Masalimat-al-Sham* (ed. Lees, Calcutta (1854), p. 25).

‡ Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, pp. 27 *et sq.*

§ Masudi, IV, 323.

|| Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 383 *et sq.*

relationship with the Prophet in support of his candidature. His mother Safiyyah was an aunt of the Prophet (daughter of Abdul Muttalib). He, himself, was the son-in-law of Abu Bakr, and was immensely wealthy *. Muawiah, too, rested his claim on his relationship with the Prophet. His sister, Umm Habibah, was married to the Prophet, and he himself was a kinsman of Othman †. He further relied upon his political power and upon his tribesmen, the Omayyads, incontestably the strongest in numerical strength among the great Arab families. And armed with all these, as he was, he awakened an idea, always most tremendously effective with the Arabs; namely, vengeance for Othman. He set the idea afloat. Round it rallied Talha and Zubair, and to them came Ayasha, the mother of the Faithful. Thus was quickly fulfilled the threat of the poet, Hasan Ibn Thabit, who, reproaching the Ansar for the betrayal of Othman, said :—

> They murdered Othman on whose brow shone the fear of God, who spent the night saying prayers and singing hymns. Soon wilt thou hear in thy own country the call: God is great! Vengeance for Othman.

The superior military talent and courage of Ali soon succeeded in vanquishing Talha and Zubair. In the "Battle of the Camel" where 20,000 fell, he rid himself of his rivals. Talha was mortally wounded; Zubair was assassinated; Ayasha besought and obtained pardon ‡. As against Muawiah he was not so successful. This was a far-sighted politician and a shrewd diplomat. Ali was merely a general and a brave soldier. The Civil War, in spite of the "Battle of the Camel", continued with unabated fury until Ali fell victim to the dagger of a fanatic §. The bitterness with which the Arab tribes fought surpassed all bounds. At Siffin 70,000 fell on the battle-field. Masudi relates the following characteristic story.

After the "Battle of the Camel" a man who was examining the corpses of the soldiers, fallen on the battle-field, found a severely wounded soldier reciting the following verses in low whispers :—

"Death has led us to the longed-for spring; well-sated with

* It is not quite clear whether he was related to Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet.

† Ibn Kutaibah, 175. Cf. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 134; II, 52; III, 78.

‡ Dozy (Eng. Tr.), p. 34., "Battle of the Camel" fought near Basra A.D. 656, so called from Ayasha's camel, which was a rallying-point.

§ Dozy, p. 39.

drink we return home. We have obeyed the Taimites because of the follies of our ancestors but what are the Banu Taim but slaves and servants ? " *.

He went near the wounded man and spoke to him. But the latter begged him to stoop down and to repeat the Muslim Article of Faith. Scarcely had he stooped when the dying man, with great effort, raised himself and bit off his ear, saying: If thy mother asks thee where hast thou left thy ear; say unto her, with Omair Ibn Ahlab of the tribe of Dabbah, the dupe of a woman (i.e. Ayasha) who coveted the Caliphate ''. Very soon, indeed, the war assumed the character of a war of extermination †.

The longer it lasted the more victims it claimed and the clearer it became to the tribes, ranged in hostile camps and under opposite banners, that there was no longer any religious question or any question of tribal supremacy involved, but merely inordinate ambition, absorbing passion for power, fond longing for sovereign authority—these were the motives of the contending claimants; these the real causes of the bloody war. Thus the verses are handed down in which after the Battle of Siffin, where she lost her son, a mother bewailed his death :—

> "O! My eyes shed streams of tears for the youths reckoned as the noblest of the Arabs. It would not matter a straw, if they did not lose their lives, what Amir eventually won the victory."

Such were the ideas which paved the way for the conspiracy that sought to destroy three lives at one and the same time. Three fanatics swore they would kill on the appointed day Ali at Kufa; Muawiah at Damascus; Amr Ibn Asi at Old Cairo. They proceeded with their design, but only Ali was mortally wounded and died. Thus Muawiah became the undisputed ruler of the Muslim world. Before we deal with the further consequences of this fateful event we must closely examine those movements which the Civil War called into existence and which have ever since powerfully affected and influenced Muslim thought.

* Masudi, IV, 333. The tribe, to which Abu Bakr and his daughter belonged, was called Taim. The latter was the prime-mover of the events which led to the murderous "Battle of the Camel."

† Masudi, IV, 340.

VI.—Rise of the Politico-Religious Parties.

It were completely to misunderstand human nature did we set down selfishness as the mainspring of action. It undoubtedly has a very important bearing and will always exercise a powerful influence on human conduct; but there are nobler sides of human nature, too, which, though rarely in evidence, yet, when they do come into play, achieve great and noble results. We have already seen that many of those who took active part in the foundation and building-up of the political fabric of Islam, were decidedly dominated by greed of gold, ambition, love of war, tribal spirit and family rivalry; and similarly our enquiry has shown that at least the first campaigns of the Muslims were prompted more by zeal for plunder than ardour for Islam. But it would be an absolute error to suppose that, later, other motives, equally powerful and of a wholly different character, were not effectively at work. Ibn Khaldun justly observes that in countries where wealth and prosperity prevail sense of piety and tendency to religious enthusiasm always and invariably weaken and vanish. Precisely for this reason we find in large towns religious feelings in a very attenuated form. Luxurious life, distractions, sumptuous fare, make men indifferent or insensible to the promptings of faith. Hence the general indifference. In country places, in the desert, on the other hand, the very opposite is the case. There, humanity, by simple fare, by laborious living, by hunger and privation, awake to religious feelings, and turn to a contemplative life.* A deep truth underlies these words of the great Arab thinker and statesman, and the history of Islam is an eloquent commentary upon them.

Early, indeed, a powerful religious feeling permeated and pervaded the masses, and the greater the outward successes of Islam the more this feeling gained in depth and intensity. It is true that religious ideas made slow progress among the Beduins; but no less true is it, that once these ideas arose, they powerfully laid hold of the

* Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 180. All that Ibn Khaldun has said about the influence of food and climate upon civilization has been worked out, from the modern point of view, by Buckle in his *History of Civilization.* What the Arab thinker has divined, the British publicist has proved. Between them, however, there is a gap of five hundred years. One wrote in the metropolis of the modern world on the Thames; the other in North Africa, in an old castle (Kalat Ibn Salamah) the ruins of which are still to be seen in the Province of Oran (Algeria) on the left bank of Mina.

Beduin mind. Superstitious—for superstition is dominant among the half-wild tribes, and renders them highly amenable to spiritual sensibilities—these tribes, once touched by spiritual emotion, became the most powerful instruments for the dissemination of religious ideas. The Patriarchal government of Omar; the continued and uninterrupted successes of the Arab arms; the conversion, in masses, of the subject races, especially in the Provinces of the Persian Empire, tended to the growth and extension of Islam, with the result that the new religion made in silence as great a conquest of the mind and heart as did the army of the Caliph win visible triumphs on the battle-field.

With this steady growth of Islam the degeneration of the ruling classes under Othman, and the bloody civil war consequent upon his death, did not in the least interfere. The spiritual seed germinated and grew silently, developing and extending its roots and branches on all sides. And yet the violent convulsions of the long-drawn civil war led to greater and greater embitterment of mind, and facilitated the gradual formation of parties.

On the plain of Siffin, on the western bank of the Euphrates, a succession of fierce fights ended in a three days' battle. A portion of the army of Ali rebelled and compelled him to accept the arbitration offered by Muawiah. The troops were weary of massacre, and were no longer inclined to fight for the ambition of their chiefs. About 12,000 men left Ali's camp, dissociated themselves from him, and retired to Harura, where they encamped.* They received the appellation of Khariji. They were composed of different elements.† Religious fanatics formed the nucleus. As Shahrastani excellently puts it, they were people of prayer and fast. The democracy set up by Omar, harmonising with the Arab temperament, found in these heroic champions. Thoroughly sick of the rivalry and jealousy of the aristocratic party of Mekka and the hierarchichal clique of Medina, they were anxious to go back to the ways of Omar. Their principles,

* On the Kharijites: see the admirable monograph of Brünnow, *Die Charidschiten*. Brill 1884; *Z.D.M.G.*, Vol. XIII, p. 605; Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, I, 220 *et seq.*; Goldziher, *M.S.*, I, 133; also Goldziher's *Mohammed and Islam*, Chapter V; Von Kremer, *Kulturgeschichte des Orients*, Chapter VI (my translation of this work published under the title of *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 258 *et seq.*).

† Weil, I, 332.

then, were decidedly democratic. They declared both Ali and Muawiah unjust autocrats. They held it a duty to renounce allegiance to a ruler who violated the laws of religion. They rejected the exclusive claim of the Quraishite relatives of the Prophet to the Caliphate as utterly unfounded and without substance, and put forward the view that the *Imam* (Head of the State) should be elected by the people, and the choice need not be restricted to an Arab. It might fall upon a non-Arab, even upon a slave. Some even questioned the necessity for a Head of the State at all, and maintained that an unjust or an irreligious ruler might be deposed or killed.* In a certain sense the Kharijites were the Puritans of Islam; fanatical in religion, democratic in politics. The majority of the Kharijites were Arab Nationalists. They belonged chiefly to Iraq, Bahrain and Central Arabia.

Another politico-religious party, in clear contrast to these, came into being about this time. It was the party of the supporters of Ali (Shi'at Ali). They stood unconditionally by him, looked upon him as the legitimate successor of the Prophet, clung to him with enthusiastic devotion, and declared themselves ready to lay down their lives for him. When, at the battle of Siffin, the award went against Ali, 60,000 men are said to have declared themselves ready to sacrifice their lives for him.† We have already spoken of the Jew, Abdullah Ibn Saba, who actively worked in Egypt on behalf of Ali, and who, even in his lifetime, gave currency to extravagant doctrines about him. For instance, he proclaimed him to be a Prophet; nay, an incarnation of Divinity.‡ At the beginning of the civil war he made his appearance in Iraq, where he worked in the interest of the Alides. But in his partisanship he went much further than Ali quite liked, and therefore Ali banished him to Medina. It is, however, beyond doubt, that even in the lifetime of Ali a party was formed in Iraq, consisting mostly of new converts, the old native population, who, in spite of Islam, which they professed, fastened upon Ali the ancient Asiatic ideas — their immemorial inheritance — ideas relating to hereditary succession and divine right of Princes.

* Sharastani, I, 129, 130, 138; Mawafiq, p. 297; Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 389; Abul Faraj, *Hist. Dynast.*, p. 170.

† Abul Faraj, p. 190.

‡ Weil, I, 209. See Prof. Friedlander's *Heterodoxies of the Shiites in the Presentation of Ibn Hazm*, p. 65.

This party consisted of his Arab troops, his clients, his tribesmen, a considerable number of pietists, and the ever-growing circle of the new converts.

Tragic as was the death of Ali — the persecution of his adherents which the Omayyads ruthlessly indulged in and the hideous catastrophe in Kerbala awoke a deep feeling of vengeance, and fostered the growth of the sect of the Shiites.

In the Eastern lands of the Caliphate, especially among the Persians, the tenets of this party found ready and wide acceptance and impressed upon Islam a peculiar stamp of its own. It soon developed a personal cult of Ali and his descendants. While the Shiite ideas, paving the way to Absolutism in religion and politics, rapidly spread in the West and attained a decisive preponderance; in the East, no less, the ideas of the Kharijites obtained an unmistakable ascendancy. Both these phenomena can be explained by the local conditions and the peculiar genius of the people concerned. The inhabitants of old Babylonia, an Aramaic race, in consequence of the nature of the country, which is a richly watered and fertile plain, have been from time immemorial engaged in agriculture, and have suffered the usual fate of agricultural nations; namely, a despotic government. They were accustomed to look upon their princes, not as human beings, but as divinities; and the idea, therefore, of electing or deposing them would appear profoundly sacrilegious to them. From the remotest antiquity * they have been accustomed to monarchical despotism, which degrades its subjects to a *will-less* instrument of the all-powerful ruler. The character of the people there was, and had ever been, slavishly servile. In fact servility was congenital with them; and it was the one quality which found favour in the eyes of their mighty rulers. Accordingly, the Shiite doctrine of fixed hereditary succession and the worship of the descendants of Ali, in the nature of things, appealed to such a degenerate race.

Quite different was the position of affairs in the West — by which we mean to convey what the Arabs understood by that term; namely, the entire North African coast-land lying beyond Egypt. With the exception of a few Greek and Roman Colonists † settled in towns and fortified places, and a small remnant of the Vandal invasion, the popu-

* Dozy, *Het Islamisme*, p. 144.

† It was specially reported of the inhabitants of Kastyliyyah and Bildeduljerid, as

lation consisted of tribesmen whom the Arabs call Berbers, and who had a strong affinity with the Arab tribes in their tribal constitution, in their mode of living, in their entire mentality.* These Berber tribes, whose† military skill and talents the Romans had learnt to know in their war with Jugurtha, had lived most simply, from time immemorial, under their native tribal chief. Cattle-breeding was their main occupation.

It can easily be imagined that among such people no despotic monarchy, in the old Asiatic sense, could find acceptance. A keen sense of freedom and independence has ever existed among tribes living in mountainous and inaccessible regions, or carrying on cattle-breeding and leading a wandering life. The agriculturist is rooted to the soil. The Beduin in his desert, the mountaineer in his fastnesses, laughs every pursuit to scorn. The Berbers do not seem to have possessed a national religion. Hence their readiness to accept foreign faiths. Thus we find Christianity in some, and Judaism in others, as the faith of the tribe.‡ Among such people Islam, which originally preached brotherhood and equality, and, in addition, assured a good deal of booty, was sure to find a quick response. § When the politico-religious party arose in Islam the doctrines of the Kharijites spread as rapidly among them as did the Shiite doctrines among the Persians.||

VII.—The Kharijites.

The twelve thousand men who rebelled at Siffin dissociated themselves from Ali and took up their position at Harura, in the neighbourhood of Kufa. Some months passed in futile negotiations, and finally Ali found himself constrained to take up arms against them. Adopting as their war-cry the words *La hukma illa li'llah* (Arbiter-

also of the town of Tuzar, that they were the descendants of the Roman Colonists. Cf. A. de Kremer, *Description de l'Afrique*, 42.

* Weil, I, 544; Dozy, *Musulmans d'Espagne*, I, 228.

† Sallust. Cf. the essay of Baron H. Aucapitaine (*Journal Asiatique* 1839,. XV, 273): Sur les tribus de la Haute Kabylie.

‡ Barth, *Reisen und Entdeckungen*, I, 53, 244.

§ The Berbers had a strong tendency to superstition. Even long after their conversion to Islam they worshipped the many Roman sepulchres in their country. They offered prayers and sacrifices there. Barth, I, 39; *Notices et extraits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, Vol. XII, 458.

|| Later at the end of the third century A.H. the Shiite doctrine obtained a footing in Africa. The result of this was the rise of the dynasty of the Ubaidites, who subdued and ruled Egypt for a long time.

ment belongs to none save God), they advanced towards Madain (Ctesiphon) with the intention of occupying it and establishing a "Council of Representatives" which should serve as "a model to the ungodly cities all around." Foiled in this endeavour by the foresight of the governor, they continued their march to Nahruwan,* near the Persian frontier. They also nominated a Caliph of their own — Abdullah b. Wahb, of the tribe of Rasib — on 22nd March, 658 A.D., and proceeded to slay as unbelievers Muslims who did not share their views or recognize their Caliph and refused to curse Othman and Ali.† When Ali's army advanced against them, most of the rebels dispersed, but a band of 15 to 18,000 unflinching fanatics held their ground. They were hewn down, if we credit the Arab version, with the exception of a very few. But such movements never perish in streams of blood. The Kharijites silently worked for their cause, and won so large a following that within a short time of Ali's death they could muster strong in the province of Khuzistan. Ahwaz, the capital of this province, is three days' march from the Tigris. Preaching sedition, they traversed the entire country between Khuzistan and Mosul. The Governor of the province needed one full year to effect even a temporary submission of the Kharijites.

After the town of Harura these earliest Kharjites were called Harurites. The little that we know of their views and beliefs leads us to conclude that they were fierce fanatics in whom the fear of Hell worked most effectively. They even thought that mere belief in Eternal Punishment would not save, and looked upon every Muslim who had committed a heinous sin as a heathen, and maintained that true faith rested not in lip service, but in the absolute avoidance of every sin. They stand, as Maqrizi excellently puts it, in complete contrast to the religious views of the Murjiya.‡ Both in Iraq and in the Persian

* Between Wasit and Bagdad. Both these towns, as is well known, were built later.

† Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, p. 222.

‡ Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Civilisation*, pp. 58 *et seq.*; Goldziher, *M.S.*, I, 91; Von Kremer, *Herrsch. Ideen*, p. 26. "The Murjiya (so called from the root *arja'a*, 'he postponed', because they postpone or defer judgment against sinful Muslims till the Day of Resurrection, and refuse to assert that any true believer, no matter what sins he may have committed, is certainly damned) were essentially that body of Muslims who, unlike the Shiites and Kharijites, acquiesced in the Omayyad rule. In doctrine they otherwise agreed in the main with the orthodox party, though, as Von Kremer thinks, they greatly softened and mitigated the terrible features, holding 'that no believing

provinces adjoining Iraq, these religious fanatics multiplied so rapidly that the Caliphs of Damascus had to send their most energetic general there to maintain mere order and peace. Basra was entirely under the influence of the Kharijites. In other towns, too, they were in large numbers; in fact, everywhere they had friends and supporters. The Iraqians were not favourably inclined towards the Omayyads, and were in sympathy partly with the Alides and partly with the rival Caliph, Abdullah Ibn Zubair. More than once, indeed, that one common purpose, namely, the overthrow of the Omayyad yoke, united the Kharijites and the Shiites, divided though they were in their belief by a sundering gulf. In Kufa the entire population was for the Alides, and held by the Shiite belief. In Basra, on the other hand, the Kharijites predominated. The inhabitants of both these towns, almost simultaneously, expelled the Omayyad Governors.* In Mukhtar the Shiites of Kufa found a competent leader. This unwearied agitator made common cause now with one and now with the other party, but always with an eye to business.

The Kharijites, on the other hand, developing along independent lines of their own, led by a chief elected by them, repeatedly lost and retook the town of Kufa from the troops of the rival Caliph at Mekka, Abdullah Ibn Zubair. When finally driven away, they withdrew under their chief, Nafi Ibn Azraq (called Azraqites after him), to the province of Khuzistan, which like Fars and Kirman they reduced to submission. Nafi fell in battle, but they elected another in his place. *Commander of the Faithful* was the title they gave to their elected chief. They possessed an army of 30,000 horsemen, and constantly put large hosts to flight. Their last chief, Katari, one of the most chivalrous figures, holds a distinguished position in the history of this

Muslim would remain eternally in hell,' and in general, setting faith above works. Their views were so evidently adapted to the environment of the Omayyad court, with which no sincere Shiite or Kharijite could have established any *modus vivendi*, though Christians and other non-Muslims stood in high favour there, and held important offices, that it is hard to regard them otherwise than as time-servers of the Vicar of Bray type. With the fall of the Omayyads their *raison d'être* ended, and they ceased to exist as an independent party, though from their ranks arose the celebrated Abu Hanifa, the founder of one of the four orthodox schools of the Sunnis which endure to the present day." (Browne, I, 280).

* Weil, I, 353. Weil does not distinguish between the Shiites and the Kharijites and hence his account in many places is not quite clear.

epoch.* Some fragments of his military poems have come down to us. The Kharijites rose in Bahrain as they had done in Khuzistan, and only after bitter fights were they vanquished.†

Not until Abdul Malik had conquered the rival Caliph of Mekka; subdued the whole of Iraq (71 A.H., i.e. 690 A.D.), brought the holy towns of Mekka and Medina under his control (73 A.H., i.e. 692 A.D.), was he able to use his whole strength against the Kharijites. In 75 A.H. (694 A.D.) Hajjaj was appointed Governor of Iraq. The rare energy and statesmanship of Hajjaj, reinforced by the tact and military talents of Muhallab, succeeded in uprooting the Kharijites. Katari, their last chief, was slain in battle. They proceeded with terrible severity against the Kharijites; thousands were sent to the gallows. Hajjaj is said to have condemned 120,000 of them to death. Such is the report of the Iraqians, who represent Hajjaj as a monster of iniquities. According to other reports he was as unselfish as he was an excellent administrator, and hence the esteem and honour in which the Syrians held him.‡ Against the Shiites he adopted no less severe and repressive measures than he did against the Kharijites; for both these sects, though differing widely in their aims and objects, were in complete accord in one thing, their hatred of the existing government. But, as is always the case with persecutions, fanaticism augments in proportion to the severity used.

A fresh revolt of the Kharijites was not long in coming. Saleh Ibn Misrah and Shabib Ibn Yazid headed the movement.§ They gathered around them a small but heroic band who knew how to die for their cause. Their views were in agreement with the general views of the Kharijites. They described both Ali and Othman as unjust Caliphs, and declared war against the tyranny of the Omayyads as a holy war in honour of God. They pointed to this life as fleeting and worthless, and relied upon the reward in heaven as sure and eternal. A deeper sense of justice, a humaner spirit, a more chivalrous tone and temper characterised this movement. A series of fights against con-

* Hamasah, pp. 4, 44, 60, 331; Von Kremer, *Kultur geschichte*, II, 360-2; Brünnow, 26; Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, I, 221.

† Weil, I, 413; Ibn Khallikan, *Vita*, No. 555. Abu Fudaik was the leader of the Kharijites of Bahrain.

‡ Zamakhshari's Rabi-ul-Abrar in Ibn Kasim, p. 33; Weil, I, 551; Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 312; Ibn Asakir, fol. 15; Khuda Bukhsh, *Orient under the Caliphs*, 201-204.

§ Weil, I, 434.

siderably superior numbers of the troops of the Caliphs took place. Saleh fell in one of these many conflicts, and Shabib succeeded him as the Commander of the Faithful. Round him tradition has woven a chaplet of romance. With his brave band he was everywhere and nowhere. Now he made his appearance in the neighbourhood of Madain; now in Adherbaijan; now in the territory of Mosul. In all his campaigns his mother and his beautiful wife, Ghazalah, accompanied him. To please Ghazalah he once made a daring attack upon Kufa (though Hajjaj with his troops was in occupation of the Government Palace) and actually took it, and this because Ghazalah had made a vow to perform a short prayer and to recite the two largest chapters of the Qur'an in the mosque of Kufa.* He even managed to attack Kufa a second time, but fortune had deserted him. Larger and larger numbers of troops were sent against him. His mother and his wife fell in battle.† The Omayyad general overtook him at Ahwaz. Shabib, to whom a small number of troops remained loyal, retreated. While riding over a bridge on the little Tigris (Dujail) his horse took fright, and fell with him into the water.‡ The heavy steel coat-of-mail dragged him down in the river, but before he was drowned he is said to have called out to his loyal companions: "God, the all-Powerful, fulfils our destiny." (Weil, I, 434, note 5).

A series of such insurrections, now of the Shiites and now of the Kharijites, followed at varying intervals. The Omayyads, in the meantime, were fast on the decline. Risings, on all sides, followed one another in swift succession, and family dissensions grew more and more bitter and paralysing. Scarcely had Merwan, the last of the Omayyads, seized the reins of government, when a Shiite insurrection broke out in Kufa. Simultaneously a far greater danger threatened from the north. Dahhaq Ibn Qais Shaibani, a Kharijite chief, collected an army of 3000 men in Mesopotamia; destroyed at one stroke the Shiite troops in Kufa, took possession of the town, and soon became

* Ibn Khallikan (Eng. Tr.), I, 616.

† We read with reference to Ghazalah that the sect of Shabibiyyah (the supporters of Shabib) declared the *Imamat* of a woman permissible.

‡ The Dujail (little Tigris) is a large river in the province of Al-Ahwaz, having a number of towns and villages on its banks. It takes its rise near Isphahan, and its bed was dug by Ardashir Ibn Babak. It must not be confounded with the Dujail of Baghdad, which branches off the Tigris opposite to Al-Kadisiya, on the west side of the river, between Tikrit and Baghdad, and waters an extensive country; Ibn Khall, I, 619.

master of the whole of Iraq.* With an army of 12,000 men he advanced towards the Euphrates near Rakkah, with the obvious intention of attacking Syria. The Caliph personally took the field against him, and Dahhaq fell in the battle and his troops suffered a complete defeat (128 A.H., i.e. 745-6 A.D.).† Though order was restored here, the Kharijites secured entire possession of Adherbaijan, from which they drove out the imperial troops. A Kharijite flying-corps even managed to obtain temporary possession of Medina.‡

In Persia the Alides took up a strong position, and visibly grew in power and influence. While the rise of hostile parties, all over, threatened to wreck the Empire; a movement, which had for long been maturing, suddenly burst into light. The Alides and the Abbasids, for some time, had been conspiring against the Omayyads, each hoping to set up his own nominee to the Caliphate. A coalition seems at last to have been effected between the two main branches of the great Quraishite family; namely, the Alides and the Abbasids. They combined against their common enemy, and overthrew Merwan II, the last of the Omayyads, a prince, surely, worthy of a better fate.

Here we shall pause to cast a glance at the extension of the Kharijite ideas in Africa, and to estimate its influence on the political history of that country. Hunted down in the East, dispersed and scattered, many of the Kharijites found asylum in Africa. There they found shelter and protection among the different Berber tribes, and there they propagated their doctrines with unexampled success. The majority of the Kharijites who emigrated to Africa belonged to the two sects of the Sufrites and the Ibadites. On this subject our information is meagre and insufficient. It seems that their doctrines were not so rigid and unbending as those of the Harurites, but their political principles were distinctly democratic. These two sects secured a large following among the Berbers.§

* Weil, I, 689 *et seq.* † Muir, Caliphate, pp. 147 *et seq.* ‡ Weil, I, 693.

§ Ibn Adhari, I, 39, 40, 41. "The Berbers' faith was the stern and passionate religion preached to them by the Kharijites. Nowhere had these zealous and convinced teachers found their tenets so fervently embraced; the Calvinists of Islam had at last found their Scotland. The Arabs had rejected their doctrines, not through any repugnance to their political principles—which, on the contrary, accorded well with the republican instincts of the race—but because they would neither take their religion seriously, nor accept the intolerant Puritanism by which these sectaries were distinguished. On the other hand the inmates of squalid African huts accepted their teachings with indescribable enthusiasm. . . . It would be unprofitable to enquire what particular sect they gave a preference to—whether they were Harurites, or Sofrites, or Ibadites—for the

By reason of the oppression of the Arab governors who mercilessly sucked the land and drained the resources of the country to enrich themselves and the Court of Damascus—the Berber population was driven to rebellion, which broke out almost simultaneously with the most violent political upheaval in Iraq (122 A.H., i.e. 740 A.D.). A great number of the Berber tribes rejected Islam, expelled their Muslim chiefs, and elected in their places chiefs of their own tribe. The insurrection became so extensive that it seemed that it would end in the complete extirpation of the Arab invaders.* A Berber called Maisarah placed himself at the head of the rebels. His countrymen chose him as their Caliph and the Kharijites (the Sufrites) appointed him their chief. But soon his troops put him to death, and elected in his place Khalid Ibn Hamid, of the great Berber tribe of Zanatah, who had inflicted several crushing defeats on the Arabs.† In the battle of Wadi Sabu (where along with 20,000 Arabs there were 10,000 members of the Omayyad family) the Arab army was completely put to flight. The town of Kairwan was attacked by the Kharijites and thirty thousand Berbers, but the inhabitants repulsed the attack. After this unsuccessful attack one of the generals, Tarif, settled down among the Berbers in Tamesna, and founded the dynasty of the Barghawatah.‡ After a great deal of bloodshed the government succeeded in suppressing the Berber revolt (155 A.H., i.e. 772 A.D.). But insurrections, great and small, uninterruptedly continued, proving how deeply the people resented the foreign yoke. The doctrines of the Kharijites had taken deep root in different tribes. Such was the case with the powerful Zanatah tribe and the Hawwarah tribe. A colony of the Kharijites (Ibadiyyah) founded the town of Taihort, and the fight between the native tribes and the Arab settlers never really ceased at any time. The governors of the Caliph had a difficult position to keep, but that did not prevent them from striving after greater and greater independence from the Central Government at Baghdad. They gradually secured allies among the Berber tribes, and, by identifying

chroniclers are not agreed upon this matter. At any rate they understood enough of the Kharijites' doctrines to assimilate their revolutionary and democratic principles, to share the fanciful hopes of universal levelling which their teachers aroused, and to be convinced that their oppressors were reprobates whose destiny was hell-fire." Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, pp. 130-131.

* Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, I, 241.

† Ibn Adhari (Dozy's edition), I, 40 *et seq.* ‡ Ibn Adhari, I, 44.

themselves with their interests, they strengthened their position and consolidated their power.

It is not difficult to see that these repeated wars of the Berbers against the Arabs were really nothing more nor less than the assertion and manifestation of the Spirit of Nationality against a foreign rule. The Kharijite ideas found so swift a response among them sheerly because its democratic spirit completely harmonised with their own sense of liberty and freedom. These wars, therefore, like most of the insurrections in Iraq, were far more political than religious in their spirit and significance.

VIII.—The Shiites.

The change of dynasty which had taken place in the East and which had transferred the Caliphate from the family of the Omayyads to that of the Abbasids was a change completely disappointing to those who had done most for it; namely, to the Alides and the Shiites. By the overthrow of the Omayyads they had cherished the hope of setting up a descendant of Ali on the throne — instead of that the descendants of Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet, obtained possession of the Caliphate. Against the new dynasty, therefore, rebellious movements were not wanting and the first Abbasids treated the Alides with as great harshness and severity as they did the Omayyads. The Shiites, as might be expected, with a small exception, who went over unconditionally to the Abbasids, clung to the Alides and shared their fate.

Fortune smiled upon them but for a while. In the fratricidal war between the two sons of Harun, Mamun relied on the Persians, who were steeped through and through in Shiite ideas; while his brother relied on the Arabs. Mamun won, and with him began not only a period of great religious toleration, but also open patronage of the Shiites. Under the influence of his Alide counsellors, especially his Wazir Fadhl Ibn Sahl, he went the length of marrying one of his daughters to a great-grandson of Ali, and even declared him as his successor. He ordered coins to be struck in his name, and changed the black flag of the Abbasids for the green of the Alides.* Against this act of the Caliph a popular anti-Shiite reaction set in. Iraq and other Provinces were not only not inclined to tolerate the tutelage of the Persian courtiers of the Caliph, but felt apprehensive of falling under the sway of the Shiite

* Weil, II, 217.

religious ideas through the influence of the Alide Crown Prince—a prospect not very cheering to the Arabs. The Shiites had made themselves thoroughly disliked by their repeated fanatical excesses, and by their wild intolerance towards the rest of the Muslims.* Mamun was forced to change his policy. He had his wazir murdered in the bath, and his son-in-law poisoned (203 A.H., 818—19 A.D.). The religious faith of the Shiites had developed early, and in quite an original way. The idolatrous worship of Ali and his descendants lies at the root of the entire system.† Even in the first century they made pilgrimage to the grave of Husain, where they sobbed and sighed and wept. Later this developed into an annual function (celebrated on the 10th of Mohurrum), which has been most effective in keeping alive the Shiite fanaticism.

In the year 62 A.H. (681-2 A.D.) a Shiite army was passing by the sepulchre of Husain in Kerbala.‡ As soon as it came within sight of the sepulchre the men dismounted, tore off their dresses, flung dust on their heads and raised a woeful cry. Stridently vocal was their commander in prayer: "Peace be on thee, son of the daughter of our Prophet! Martyr, son of a martyr! Truth-lover, son of a truth-lover!

* "It is an erroneous view," says Goldziher in his *Mohammed and Islam* (pp. 255-256), "which traces the origin and development of Shi'ism to the modifications of the ideas in Islam, brought about by the conquest and spread among Iranic nations." This wide-spread view is based on an historical misunderstanding, which Wellhausen has overthrown conclusively in his essay on the *Religiös-politischen Oppositions-parteien im alten Islam.* The Aliite movement started on genuine Arab soil. It was not till the uprising of Mukhtar that it spread among the non-Semitic element of Islam. The origins of the Imam theory, involving the theocratic opposition against the worldly conception of the State; the doctrine of the Messiah into which the Imam theory merges; and the belief in the Parousia in which it finds an expression, can be traced back to Judaeo-Christian influences. Even the exaggerated deification of Ali was first proclaimed by Abdullah Ibn Saba before there could possibly have been a question of the influence of such ideas from Aryan circles, and Arabs joined this movement in great numbers. Even the most marked consequences of the anthropomorphic doctrine of incarnation (see Goldziher, p. 233) owe their origin in part to those who are of indisputable Arabic descent. Shiism as a sectarian doctrine was seized upon as eagerly by orthodox and theocratically-minded Arabs as by Iranians. To be sure, the Shiite form of opposition was decidedly welcome to the latter, and they readily identified themselves with this form of Muslim thought, on whose further development their old inherited ideas of a divine kingship exercised a direct influence. But the primary origins of these ideas within Islam do not depend on such influence; Shiism is, in its roots, as genuinely Arabic as Islam itself.

† Shiism was a fertile soil for fostering absurdities calculated to bring about the total disentegration of the God-idea in Islam. See Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, p. 234. Also pp. 232-233.

‡ Weil, I, 359, according to Tabari. See Wüstenfeld, Der Tod des Husein und die Rache.

Imam, son of an Imam! How unjust and violent was thy death! what noble bodies were trodden under the horses' hoofs! what a head pierced by an enemy lance! we have blackened our faces, and with blackened faces we appear before thee to seek thy forgiveness! we are sinners. Thy blood is on our neck. We have vowed to avenge thee with our very lives, so that the Almighty may forgive us and the Prophet may not withdraw his intercession from us!" Animated by such ideas the Shiites still visit the sepulchre of Husain, and, in the very same spirit as their forefathers, celebrate the anniversary of his death.*

At first the oldest Shiites regarded Husain and Hasan as Imams. After their death opinion was divided. Some maintained that the Imamat continued in their descendants (the holders of this view are the Imamiyya and the Zaidiyya); others held that the Imamat after the death of Husain was transferred to Ali's son, Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya, whom, henceforward, they considered their rightful Imam Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya died in A.H. 81 (A.D. 700) at Taif at the age of 65.† After his death extravagant stories about him were put in circulation by a freedman of Ali, called Kaisan. Some fanatics asserted that Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya was not dead but had disappeared, and that he was actually living in concealment; that he would return at a stated time, and fill the Earth with justice and righteousness.‡

* Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, pp. 253 and 254.

† Ibn Kutaiba, p. 111.

‡ Shahrastani, I, 168. The well-known poet Saiid Himyari believed in this. He died in A.H. 171 or 179 A.H. (A.D. 795). Hammer-Purgstall, *Lit. Gesch. d. Araber*, III, 548; Kharidat-ul-Ajaib, p. 153. "Even in the earliest days of the development of the Imam theory there was no agreement among the Shiite community as to the personalities of the Imam. One of the earliest manifestations of the Shiite idea, as we have seen (p. 224), appeared in connexion with an Imam who did not trace his descent from the Fatimide line of Ali. And even within the Fatimide descendants various groups of Ali adherents have set up quite distinct lines of Imams—a divergence due to the numerous ramifications of the Ali family. After the death of the Imam Abu Muhammed Al-Askari, the Shiites were already split up into about fourteen divisions, each claiming the privilege of direct descent from Ali. The series of Imams most widely recognised at the present time among the Shiites is that set up by the sect of the so-called 'Twelvers' (or Imamites). According to them Ali's rank as Imam was directly inherited by 'visible' Imams, up to the eleventh, whose son Muhammed Abul Kasim (born in Baghdad, 872) was removed from the Earth when scarcely eight years old, and since then lives hidden from the sight of men, in order to appear at the end of time as the Imam Mahdi, the Saviour, to free the world from injustice, and to set up the kingdom of Peace and Justice. This is the so-called 'hidden Imam' who has lived on ever since his disappearance, and whose re-appearance is daily awaited by the faithful

The idea of a "hidden Imam" who, at a certain point of time, would come out of his concealment to rule the world and to usher in a golden age, made its appearance very early, and has played an important rôle in later Islam. In fact it is not without influence even now (Ibn Athir, VIII, 21 *et seq.*). We might divide the Shiites into two main classes: those who acknowledge the transmission of the Imamat to the descendents of Ali's wife, Fatima, only (Imamiyya, Isna-Ashaziyya, Zaidiyya), the severe, uncompromising legitimists; and those who make the Imamat hereditary in the line of Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya (Kaisaniyya, Hashimiyya, etc.). A portion of the latter went over to the Abbasids and acknowledged the Imamat of the first Abbasid and his successors. By this, of course, they ceased to be Shiites.* Apart from the cleavage due to the question of succession, there is a yet wider fissure, traversing the whole of their religious system, according as the latter deviated more or less in the matter of dogmatic questions from general orthodox Islam. We must, therefore, follow the Arab authorities, and divide them into moderate and ultra-Shiites.

The (oft-mentioned) South Arabian Jew, Abdullah Ibn Saba, championed the view that the spirit of God had descended on Ali, and that he would, at some future time, return and fill the Earth with righteousness.† This idea steadily gained ground among the ultra-Shiites, especially among the Persians, who incorporated into Islam the old Indian idea of the divine incarnation in man. They looked upon the Imam as one directly appointed by God. He was sinless and infallible; a continuing manifestation of Godhead in human form, whose soul, when dead, passed into the body of his successor.‡

Shiite. This belief in a hidden Imam is to be found in all branches of Shiism. Each one of the parties believe in the continued existence and ultimate appearance of that Imam who in the special order of Imams is regarded as the last. . . . The 'Return' is, therefore, one of the decisive factors in the Imam theory of all sub-divisions of the Shiites; they differ only in regard to the person and order of the hidden and returning Imam. . . . The next person to be regarded as a vanishing Imam who would some day return, was Ali's son, Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya, whose adherents were convinced of his continued existence and his re-appearance. The idea of the 'Return' is not of itself an original doctrine. Probably this belief came over to Islam through Judaeo-Christian influences". Goldziher, pp. 240-242.

* Shahrastani, I, 169, 170.

† The sect of Ibbaiyyah regarded Ali as God. Others associated Mohamed with him in his divinity, and some thought that God was a mystical five, consisting of Mohamed, Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husain. Shahrastani, I, 202; Mawakif, 346.

‡ Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 404; Shahrastani, I, 170.

He was the very embodiment of religion and morality; and, therefore, to him was due blind, unquestioning obedience. They went, in the end, even to the extent of regarding the Imam as God in human shape.* The Alides, exposed as they were to constant persecutions, set up the doctrine of the hidden Imam, and this for the obvious reason that it was not safe for the Imam publicly to appear and declare himself as such.† Mohammed Ibn-Al-Hanafiyya was worshipped as such by a sect. The Isna-Ashariyya held a similar belief. They maintained that their last Imam, Hasan Askari, whom they also call Mahdi, had disappeared in a subterranean passage, and would return at the end of time, as Messiah, to rule the world. This doctrine of the "hidden Imam" led to further deviations. The idea that God manifested himself in the family of Ali was extended, enlarged, amplified. It came to be believed that other men, too, might be ordained by God as Imams, and thus become his Representative on Earth, exercising supreme authority in matters spiritual and temporal. In the first century such ideas got abroad and laid hold of the popular mind—calling forth a great many popular risings. A long series of fanatics and impostors put themselves forward as the expected Imam (the Mahdi), and the instance of the Bab clearly points to the conclusion that this tendency has not yet wholly died out from the East.‡

Under the strong and stern government of the first Abbasids these politico-religious parties, in spite of repeated insurrections and fierce fights, could not make much headway. The hand of an all-powerful government kept them under control, and even if, perchance, an individual ruler felt favourably inclined towards the Shiites, he could not, with any safety to himself, abandon the path of orthodoxy—

* The Sect of Bazighiyya looked upon Jafar Ibn Mohamad, an Alide, as an incarnation of God. Khittat, II, 352. Others worshipped Jafar Sadiq as God. At Kunash in Kufa they erected a hut, where they met and worshipped.

† Sunni Islam, says Goldziher, emphatically rejects the Shiite form of this belief. It ridicules the long-lived hidden Imam, p. 246. Even during his bodily absence the hidden Imam is the genuine "leader of the time" and not without the power to manifest his will to believers, p. 247. Goldziher, on p. 247, cites a remarkable proof of the active force of this belief in modern Persia. "The doctrine of the Imam, accordingly, maintains its active force. It has attained a dogmatic significance of fundamental importance, and is an active, essential element of the religious and political system."

‡ Even under the Omayyads one Bonan Ibn Sinan gave himself out as an incarnation of God. Shahrastani, I, 172. He was killed. Mukanna played a similar rôle, and so did Abu Mansur Ijli and Abul Khattab. Hallaj and Shalmaghani died for this idea, and many other enthusiasts sacrificed their lives for it.

for the great mass of Muslim population in Syria, Egypt and Arabia were decidedly orthodox. In Iraq itself, where formerly the Kharijite and the Shiite ideas flourished, a change manifested itself when, after the fall of the Omayyads, the Abbasid Caliphs went into residence at Baghdad. The orthodox party, henceforward, gained and managed to retain the upper hand here, and the masses, especially in the Capital, were distinctly and positively hostile to the Shiites, as the frequently recurring street riots only too clearly prove. Later, these riots between the Orthodox and the Shiites became an annual institution, so to speak, both at Baghdad and in other large towns. Circumstanced as they were, the Shiites resorted to a method which oppressed political parties have adopted at all times and in all ages. They worked in the dark, formed secret societies, sent emissaries to outlying provinces. From the centre of the Caliphate they transferred their activity to its periphery. Thus they succeeded in founding small independent principalities and dynasties. Thus arose, in the extreme west of Africa (in the modern Morocco), the dynasty of the Idrisides. Under the Caliph Hadi (169–70 A.H., 785–86 A.D.) an insurrection of the Alides took place in Mekka and Medina which was quelled with streams of blood. One of the Alides, a great-grandson of Ali, called Idris, saved himself by flight. He settled down in the west in the neighbourhood of Walyly,* where he was welcomed by the Berbers, and where he laid the foundation of the Idriside dynasty.† He was poisoned at the instance of the Caliph Harun, but his dynasty continued through his son (187–312 A.H.; 808–924 A.D.)‡

A Shiite emissary, himself a descendant of Ali, succeeded in Tabaristan, in the north of Persia, in inducing the inhabitants to accept the Shiite faith and the Alide rule.§ Some time later an Alide, called Nasir Otrush, came to Dailam, and successfully proclaimed himself as Imam ||.

During the great Alide insurrection under Mamun (199 A.H., 814–5 A.D.), when Ibn Tabataba, being proclaimed Imam, occupied Kufa and Basra, and managed to hold out some time, Yaman, the

* Walyly is the Berber name for the town of Tangier. Cf. Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 73.

† Muir, *Caliphate*, p. 470. Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, p. 35.

‡ Ibn Adhari, Dozy's Ed., I, 218.

§ Weil, II, 391; Hamza Ispahanensis, 232.

|| Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 408; Weil, II, 613. He conquered Tabaristan in 302 A.H. Ibn Athir, VIII, 60.

inhabitants of which were for the most part Shiites of the Zaidiyya sect, declared for him and accepted his governor.*

In Yaman, where the largest portion of the inhabitants were Zaidites, small Alide princes maintained themselves, assuming the title of Imam, which is still borne by the rulers of San'a.† Thus grew up within the Caliphate more or less independent Alide dynasties. Most of these were short-lived, and were without any influence on the course of Islamic history. Far greater, however, were the successes which the Shiites achieved in Africa. There, in the second half of the third century, Shiite emissaries had already secured power and influence among the great Berber tribe of Katamah. A certain Abu Abdullah, belonging to San'a, succeeded in winning over and obtaining the leadership of this tribe, along with most of the allied tribes.‡ He preached to them the doctrine of an infallible hidden Imam of the family of Ali who would shortly reveal himself and assume, as Mahdi, the reins of spiritual and temporal sovereignty. He cursed the first two Caliphs as usurpers, and accused the Companions of the Prophet of apostacy. Those who held beliefs similar to his own he called "Faithful" — all others he set down as infidels and outlaws.§ He soon felt himself strong enough to cross swords with the Aghlabides — the then ruling dynasty in Africa. The first military successes nerved the booty-loving Berber tribes to greater exertions. The last of the Aghlabides was soon compelled to abandon his residence, Rakkadah, and to fly with all his treasures to Egypt.‖ In the meantime a scion of the family of Ali, with his son, was discovered in the prison at Sigilmasa. He was called Ubaidullah, and Abu Abdullah regarded him as the infallible, sinless Imam. He liberated him (296 A.H., 908 A.D.) and proclaimed him the Mahdi, the Imam, who had come out of concealment, and to whom blind, unhesitating obedience was due.

Ubaidullah was not slow in claiming his privileges, and soon, as infallible sinless Mahdi, he demanded complete obedience to his will, and carried out the principles of the Shiite belief to all their extreme consequences. In outer seeming Islam was retained, and Ubaidullah

* Weil, II, 205.

† On the fate of the South Arabian Zaidetes. Cf. Rutgers: *Historia Jemanæ sub Hasano Pascha* (Leyden, 1838), p. 124. Some Alide princes maintained and some still maintain a more or less independent rule up to the present time. Thus in the Central Arabian town of Hail an Alide family still rules. Ausland, 1865, N. 40, p. 941.

‡ Ibn Athir, VIII, 23. § Ibn Adhari, I, 132. ‖ Ibn Adhari, I, 143.

on every occasion strengthened himself by citing suitable verses from the Qur'an: but, in the place of Islam, a complete enslavement of the mind, and a deification of the person of the prince, were really introduced and established.

Mahdiyya, the new residence built by him (308 A.H., 920 A D.), was regarded as a national sanctuary by the followers of Ubaidullah, and instead of turning, at prayers, to Mekka, they turned towards Mahdiyya, as they had formerly done towards Rabbadah, when the Imam was in residence there. One of the confidants of Ubaidullah used often to say to him: "Ascend to heaven! how long wilt thou tarry on earth and move about among mankind?" *

Everywhere an anti-Islamic spirit manifested and asserted itself. They preached community of wives; † they publicly renounced the Fast of Ramadhan; they altered the usual form and number of prayers, and everywhere they fiercely persecuted the orthodox school. But in this general wreck of the old order there were symptoms which caused uneasiness to the infallible Imam and movements which needed no little effort to check and to completely crush. In the neighbourhood of Tetuan lies a mountainous district — the Ryf — which is inhabited by the Berber tribe of Ghomarah.‡ This tract of land, rich in fertile plains and smiling cornfields, was intersected all over by rivulets and mountain streams. This, for obvious reasons, was always the seat of a thick population. Its length may be computed at six days', its breadth three days' journey. The inhabitants, the Ghomorah tribe, were always noted for their freedom and independence. Shortly after Ubaidullah had settled down at Mahdiyya, an alleged Prophet called Hamim, son of the Merciful God, made his appearance among them.§ A great many of his Berber fellow-citizens joined him, and he fought those that did not — like the Masmudah tribe in the coast land of Tangier. || He set up for his followers a religious system different from but far more comfortable than Islam.¶ Instead of five he enjoined two daily prayers morning and evening. On Wednesday he enjoined

* Ibn Adhari, I, 190. † *Ibid.*, 190, 191.

‡ The Ghomarah are one of the three chief tribes of the great Masmudah family which resides on the western part of the Maghrib, the western chain of Atlas and the Ryf.

§ *Description de l'Afrique*, Texte Arab, published by Von Kremer (Vienna 1851), pp. 79, 80; *Journal Asiat.*, 1859, XIII, 185.

|| Ibn Adhari, I, 198. ¶ Wüstenfeld, *Gesch. d. Fat. Chalifen*, p. 66.

a half-day's, on Thursday a full day's fast. For failing to fast he imposed the penalty of five cows to the Prophet. In the month of Ramadhan * only three days' fast were sanctioned. He declared the pilgrimage to Mekka, ablution and purification unnecessary. He even allowed pork, but absolutely forbade eggs. He announced a revelation in the Berber tongue, and called it his Qur'an. The following is a verse from it: "Save me from my sins! O thou, that hast granted me sight to see the world. Save me from my sins, O thou that leddest Moses out of the sea." Hamim levied the tenth for his own use from his community.† He was finally killed by the Masmudah tribe in the coast land of Tangier.‡ The rising of the numerous Berber tribes, which took place shortly after under Abu Yazid, calls for serious attention. It was less religious than political in its bearing, and aimed at the overthrow of the Shiite government. The innate sense of liberty and freedom of the Berbers would not long endure the despotism of the Ubaidites. Shortly after the death of the Imam Ubaidullah (322 A.H., 934 A.D.) and during the reign of his son Abul Kasim, a man, called Abu Yazid Makhlad, of the tribe of Zanatah, revolted. In the valleys of Mount Atlas he found his first supporters, but later many Berbers gathered round his standard. His teachings were distinctly democratic, and hence the Arab authors call him Kharijite (Ibady). With his troops he overran the whole of Africa and conquered Kairowan. All the orthodox, dissatisfied with the Shiite rule, cheerfully joined him. But Makhlad, like a true Berber, abandoned Kairowan with absolute unconcern for his Arab allies; with the result that the Shiite troops retook it and committed a fearful massacre of the orthodox population of the town.§ These fights of the Berbers with the Ubaidites continued with varying results until Makhlad, by arraying himself in princely splendour, offended the democratic susceptibilities of the Berbers, suffered a great defeat, and, though successful in escaping from the field of battle in the Katamah hill-tracts, was at last, after desperate resistance, taken captive and cruelly executed (336 A.H., 947-8 A.D.).||

* According to the author of Tarikh-ul-Juman (fol. 136) he fixed 10 days' fast in the month of Ramadhan. According to the same author the Spanish Caliph Nasir sent troops against this false Prophet, who killed him in 310 A.H., 922 A.D.

† Kremer, *Description de l'Afrique*, pp. 79, 80.

‡ Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 198.

§ *Ibid.*, I, 226.

|| According to Ibn Athir he died of his wounds, VIII, 332.

Unopposed, the rule of the Ubaidites now extended over Africa. Egypt was conquered by them, and Cairo founded by their general Moizz.* Thereto they transferred the seat of government, and appointed governors to administer the Western Province. But soon these governors managed to make themselves independent and to restore the glory of orthodox Islam.† The Shiite faith reached its farthest point of development under the Caliph Hakim, the sixth of the Fatimides, who declared himself an incarnation of God. In the recesses of Lebanon, among a simple unsophisticated people, his supporters found a congenial soil and a large following. The Druses worshipped and still worship him as God, who was naught but a wild, insensate tyrant. With the death of Hakim and the fall of the Fatimides, who were supplanted in Egypt by the Ayyubides, the Shiite movement ‡ ended in the west.

Henceforward the rule of orthodox Islam continued undisputed, but the Berber insurrections did not cease. Under the cloak of religion the Almoravides took up the cause of the Berber nation against the foreign rule of the Arabs. These, in turn, succumbed to the Almohades. However great the success of the Shiites may appear in the west, the importance and significance of the Shiites really belongs to the religious and political history of the eastern lands of the Caliphate.

We have already described the fearful insurrection of the Zenj, which broke out in Bahrain in the second half of the third century, precisely at the time when the Shiite missionaries were most active in Africa. Suppressed for a while, it broke out again in Basra, and continued for fourteen years, devastating Iraq and the adjoining provinces (up to 270 A.H.; 803–4 A.D.).§

In this the Shiite ideas were used as a mere pretence, for the entire movement was pre-eminently a democratic movement, that is, of Kharijite colour and complexion. It was supported by the lowest strata of society, especially the slaves. The wars of the Zenj ran a wild and bloody course.

A still more violent upheaval directly followed the rise of the

* Prof. Margoliouth's *Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem.*

† On the Ziyarides; cf. Ibn Adhari, I, 237, 305, 307. Party spirit broke out among the Berber tribes themselves. Thus the Sarhagah tribe remained loyal to the Ubaidites; while the Zanatah tribe sympathised with the Spanish Omayyads. Dozy, I, 262.

‡ A great persecution and massacre of the Shiites took place in Africa in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D.

§ Muir, 541.

Zenj; namely, the Karmathian outbreak (281 A.H., 894 A.D.).* They established their power in Bahrain, and, using Bahrain as the base of their operations, they overran Iraq, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, plundering, burning and murdering wherever they went. Even Baghdad, the residence of the Caliph, fell into their possession, though only for a short time. They captured Mekka, plundered the Holy City, and carried away the Black Stone from the Ka'aba, which, however, they restored twenty-two years after at the command of the fourth Fatimide Caliph.† It took almost a century to repress these fearful hordes, but their power was never completely broken up. They still continue in Bahrain, where their influence appears to be powerful up to the present day. The striking similarity in many respects of the Wahabite Movement with that of the Karmathians cannot be put down to a mere accident.

The developments which the Shiite doctrines showed among the Ubaidites and the Karmathians clearly prove how completely they had drifted away from the Islam of the Prophet.

One other sect of the Shiites which distinguished itself by its political activities in Eastern history appeared on the scene under the name of the Assassins. Its founder, Hasan Ibn Sabbah, lived at Rayy in the fifth century of the Hijra. His father was a zealous Shiite, and belonged to the sect of the "Twelvers", then largely diffused in Persia. He sent his son Hasan to Nishapur, then the most famous orthodox university of Persia. There he made the acquaintance of the Shiite emissaries, who persuaded him to go to Cairo, where ruled the Fatimide Caliph, the spiritual chief of the African Shiites.‡ In Cairo he was admitted into the secret order, where Islam probably was regarded as no more than an outward formality. After a residence of almost twenty years Hasan left Cairo. The Egyptian Caliph provided him with money and recommendations, and commissioned him to launch on foot a propaganda on behalf of the Fatimides. In the year 1090 he succeeded in taking the castle of Alamut in the district of

* Wood's *History of the Assassins*, pp. 29 *et seq.*

† Weil, II, 611, 612; Dozy, *Islamisme*, p. 186; Ibn Athir, VIII, 365.

‡ The ultra-Shiite sect of the Batinites, who later merged into that of the Ishmaelites, existed in Persia before Hasan, owned many castles, and were specially numerous in Isphahan, where a certain Abdul Malik Ibn Attash was honoured by them as their king. Hasan professed to be the follower of Abdul Malik. It is therefore an error to call Hasan founder of the Assassins. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, 216, 299.

Rudbar, north of Kazwin. Here he organised his religio-political order, at the head of which he presided, as its great master, after the death of Ibn Attash, who held the castle of Ispahan and was worshipped by his sect, as their King.* To all the provinces he sent his missionaries to enlist supporters or assassins (Fida'ii); fanatics, whom he secured so completely under his influence that they only too cheerfully sacrificed their lives for him. With such instruments as these, the order grew into power and prominence. It obtained a firm footing not only in Persia but also later in Syria†, and thus, in process of time, the Assassins became a tremendous political force.‡ A succession of great masters followed Hasan. For some time this order was in close and intimate touch with the Fatimide Caliphs of Egypt, in whose interest and on whose behalf it worked; but later it completely shook itself free from Islam. Not until Halaku, the Mongolian conqueror, was its power broken: for he captured and destroyed the fort of Alamut.

Though shorn of political power, the Ishmaelites as a sect still exist both in Persia and Syria.§ The moderate Shiites would have nothing to do with this extreme sect. They stood by Islam, and differed from the Orthodox mainly on the question of succession, which they deemed to be exclusively in the descendants of Ali. The moderate sect of the "Twelvers" (Isna-Ashariyya, also Imamiyya) found the largest diffusion among the Shiite sects; especially in the Persian countries.|| There were Shiites also in Iraq, Syria and Egypt; but they were constantly exposed to persecutions, from the side of the orthodox government as well as from the populace. Their own fanaticism, as also their obstinacy with which they celebrated, even when in the minority, the anniversary of the tragedy of Kerbala, contributed largely towards these ever-recurring persecutions. This was the occasion, almost every year, of great fights at Baghdad culminating in murder and plunder.¶

* Ibn Athir, X, 299.

† Ibn Athir, IX, 358; X, 161, 216.

‡ In Lebanon, on the way from Hamah to Tripoli, there are ruins of the castles of Kadmus and Masjat which belonged to the Assassins. Ibn Athir, X, 461; XI, 452.

§ Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, pp. 265 *et seq.*

|| Browne, pp. 229, 239.

¶ Compare Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 707, 708; *Gemäldesaal*, V, 21, 22 29; Ibn Athir, specially IX, 394, 406. Hammer is instructive on the disputes between the Shiites and the Sunnites. For the offensiveness of the Shiites, see Polak's *Persien*, Vol. I, pp. 320 *et seq.*

Political considerations at first induced the Buwayhids, who ruled the Persian Iraq, to favour the Shiites. As the latter did not acknowledge the Caliphs as their legitimate rulers, they were well in harmony with the politics of the Buwayhids, who were only too anxious to make themselves independent of the Caliphs, and that as quickly as possible. They continued to favour the Shiites until they got the Caliph well in hand (334 A.H.; 945–6 A.D.).* For this very reason Mahmud Ibn Subuktagin, the opponent of the Buwayhids, persecuted them.† Henceforward the fate of the Shiites depended, for the most part, on political conditions. The dynasties that gradually arose and obtained more and more independence in Persia were oftener favourable than otherwise to the Shiites. In Baghdad, on the other hand, with the weakness of the Caliphs, orthodox fanaticism gained the ascendancy.‡ When, after a violent street fight between the Shiites and the Sunnis, in the suburb of Karkh, inhabited by the Shiites, a son of the Caliph sided with the Sunnis and most mercilessly persecuted the Shiites, the latter applied to Halaku (who had just smashed the Assassins) for protection. To this step of the Shiites is ascribed Halaku's march upon Baghdad, and its conquest by him (656 A.H., 1258 A.D. Weil, III, 471; Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 141). Under the Mongolian dynasty better days dawned upon tne Shiites; for the Mongolians were ever tolerant in matters religious. The Alides rose into favour, and the Mongolian prince Khudabanda, the twelfth ruler of this dynasty in Persia, not only accepted Islam but is said to have professed the Shiite faith, though only for a time, for he soon again became a Sunni. But two centuries later, when the dynasty of the Safawis ascended the throne, the Shiite faith with Shah Ismail became the State religion of Persia (Isna-Ashariyya). This change was marked by a horrible persecution of the Sunnis all over the kingdom. The Ottoman Sultan Salim, who professed the Sunni faith, returned the compliment by massacring the Shiite residents of the Ottoman Empire (1514 A.D.). About 40,000 Shiites are said to have been massacred.

* Ibn Athir, VIII, 339, 372, 403, 407. The Buwayhids later took up a mediatory attitude between the Shiites and the Sunnites. Ibn Athir, IX, 126, 184, 217. Finally they made enemies of the Shiites, who received the Seljuk, Toghrul Beg, the destroyer of the Buwayhid dynasty, with open arms. Ibn Athir, IX, 420.

† Ayun-ul-Tawarikh, XII, fol. 85. Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, IV, 82; Ibn Athir, X, 440.

‡ Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 125, 126.

With this the deep rent, which from the very beginning divided the Muslims into two hostile camps, was fixed for all time. The Turks became the ruling nation in the west, the Persians in the east. The Turks represented the Sunnis; the Persians the Shiites. It must be apparent from the foregoing pages, how deeply and how widely they had diverged from the original ideals of Islam. In the intellectual and spiritual life of humanity there is always an ebb and flow. It is never stagnant or stationary. New ideas come to life; new spiritual veins open up: even religions, which, by virtue of their inherent force and inner stability, are said to remain unaffected amid the storms that at intervals sweep over the world, do, as a matter of fact, suffer from change and decay, and are liable to transformation, or even to complete subversion. As the centuries with their noiseless feet go by, we find either fresh transformations in religions, more consonant with the spirit of the age, or, where transformation is impossible, complete breakdown and overthrow of the original system in favour of a more robust, vigorous, life-giving and life-sustaining one. What is to be the eventual lot of Islam no human foresight, at this stage and in the present condition of things, can divine: but signs of timely reform augur a future bright and hopeful!

IX.—Chilafat and Imamat.

With the accession of Muawiah an exceedingly important epoch for the inner development of the Caliphate sets in. The Chilafat, which, under the first two Caliphs was purely patriarchal (the religious aspect being more obtrusively prominent), suffered under Othman a transformation which led to a great civil war. Muawiah, indeed, triumphed over his rivals, and the Chilafat gradually assumed a worldly character. During the weary struggle for sovereignty Muawiah found unwavering support in the Syrians. Accordingly after his victory, in loyalty to them, he made Damascus the Capital of the Islamic Empire. With this change Medina, which had hitherto been the metropolis of Islam, sank into an insignificant provincial town. The new Caliph set himself up as the spiritual and temporal chief of Islam. Like his predecessors, as the chief judge, he decided religious and secular disputes. Like them too he preached at the mosque, and presided over the divine service: but in all other respects he acted as a temporal sovereign. He concluded a humiliating peace

— a thing unheard of in Islam—with the Byzantine Caesar, as against the payment of a tribute—and this, with a view to having a free hand at home to use the whole weight of his power against Ali.* He is reported to have said, "I am the first king in Islam.† Muawiah disposed of the State revenue at will. He made a gift of the entire revenue of Egypt to Amr Ibn Asi.‡ He was the first to assail the rule introduced and rigorously adhered to by Omar; namely, that no Muslim should acquire landed property in conquered countries. Not only did he personally appropriate large landed properties in Syria, but he made lavish presents of them to his friends and tribesmen. And this, of course, at the sacrifice of the State, or as the Arabs would say, from the common property of the Muslims.§

But nothing was more calculated to change social conditions than these dispositions of landed properties. With the first step the rest followed of itself.|| Muawiah disposed of the ownerless lands with which Othman had invested him thus: he made them into an endowment in favour of the members of his family and of Muslims generally—the endowment coming into force on his death. But his adherents, who also had been invested with lands, kept these to themselves, making no such arrangement as Muawiah had done. When all ownerless lands were disposed of, they sought other resources and devised other means. The Caliph Abdul Malik allowed such lands as were in possession of subject races, but whose owners and possessors had died out, to be given away to Muslims. But the result of this policy was that these lands ceased to pay the land-tax—the Muslim landowners being liable for the tenth only. When these lands were exhausted the government went still further in granting concessions. Both Abdul Malik and Walid permitted Muslims to purchase lands from the subject races. The purchase-money went into the treasury in payment of the arrears of the land-tax. The land-tax, henceforward, disappeared, and in its place the tenth was substituted.

* Masudi, IV, 350. Abul Faraj, *Hist. Dynast.*, on p. 194 says: "He preached before prayer for fear that people might disperse before he had said what he intended to say."

† Muatta, II, 106.

‡ Maqrizi, *Khittat*, II, 337. Out of it he had to maintain the administration and pay the salary of the soldiers.

§ Ibn Asakir, Fol. 97.

|| Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State*, p. 431. (This is an English translation of Beladhuri).

Thus a great deal of land came into Muslim possession. The Caliph Omar Ibn Abdul-Aziz made a futile attempt to prevent lands passing out of the hands of the subject races and falling into the possession of Muslims.* He cancelled all sales concluded without sanction of the Government, and issued an edict declaring sales of all land, after the year 100 A.H., invalid. But the edict was fruitless. Thus, ever since the Caliphate of Muawiah, a fateful social transformation was at work within the bosom of the Caliphate. The Arab conquerors were gradually transformed into owners and cultivators of land. At first they constituted a warrior-caste, for whom the subject races worked and tilled and toiled. Now, partially at least, they were rooted in the land, and the floating Arab population, available for military service, declined in exactly the same proportion as the acquisition of land spread among them. This explains the policy of the various administrators who sought to check as much as possible the transfer of landed properties from the subject races to Muslim hands. Nor were financial reasons absent from this policy. While the subject races paid the land-tax, the revenue was far more considerable than the tenth levied upon landed property in Muslim possession.†

Another important measure dates from the time of the Omayyads; namely, grant of the revenue of certain districts to entire Arab tribes. This was a continuation of the system of military stations begun under Omar. The Arab army was not divided into regiments, but according to tribes who received fixed pay from the treasury along with a share of the booty. As soon as the system of granting lands in fiefs made its way under the Omayyads, the tribes, distributed in various military cantonments, were invested with the lands where they were stationed. The arrangement arrived at was that, instead of pay from the treasury, they would levy for themselves the land-tax from the lands cultivated by subject races, and also receive from them provisions for themselves and fodder for their beasts of burden. They, on the contrary, were always to hold themselves in readiness for military service at the command of the Caliph. This Syrian

* Khuda Bukhsh, *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 208 *et seq.* (This is an English translation of Von Kremer's *Culturgeschichte des Orients*).

† See Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance*, p. 374 *et seq.* For Khiraj or Land-tax, see Chap. VI of this book.

system was adopted in its entirety by the Omayyads in Spain, when, after the battle of Saba, they repaired to Spain, and founded later an Omayyad dynasty there. We possess reliable information here, and with the help of what we know regarding the military organisation in Spain, we can offer a pretty accurate account of the Arab military system in Syria. According to the Syrian model the Omayyad troops in Spain were divided into four legions (Jund), named after the military districts to which their forefathers belonged; Legion of Damascus (Jund Dimishq), Legion of Emessa (Jund Hims), Legion of Chalcis (Jund Kinnesrin), and Legion of Palestine (Jund Filistin). The first had their lands in the district of Elvira; the second in the district of Seville; the third in the district of Jaen, and the fourth in the district of Sidonia.* For a long time this arrangement remained in force in Spain. Sultan Mansur Ibn Abi Amir, for the first time, strove to effect a change in the system, but unsuccessfully.†

On this subject a Spanish savant has handed down ‡ to us some very instructive information: "I was informed," says he, "by several Spanish shaikhs, some of whom actually belonged to the Jund, that Muslims remained victorious so long as land was distributed among the legions; for the troops cultivated the land and took care of the peasants, in whose welfare they were as much interested as the slave-dealers were in the health of their slaves. Thus land, receiving proper care and attention, yielded a rich harvest. The legions had everything in abundance: both arms and beasts of burden. And so it continued until Mansur, who towards the close of his reign, again assigned to the troops, as had been the practice earlier, a fixed pay, and collected taxes from the peasants direct through his tax-collectors, who exhausted the tax-payers and embezzled the revenue. So great was the extortion that a portion of the population sought safety in emigration. Thus agriculture declined, and with agriculture the revenue too, and the legions lost their earlier strength and valour. The enemy grew more and more daring, and won back many of the lands of Islam. Thus things continued until the

* Ibn Adhari (Dozy's ed.), II, 260. The Christian population had to supply to the troops a third of the harvest crop. Dozy, *Musulmans d'Espagne*, I, 268.

† On Ibn Abi Amir: see Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, pp. 457 *et seq.* On Jund and Awasim, see Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State*, p. 202.

‡ Tartushi, *Siraj-ul-Muluk*, fol. 122, Chapter 47. On Tartushi, cf. *Journal Asiat.*, 1861, Vol. XVII, p. 147.

Al-Moravides conquered Spain and restored the old system of granting land in fiefs." Out of the system of granting the income of certain districts to particular regiments, arose early in Syria proper military colonies. Such especially was the case in the districts on the northern frontier, which were constantly exposed to the attacks of the Greeks. They therefore posted at important points divisions of troops, whose duty it was to guard the frontier against hostile attacks or incursions of the enemy*. For this purpose they even took to establishing colonies of foreign peoples. Thus it is pretty certain that the last Omayyad Caliph settled Slav races on the northern frontier of Syria—a piece of information which is confirmed by the Byzantine chronicles.† According to Beladhuri the Caliph Mutasim transferred a colony of Zotts—an Indian race who had taken possession of the marshy lands of Basra—to Masisah in Asia Minor: and Harun even earlier planted colonists from Khorasan at Anazarba, and established a military colony at Hadith, and also built the hill fort of Haruniyya.‡ The second Abbaside Caliph established a military colony of 4,000 men at Malatia, and built the fort of Klaudiyya (Claudia: Abul Faraj, *Hist. Dyn.*, p. 217). Thus did several Caliphs provide for the defence and safety of the northern frontier of Syria; and these facts clearly indicate a great change of conditions. After their immense conquests the Arabs had reached the limit beyond which, for the time being, they could not go. They then began to think of the defence of their conquered countries. The tribes who had constituted the Muslim soldiery, and who had overflooded the whole of Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Persia, had gradually settled down in the luxurious

* Thus according to Beladhuri in Kuris (Cyrrus) at Antioch; Kremer, *Beiträge zur Geographie des nördlichen Syriens*, p. 12. "Kurus was for Antioch the seat of a garrison that kept watch on the enemy. To it came every year a detachment from the Antioch army to act as garrison. Later, one of the four divisions into which the army of Antioch was divided was moved to it; and the periodical detachments were no more sent there." Hitti, p. 230. Thus Muawiah stationed a division of troops at Marash (*Beiträge*, p. 21) and another at Malatia.

† *Beiträge*, p. 12. For further information see *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 304 *et seq.*

‡ Beladhuri (in Hitti's translation, p. 264) says, "In the year 180 Ar-Rashid ordered that the city of Ain-Zarbah should be built and fortified. He summoned to it a regiment from Khurasan and others, to whom he gave houses as fiefs. In the year 183 he ordered Al-Haruniyah to be built. It was accordingly built and manned with a garrison and with volunteers that emigrated to it. The city was named after him. Others say that Harun started its erection in the Caliphate of Al-Mahdi, but completed it in his own Caliphate." Regarding the Zotts, see Hitti, p. 250.

landed estates of conquered provinces, or peopled large towns; and, spreading as they did far and wide over the vast empire, had considerably lost their martial valour and military aptitudes. By contact with the inhabitants of conquered countries they lost their original purity of race and the force of the old Arab tribal spirit.* The Arab manhood was, moreover, exhausted in the early Muslim wars, and well-nigh two centuries were needed before it could again furnish proof, as it did in the Karmathian movement, essentially an east Arabian movement, that the vitality of Arab national life was not completely extinct. During the first Muslim wars a mere summons to arms sufficed to bring together an army of requisite strength; but witness the altered conditions even at the time of Hàjjaj, who could not get the inhabitants of Kufa to do military service except under threat of death.† With the fall of the Omayyads these unfortunate conditions did not end, but rather steadily grew worse. The Abbasids mainly relied upon the people and troops of Khorasan, who had been won over for them by their great general Abu Muslim, and thus with the ascendency of the Abbasids the Persian element got the upper hand of the Arab. This state of affairs comes clearly to light under Mamun. Under his successors the troops of foreign mercenaries (mostly of Turkish origin) who henceforward surround the Caliphs, gain greater and greater influence. The military spirit of the Arabs (both in town and country) had almost disappeared, and the Beduins were no longer animated by those ideas which had characterised them in days of yore. Henceforward, like most oriental rulers, the Caliphs relied mainly upon foreign mercenaries. From their midst came the Pretorian Guards, who reduced the Caliphs to a shadow. The religious enthusiasm of the first century, which welded the Arab tribes into one great family, soon waned and wore away, and the more the circle of foreign converts enlarged the more the Caliphate lost its Arab character. Foreigners, widely apart in ideas and traditions, found themselves united in the bosom of Islam. Among them naturally flourished the spirit of faction and rivalry, born of the feeling of differing nationalities. Thus the idea of nationality, once fully awakened to life, led to most fateful results. It proved stronger than the tie of religion, and made the first breach in the proud edifice of the Caliphate. In the east

* Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 272, 273. See the monograph of Bouvat on *Les Barmécides.*
† Weil, *Gesch. d. Chal.* I, 432; Kamil, ed. Wright, 216.

the Persians; in the west the Berbers strove to shake off the Arab yoke, and did in fact succeed in establishing fairly independent dynasties under the shadowy suzerainty * of the Abbasids.

The strength of the Caliphate rested on the national sentiment of the Arabs; but when its original force was weakened and lost, and the Caliphs had to rely for protection upon foreign mercenaries, the glory of the Caliphate rapidly declined and departed. †

Relying upon and making use of the Beduins' greed for conquest and love of booty, the first Caliphs succeeded within a few years in founding their colossal Empire. But they did something more—with the aid of the new religion they brought these rude tribes under one supreme spiritual control. The great civil war, in which the tribes fought each other until they were sick of fighting any more, struck the first and the most decisive blow at this unity and cohesion of the Arabs. In the meantime, with the advancing civilisation and growing political organisation under the Caliphate, fresh conditions came into life, which were not very pleasing to Beduin mentality. Permanent military stations were established, and many tribes settled down in large towns, or conquered provinces, with the result that the

* "When the Persians restored to Mamun the insignia of empire their influence with him was very great, and they became contemptuous of the Abbasid power. After Mutasim's time the Turks obtained control over the Caliphs, tied their hands and enfeebled their power, in which operations the Persians had a considerable share. When, however, they found their influence at the court departed, they endeavoured to substitute for it independence in their principalities. The captains and governors who acquired independence continued to acknowledge the spiritual sovereignty of the Abbasids, and desired independence under their suzerainty. The Abbasid empire thus split into a number of independent principalities, increasing by some law of progression. The following is a list of the Persian dynasties according to the order in which they became independent, with the names of the founders :—

Dynasty.	Province.	Duration.	Founder.
Tahirides	Khorasan	205—259	Tahir Ibn al-Husain.
Saffarides	Fars	254—290	Yakub Ibn al-Laith.
Samanides	Transoxania	261—389	Nasr Ibn Ahmed.
Sajides	Adherbaijan	266—318	Abul Saj.
Ziyarides	Jurjan	316—434	Mardawij Ibn Ziyar.

We thus see how Persia became divided into a number of Persian principalities. The Alid faction revived, and realized to some extent the original object of their efforts in behalf of the family of Ali, viz. the restoration of the mighty power of Persia as it had existed before Islam. These principalities were, as appears from the table, of no long duration, and presently there arose the Buyid dynasty, the greatest Persian and Shiite dynasty which arose in the east under Abbasid suzerainty." Zydan, *Umayyads and Abbasids*, pp. 239-40. For the Buyid dynasty, Zaydan, pp. 240-242; for Turkish Dynasties under the suzerainty of the Abbasids, *ib.*, p. 242.

† Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 423, 424.

settled Arab population became more and more estranged from Beduin life. The Government, further, relied upon the standing army and the townspeople, with the result that the Beduins ceased to be the ruling element of the Empire. There was no longer any prospect of booty, for there were no more Persian and Roman provinces to conquer and to exploit. Such being the position of affairs, the old Arab independence of the Beduin tribes once more asserted itself, bursting all the trammels of convention. They gradually withdrew to the solitude of their desert, and reverted to their old, bad ways. Once again they went back to the life that they had led before the Prophet, the pastoral life alternating with the life of plunder, common to all nomads. We may thus divide the Arab nation into two parts; one which lived in towns, cultivated lands and served in the army of the Caliph; and the other which retired to the desert, and worried no more about the Caliph or Islam. Often, indeed, did the latter burst into civilised countries, plundering and devastating, now fighting on the side of the Caliph, and now against him. Their oft-recurring predatory expeditions contributed more than anything else to the decline of civilisation and the fall of the Caliphate.

Thus, from the tribes of the desert the Karmathians pre-eminently received help and support.* One of the most powerful insurrections against the Caliph Vathiq was the insurrection of the Beduin tribes of Najd and Central Arabia (about 230 A.H., 844–45 A.D.). At the head of the rebels stood the two old Arab tribes of Sulaim and Fazarah. To these repaired many other North Arabian tribes. They plundered the villages round about Medina, even pressed forward into the town, and only after several years of warfare were they reduced to submission.† In the region to the north of the Euphrates‡ the Anazah tribe lived in complete independence. Then, as now, they made predatory raids into civilized lands. South of the Euphrates and along the richly-watered banks of the Tigris lived then, as now, the powerful Muntafiq tribe, who plundered Basra under the Caliph Mustarshid.§

* Weil, II, 509, 527. † Cf. Ibn Athir, VII, pp. 8, 12, 18; also Muir, p. 516.

‡ Athwart the plain, from Aleppo to Babylon, runs the Euphrates, while the far east is bounded by the Tigris, flowing under the mountain range that separates Iraq-Araby from Persia. Between the two rivers lies Mesopotamia, full of patriarchal memories. Muir, *Caliphate*, p. 50.

§ On the predatory expeditions of the Beduins, see Ibn Athir, X, 121, 147, 288; XI, 182; XII, 52.

In the fifth century after the Prophet a far more fateful Beduin movement took place from Egypt in a westerly direction, laying Africa, hitherto one of the most prosperous countries, in ruins. In the eastern desert, bordering on the rich region watered by the Nile, which the isthmus of Suez connects with the Arab motherland, lived since the earliest times, and especially since the Arab conquest of Egypt, a considerable multitude of Arab nomads. Attracted by the luxurious and charming regions of the Nile, their numbers steadily augmented. They lived chiefly by cattle-breeding and by caravan trade, but partly also by agriculture, and yet they never really renounced their Beduin ways, as may be observed to this day among the Beduin tribes settled in Egypt. The Egyptian Government never allowed any settlements on the western side of the Nile. But under the Fatimide Caliph Mustansir these Egypto-Arab Beduins crossed the river and advanced westward.* This movement, which soon assumed the character of a *Völkerwanderung*, is said to have been encouraged by the then Egyptian Government, as their African governors had got out of hand and refused obedience.† As has always been the case, the Beduin hordes poured like torrents into the rich and fertile coast-lands of North Africa. They destroyed the troops of the native princes sent to oppose their onward march—especially the troops of the ruler of Kairowan, Moiz Ibn Badys.‡ Immense booty fell into the hands of the conquerors, who overran the entire country, plundering and pillaging. As Leo Africanus informs us, they conquered Tripoli and cruelly plundered it. Then they took Kabis, and finally Kairowan (449 A.H., 1057 A.D.), and drove away a portion of the inhabitants to the south.§ Thus the most beautiful and the most fertile districts of Africa passed into the hands of the Arab hordes, who henceforward exercised a decisive influence on the political conditions of this country, for they now sided with one and now with some other of the smaller dynasties there. With justice the great Arab historian observes: "But now, I mean at the end of the eighth century A.H., the condition of Africa, as we see it, is completely changed. The Berbers, who have inhabited the country from the most ancient times, are supplanted by the Arab Beduins, who flooded the land in the fifth century of the A.H. and subjugated the native population by their

* According to Ibn Athir (IX, 387), in the year 442 A.H. (1050 A.D.).

† Dozy, Ibn Adhari, I, 300. ‡ Ibid, Vol. I, p. 302.

§ Barth: *Wanderung und Entdeckungen*, I, 245.

number and their strength, took away from them a large portion of their landed properties, and shared with them the enjoyment of those lands that they were allowed to hold. Moreover, in the middle of the eighth century (A.H.) a fearful pestilence desolated the eastern and the western lands, swept away a great part of the population, and destroyed culture and civilisation.'' The devastations of the Beduins, which Ibn Khaldun had before his eyes, filled him with grief: and in a genuine philosophic spirit, relying upon his experiences, he fashioned his theory that the nomad element, wherever it appears, works destructively, destroying governments and wrecking civilisation. With the deep earnestness of a Tacitus he draws a picture of the universal decline and decay of the Islamic countries.

"Consider", says he, "all the countries which the Arab Beduins have conquered since the earliest times. Civilisation and population have disappeared therefrom; even the very land seems to have changed its character. In Yaman, with the exception of some towns, all the great meeting-places of the people have become dreary and desolate. Previously the same thing happened in Iraq Arabi. All the beautiful buildings, with which the Persians had adorned it, disappeared. In our own time Syria has been ruined. Africa and the west are still suffering from the devastations of the Beduins. In the fifth century A.H. the nomad tribes of Hilal and Sulaim made their appearance in the country; and ever since, for three centuries, they have done their work of horror and devastation, and lo! you see nothing but waste and ruin. Before their appearance the entire country from Nigritia to the Mediterranean was richly populated: and proof of this you find in the remains of the old civilisation, in the ruins of numerous towns, hamlets, monuments and buildings.'' In the eastern parts of the Islamic Empire we find a similar painful picture. Following a law of nature, frequently repeating itself in history, the northern peoples pressed south. The old wars of Iran and Turan were due to the descent of the Tātar races of High Asia upon the Persian and Indian frontiers. The very same process is repeating itself in the slow but steady advance of the Russians from Central Asia to the south. Thus, between the middle of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century A.H., a movement of the Turkish tribes took place. Towards the end of the ninth century A.D. the Ghuzz advanced to the west, and conquered the Turkish tribes of Kipdschak who inhabited the country between the Volga and the

Dnieper.* About 960 A.D. a Turkish chief called Tschanak, or Kara-Khan, with two thousand families, accepted Islam, advanced towards the west, and settled down on the eastern bank of the Caspian Sea. Individual tribes even went further, and settled in Adherbaijan, Armenia, and Asia Minor, where they received the name of Turkomans.† Other tribes of Ghuzz showed themselves in Khorasan. There they split up into different branches and made their way into Muslim lands as far as Isphahan, Maraghah, Mosul.‡ In consequence of a dispute with the Chinese authorities, almost contemporaneously with Kara Khan, another Turkish tribe, which later became famous under the name of the Seljuks, emigrated from Eastern Turkistan, and settled down in the region of Bukhara. Within a hundred years they moved on to Khorasan and conquered it. Togrul, a grandson of Seljuk, took possession of the towns of Nishapur and Merv, and scarcely had he secured a footing there when he advanced, making conquests in Persia, Asia Minor, and Iraq, overthrew the Buwayhids, the protectors of the Caliphs, and got himself appointed Amir-ul-Omara by them.§ These emigrations of the Turkish tribes and their unceasing wars and marauding expeditions played havoc with the eastern lands of the Caliphate. To these were added continued incursions of the Greeks and Armenians into the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontier-districts, as well as predatory expeditions of the rude but warlike inhabitants of the Caucasus region—namely, the Georgians, Khazars and Kipdschaks.|| The countries under the Caliphs resounded with the horse-hoofs of these roaming bands, who spread in Persia, in Asia Minor, in northern Mesopotamia and in Syria, but who nevertheless bowed in superstitious reverence before the Caliphs, surrounded as they were by the nimbus of religion.¶

But the Arabs, in whose midst grew and matured the institution of the Chilafat, now retired more and more into the background, leav-

* Ibn Athir, IX, 68, 209, 266 *et seq.*, 365.

† Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 37, 38; see also, *Gemäldesaal*, V, 2, 3. A further inroad of the Turkish tribe took place in the year 1153 A.D. (548 A.H.) when Sultan Sanjar was taken prisoner, and the Ghuzz for four years devastated Khorasan. Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, V, 117, 118.

‡ Abul Faraj, *Hist. Dynast.*, 337.

§ Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 39. On later inroads, cf. Ibn Athir, XI, 53, 116, 138, 152, etc. Finlay, *History of Greece*, Vol. II, pp. 441 *et seq.*, Vol. III, pp. 87 *et seq.*

|| Abul Faraj, *Hist. Dynast.*, pp. 377, 431.

¶ See Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, chapter III.

ing the Caliphs no alternative but to come to terms with these bold adventurers. Along with this great historical process which was gradually undermining the Chilafat, other reasons too contributed to its fall. Among these we must first of all mention want of a fixed rule of succession, and the uncertainty of public opinion regarding constitutional questions of vital importance. On the subject of succession, from the very beginning they adhered to the idea that none but a member of the ruling family could ascend the throne. But the old Arab idea of seniority constantly conflicted with the direct transmission from father to son, naturally most frequently striven for.* The former was the idea that dominated in the first century of the Caliphate; the latter came to a head later. Of this the following table offers ample proof:—

Name of the Caliphs.	Successor.	
	Son.	*Brother or other relative.*
1. Abu Bakr		Omar
2. Omar		Othman
3. Othman		Ali
4. Muawiah	Yazid	
5. Yazid	Muawiah II	
6. Muawiah II		Merwan
7. Merwan	Abdul Malik	
8. Abdul Malik	Walid	
9. Walid		Sulaiman
10. Sulaiman		Omar Ibn Abd ul Aziz
11. Omar Ibn Abd ul Aziz		Yazid II
12. Yazid II		Hisham
13. Hisham		Walid II
14. Walid II		Yazid III
15. Yazid III		Ibrahim
16. Ibrahim		MerwanII
17. Merwan II		Saffah
18. Saffah		Mansur
19. Mansur	Mahdi	
20. Mahdi	Hadi	
21. Hadi		Harun-ul-Rashid

* Von Kremer has more thoroughly discussed this subject in his *Culturgeschichte*. See the Eng. transl., Khuda Bukhsh, *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 244 *et seq.*

Name of the Caliphs.	Successor.	
	Son.	*Brother or other relative.*
22. Harun-ul-Rashid	Amin	
23. Amin		Mamun
24. Mamun		Mutasim
25. Mutasim	Wathiq	
26. Vathiq		Mutawakkil
27. Mutawakkil	Muntasir	
28. Muntasir		Musta'in
29. Musta'in		Mutazz
30. Mutazz		Muhtadi
31. Muhtadi		Mutamid
32. Mutamid		Mutadid
33. Mutadid	Muktafi	
34. Muktafi		Muqtadir
35. Muqtadir		Qahir
36. Qahir		Radhi
37. Radhi		Muttaqi
38. Muttaqi		Mustakfi
39. Mustakfi		Muti
40. Muti		Tai
41. Tai		Kadir
42. Kadir	Kaim	
43. Kaim		Muktadi
44. Muktadi	Mustazhir	
45. Mustazhir	Mustarshid	
46. Mustarshid	Rashid	
47. Rashid		Muktafi II
48. Muktafi II	Mustanjid	
49. Mustanjid	Mustadi	
50. Mustadi	Nasir	
51. Nasir	Zahir	
52. Zahir	Mustansir	
53. Mustansir	Mustasim	

We see from this that in the first two columns of Caliphs—consisting of 18 rulers—only four bequeathed the throne to their sons. Among

the Abbasids the position seems more favourable, although of the first twenty-four Caliphs only six had their sons as successors. No less was succession to the throne influenced by another idea which may be traced back to the beginning of Islam, and which seems to be deeply rooted in the old Arab idea of freedom. Hereditary descent was never, among the Arabs, a recognized title for spiritual or temporal sovereignty. Free election and acknowledgment by the entire people were deemed indispensably necessary for succession to the throne.

Thus with legitimate right to succession by inheritance was coupled a democratic element; namely, election by the people. A long series of civil wars, popular insurrections, family disputes, and fearful conspiracies were the result of the fundamentally divergent elements regulating succession to the throne. To this may be referred an unbroken chain of wars which, throughout the Caliphate, make the pages of history crimson. In Turkey—the modern counterpart of the old Arab Chilafat—some of these ideas are still operative. Thus, according to the idea of seniority, which in Turkey has become an express rule of succession, the legitimate successor is not the son but the brother of the ruling Sultan.* It was indeed reserved for our age to see the extinction of this old Asiatic idea. Sultan Abdul Aziz sanctioned direct succession in Egypt. He even thought of securing the succession in his own line as soon as that could be safely done.†

Election by the people goes back to the old Arab custom, according to which the chief of the tribe was elected by the free choice of the members of the tribe. Immediately after the death of the Prophet election of a successor took place, and was accompanied, as always, by party disputes. This was the election of Abu Bakr. Medina was then the centre and metropolis of Islam, and in Medina lived the ruling families who determined the election. There was, of course, no such thing as representation of the people in the modern sense. Election consisted in tendering the oath of allegiance to the Caliph-elect. This, in Arabic, was called *Baiah*, and was reckoned of such vital importance that even those Caliphs who appointed their sons as successors in their lifetime never omitted to have homage done to them, for only by *Baiah*

* Under the first Ottoman Sultans direct succession obtained. In fact fratricide was even sanctioned by the law of the realm. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 582.

† Even the oldest Hungarian rule of succession was oriental. It preferred the brother to the son. Among the Berbers the dignity of the chief passed to the sister's son. Barth's *Reisen und Entdeckungen*, I, 374.

did the succession receive its legal force and validity. This ceremony, in the earliest times, was of a purely patriarchal character: the electors offered their hand, and thereby vowed loyalty and obedience to the Caliph. *Baiah* could also be rendered in writing. Thus a copy has come down to us of the letter in which Abdullah, the son of the Caliph Omar, did homage to the fifth Omayyad Caliph, Abdul Malik. It runs thus: "In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate, to the Servant of God, Abdul Malik—Prince of the Faithful. Peace be on thee! I praise Allah before thee, and I offer my submission and obedience to thee, according to the precept of God and his Prophet, in all that I do."*

Later, the election and homage degenerated into a pure court ceremony—especially among the Sultans. Already, Ibn Khaldun observes, homage was becoming more and more what it was at the court of the old Persian Kings of Kings (Shah-an-Shah); namely, the courtiers kissed the ground before the new Sultan, and his hand and his foot.†

Like the later Roman Emperors, whose election for the most part depended upon the Pretorian guards, the Caliphs had on these occasions to make lavish gifts of gold to their troops.‡ So long as Medina was the seat of the Caliphate and the residence of the influential families, the election of the Caliph passed off, if not without violent party strife, still without any serious convulsions, until the election of Ali, which evoked a bloody war. Things, however, shaped themselves differently when the Caliphate was removed to Damascus, then on to Kufa, Anbar and Baghdad. The inhabitants of Mekka and Medina always claimed for themselves the right of choosing the Caliph according to their judgment, and disregarded the election effected at the residence of the Caliph hundreds of miles away from them. For this presumption the two holy towns paid heavily. Military measures of extreme severity soon compelled them to obedience, and proved to them that might was oftener more effective than right. But the unrest occasioned by the election of the Caliph, and its ruthless suppression, brought one lesson clearly home to the people; namely, that the inhabitants of the

* Muatta, IV, 220. The address in the text, "Servant of God, son of Abdul Malik," is obviously wrong. The formula of homage, as it obtained among the later Caliphs, has been preserved by Ibn Hamdun, in his *Tazkirah*, and Ibn Hamdun, as State Secretary at the Court of Baghdad, must have been quite familiar with it.

† Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 425.

‡ Thus the Caliph Kaim, at his election, made a gift of three million dinars to his Turkish body-guard. *Uyun-ul-Tawarikh*, XIII, fol. 104.

provinces were bound to accept the election effected at the residence of the Caliph, and to recognise it as legally binding.

A learned Muslim jurist, Mawardi, who wrote in the first half of the fifth century after the Prophet, makes the following observation:—"The following qualifications are necessary for the electors: (a) spotless purity, (b) capacity for judging the qualifications for leadership of the State, (c) insight and judgment to decide which of the candidates is most suited to conduct the government and to assume the charge of affairs. In this the inhabitants of the capital had no pre-eminence over the rest of the people; but practice, not legal theory, settled that, since the inhabitants of the capital would be informed of the death of the Caliph sooner than the others, they could forthwith proceed with the election. Further, the persons likely to succeed mostly reside there".*

It is apparent from this that the old Arab franchise, which was a universal franchise, soon disappeared, and the right to elect the sovereign fell into the hands of the soldiery and the inhabitants of the capital. That portion of the Arab people who would not acquiesce in this state of affairs, passed over to the Kharijite camp, where the old democratic ideas prevailed, and where even the necessity for and usefulness of a head of the State was called into question and denied,† or where the election of the sovereign was held to be wholly unfettered by any consideration of hereditary succession or family connexion; for they maintained that even a slave or a peasant, if just and pious, was eligible for sovereignty (Goldziher, *Muh. Studien*, Vol. I, pp. 138 *et seq.*; Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Civilisation*, pp. 122 *et seq.*).

The Shiites, the legitimists of Islam, stood in opposition to these views. Between the two, namely, the Shiites and the Kharijites, steered the great orthodox party of Islam. They represented the staunch monarchical idea of the East. Different parties—each in its own way—supported this position. Thus the Mutazalites and the Zaidites (these are moderate Shiites) sought, on rational principles, to establish the necessity for monarchy. Mankind, they contended, needed a guide, a prince, to end injustice, to decide disputes. Without such a one there would be disorder, chaos, anarchy. Others proved from the Qur'an the

* Mawardi, ed. Enger, p. 4; Shahrastani, I, 138; Abul Faraj, p. 170; D'Ohsson, Eng. Tr., p. 150; Khuda Bukhsh, *Orient under the Caliphs*, p. 263. Al Ashari holds unconditionally by elective franchise.

† Mawakif, pp. 297, 301; Ibn Khaldun, *Proleg.*, I, 389; Shahrastani, I, 138; Abul Faraj, p. 170.

necessity for monarchy, and looked upon the monarch, from a religious point of view, as the custodian and defender of religion, as its high-priest*. On one point there was complete unanimity among the orthodox; namely, that the Caliph or Imam should belong to the family of Quraish, and to none else.†

The relation of the sovereign to the people was regarded in the light of a bilateral compact (Akd), which only subsisted so long as there was mutual observance of the terms, but not otherwise.‡ These were the duties of the sovereign :—

(a) to maintain religion in its original purity, to suppress heresies, etc.,
(b) to lay down the law and to decide disputes,
(c) to keep the peace,
(d) to punish transgressions, offences and crimes,
(e) to defend the frontiers,
(f) to fight those who refused to accept Islam,
(g) to collect and administer war-booty and poor-tax,
(h) to distribute rewards to soldiers, and to make other payments from the treasury sparingly and conscientiously,
(i) to appoint efficient and trustworthy officers,
(j) to personally take part in the affairs of the State, and to work diligently and carefully.§

To the Prince of the Faithful who duly discharged these duties the people were bound to render ready obedience and ungrudging support. But if he neglected them, or from some other untoward circumstances, such as blindness, chronic disease, mutilation, etc., was unable to carry on his duties, his right and title to Imamat ceased.||

Along with the elective sovereignty Muslim jurisprudence recognises a mode of transmission of sovereignty in direct opposition to elective sovereignty; namely, transmission by will. Of that nature was the appointment of Omar by the Caliph Abu Bakr, and such also was the procedure adopted by Omar when he left the choice of his successor to a Council of Regency.¶

* Mawardi, p. 4.

† Kadhi Abu Bakr Bakillani differed from this view and held that a non-Quraishite could become Imam. On the orthodox view. Mawardi, p. 5; Ihya 1, 147; D'Ohsson, I, 153; Mawakif, p. 302; Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 396. The Shiites acknowledge only the right of the Hashimite branch to the Imamat, Mawakif.

‡ Mawardi, p. 11. § Mawardi, 23, 24. || Mawardi, p. 25. ¶ Mawardi, p. 12.

Later, when the Caliphs were pressed on all sides by supercilious vassals who gradually became independent rulers and sought to ignore the Caliphs both in matters temporal and spiritual, Islamic jurisprudence learnt to recognise a new mode of acquiring sovereignty, which consisted in the acknowledgment of accomplished facts. *This was acquisition of sovereignty by force.* It was stated to be the last alternative on which a Government could be founded. Ibn Jama'ah, an Egyptian writer, makes the following observation, "Force is the last alternative on which a Government may be founded. When there is no legitimate Imam present, or when none capable or competent to assume the leadership seek the Imamat, and some one takes possession of the government by force, and even though there has been no election nor transmission of sovereignty to him (by any of the recognised methods), he is to be acknowledged as ruler and is entitled to obedience; and this, indeed, to keep Muslims together and to avoid growth of parties. It matters not if the ruler is ignorant or godless. But if one has seized the government by force, and another rises against him and conquers him, the conqueror is to be acknowledged as the rightful Imam; and this for the reasons already given." *

A further result of this opportunist theory was that in complete opposition to the old Arab ideas which dominated in the beginning of the Caliphate, they declared it permissible for two Islamic sovereigns (Imams) to rule simultaneously. The oldest Islam knew only of one ruler of the Islamic Empire, the Caliph. But soon they saw several rival Caliphs claiming to rule simultaneously, and the nearer the Caliphate approached its fall the larger grew the number of the independent rulers. Thus they came to hold that the co-existence of two (or even several) Imams was legally permissible if they did not rule in the same but in different and distant countries.† Another result of the gradual transformation of the political conditions was that the old Arab theory, according to which the Prince forfeited the throne by reason of irreligion and godlessness, was insensibly shelved, and the very opposite view asserted itself, which found a staunch champion in Nasafy, who expressly stated that neither vice nor unrighteousness

* Ibn Jama'ah, *Kitab Tahrir-ul-Ahkam*; ms. fol. 7.

† Mawakif, p. 306; Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 391; Ibn Jama'ah finds fault with this view and adheres to the old principle that there can be only one legitimate Imam at a time. He looks upon the Imam in the sense of the "head of the religion."

would justify the deposition of the Imam.* In full possession of their temporal power the earlier Caliphs rarely relied upon the spiritual aspect of their dignity, and liked to act like temporal potentates; but the later ones, the more they lost their political power, the more they sought to encircle themselves with the halo of an inviolable religious sanctity. And thus we see that at the time when the political authority of the Caliph hardly extended beyond the walls of Baghdad, those very princes who had torn from him his fairest provinces only felt secure in the possession of their power when the Caliph invested them with those lands and granted them his sign-manual warrant and conferred upon them high-sounding titles such as: Baha-ud-Dawlah; Adad-ud-Dawlah; Jalal-ul-Mulk; Rukn-ud-Din, etc.† We can only explain this phenomenon by the increasing ignorance and growing superstition of the times. Under the Caliph Kadir the Buwayhid princes ruled Iraq and Fars under the title of Amir-ul-Omara. And yet every one of them sought and obtained solemn investiture from the Caliph. It consisted in the Caliph summoning the officials to his palace, receiving the new *Amir* in solemn audience in their midst, attiring him with seven robes of honour, a black turban, and presenting him with two arm-buckles and a gold chain. Then he made over to him two banners which he with his own hand fastened to the spear-staff, and finally got his courtiers to engirdle him with a sword.‡ The union of the spiritual and temporal power in the person of the ruler—though it prolonged the life of the Caliphate—was not without disadvantage. In the earliest days of Islam they could not conceive of the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power. In fact the governors

* D'Ohsson, I, 163, 164, § 37.

† The last title was the subject of a long diplomatic negotiation between the Caliph Kadir and the King Abu Kaligar. (Weil, III, 54). In this negotiation Mawardi acted as the ambassador of the Caliph. The King wished for nothing less than the title of "Sultan-ul-Muazzam Malik-ul-umam" but Mawardi peremptorily refused, on the ground that only the Caliph was the great Sultan and the ruler of nations. At last he consented to the title of Malik-ud-Dawlah and sent rich presents to the Caliph through Mawardi. Weil, III, 78, Ibn Athir, IX, 313.

‡ *Uyun-ul-Tawarikh*, XIII, Fol. I. The hanging of sword and attiring with fur is, to this day, the usual form of investiture of the vassal-princes in Constantinople. The diadem and the arm-buckles are the exclusive tokens of royal dignity. Abul Faraj, p. 374. The decorations conferred by the Abbasid Caliphs consisted of black banners, robes of honour, a golden chain and a diadem. Cf. Ibn Adhari, I, 169. Ibn Athir, VIII, 315. Compare the investiture of Toghrul in Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 39; *Gemäldesaal*, V, 24, on investiture: see also Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 139.

appointed in their provinces, were not only at the head of the administration (military, financial and judicial), but were also the representatives of the Spiritual Chief of Islam in all matters religious and ecclesiastical. They preached every Friday at divine service in the mosque, presided at the prayers, and were not only governors but also the legates of the High-Priest of Religion. It is not difficult to see how wide and extensive their powers were, for they ruled over the conscience of their subjects. But, as Ibn Khaldun truly observes, just as there is a constant tendency in an oriental monarchy towards absolutism, towards unlimited power, so undoubtedly the effort of the oriental governors was always in the direction of greater and greater independence of the central authority. This the Caliphs soon perceived and sought to check, by the introduction of posts and postmasters, who continually kept sending in reports and informing the Caliphs of all that was going on in the provinces; not omitting to mention the conduct of their governors.* But this was of little avail. The governors became more and more independent in their provinces. They even converted them into hereditary governorships—transmitting the dignity to their descendants—and soon became absolute independent princes who, in conformity with the spirit of the age, duly acknowledged the Caliph as the Spiritual Chief of Islam. From the theoretical views which the earliest Arab jurist, the oft-mentioned Mawardi, has set forth, we see at once that the idea of a strong central government never obtained in the Caliphate. Like the Wizarat, governorship too was divided into limited and unlimited functions. According to Mawardi the governor with unlimited powers, was appointed directly by the Caliph, and in his province was all in all. He stood at the head of the army, he decided disputes, appointed judges, collected taxes and poor-tax, applied the revenue to government expenses, maintained religion intact, punished religious offences, and held the position of the Commander-in-Chief when at war †. This unlimited governorship at the time of Mawardi was nothing more nor less than kingship. It prevailed throughout the Empire. In Iraq, nay, even in Baghdad itself, the Buwayhids ruled under the title of *Amirs*, but really as independent princes.

The limited governorship fairly corresponded to the governorship as it existed in the best days of the Caliphate, when the Caliphs could

* Cf. Sprenger, *Die Post und Reiserouten des Orients*, p. 1 *et seq.*

† Mawardi, pp. 47, 48, also 51-53.

keep the governors under control. The limited governor was entrusted with the command of the troops and the administration of the province, but he neither exercised judicial functions, nor had he anything to do with the taxes, nor indeed did he represent the Caliph in matters religious.

On the other hand, governorship by usurpation, referred to by Mawardi, gives us a correct picture of the then conditions of the Caliphate which was hastening to its fall. Discussing the views of the Islamic jurists on sovereignty and their opportunist theory of acknowledging the rule of might, we have already seen that they accepted accomplished facts. Mawardi's theory of governorship by usurpation rests upon the very same principle, namely, acceptance of the inevitable. By governorship by usurpation he understands the governorship which a rebel acquires by force of arms, and in which he is confirmed by the Caliph. The conditions necessary for such confirmation are too significant to be passed over in silence. They are: (1) the usurper must acknowledge the sovereignty of the Caliph, and his authority as religious head; (2) in matters religious he must submit to the authority of the Caliph and promise obedience to him; (3) he must promise friendship and assistance to the Muslims; (4) he must permit the bestowal of religious ranks (through the Caliph), and recognise as lawful the resulting decisions and orders; (5) the legal dues must be adjusted according to law, so that the giver may fulfil his duty, and both the giver and the receiver may feel that they are just and fair; (6) the legal enactments must be observed and applied with firmness.*

It is not possible to cite a clearer proof than this passage of the effort of the Caliphs to preserve the nimbus of religious sovereignty, and to maintain the spiritual dignity in its absolute entirety, as their last sheet-anchor, in the growing decay of their political power. They willingly acknowledged a bold adventurer, who took possession of a province, by transforming him through their consecration from a rebel into a legitimate ruler. They recognised his new position, with unlimited powers, provided he acknowledged unconditionally the religious supremacy of the High Priest of all Muslims enthroned at Baghdad. Very great was the respect and veneration in which the Caliphs were held as the Spiritual Chiefs of Islam. And this indeed conferred upon them a

* Mawardi, pp. 55, 56.

political power at the time when they possessed no army, and had even in their own capital to submit to the tutelage of the Seljuks. I will here mention a fact characteristic of what has been said. When the powerful Seljukian Sultan, Malik Shah, received the investiture from the Caliph at Baghdad, he wanted at the conclusion of the ceremony to kiss the hand of the Caliph, but this the Caliph refused, and offered him his signet to kiss.*

Thus nominally the Caliph still remained the spiritual and temporal head of the largest portion of the Islamic world. In fact, from Muktafi II (d. 555 A.H., 1160 A.D.) onward, they even managed to acquire great political independence, and to step into light once again as powerful temporal rulers. But the Moguls made an end of their temporal power. They took Baghdad, and killed the Caliph, his two sons and many kinsmen (656 A.H., 1258 A.D.). The importance which the religious element conferred upon the Caliphs shows itself at best in the fact that, though their temporal power perished, their religious dignity continued unimpaired.

A son of the last Caliph but two continued the Caliphate in Egypt under the protection of the Ayyubides, the rulers there. But a great change had taken place. In Cairo the Abbasid Caliphs ruled merely as the religious chiefs of orthodox Islam. They exercised no temporal power of any kind, except that they conferred investiture, now reduced to a mere formality, upon the Sultans, who, for reasons religious or political, sought it from the Caliphs.†

Thus was completed the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power of the Caliph. The Caliph was the spiritual head—the Sultan, the temporal ruler of Islam. Until the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Salim, this Spiritual Chief of Islam resided at Cairo under the almost meaningless title of the Caliph, or the Commander of the Faithful, and, under the protection of the temporal sovereign, led a precarious existence. The last of these is said to have resigned his claim in favour of the Turkish conqueror. Upon this the Ottoman Sultans rest their claim to the spiritual and temporal sovereignty of Islam.‡

* Ibn Athir, X, 104.

† Like Firuz Tuglak, the third ruler of the dynasty of Tuglak Shah at Delhi. Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, IV, p. 233. *Gesch. der Ilchane*, I, 214.

‡ D'Ohsson I, 154. Hammer in his *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs* does not speak of any direct transfer of the Caliphate, but only emphasises the homage of the Sherifs of

Thus vanished one of the most powerful ideas, the old Asiatic conception of theocracy, which made everything subordinate to religion, and which looked upon the prince more as a High Priest than a temporal ruler.

X.—The Sultanat.

With the extinction of the Caliphate the Church of Islam lost its Spiritual Chief. The common tie which united all Muslims into one religious community, irrespective of race and language, was rent asunder. In the following pages we propose to deal with the further developments which took place in the bosom of Islam: showing how the old Arab ideas of Church and State were gradually transformed, nay, displaced by fresh ones, and how, even in the woeful tumults of the Mogul invasion and the devastating incursions of the Turkish hordes, signs of progress were not wanting which heralded a better and brighter future for the East.

All this demonstrates how little the human mind can be constrained in rigid forms, and how, under new and altered conditions, it will strive to bring itself into line with the culture and civilisation of the times. It further demonstrates how the ideas of a vanished age live and linger, long after they have spent their force and served their purpose. They persist, indeed, amidst the assault of newer forces, until they are completely worn away.

Though ruled by independent governors, the individual provinces of the Caliphate were yet part and parcel of one empire; and this, by reason of the spiritual authority of the Caliph, which was, so to speak, the uniting tie. But, with the altered conditions, they became absolute independent States. Geographical position and the dawning sense of nationality determined their growth and defined their boundary.

Thus in his own dominion every Sultan was an unlimited ruler in matters both spiritual and temporal. Not only was he the head of the State, but also the high-priest of Religion.* Thus it was in Spain and Africa; and thus in Arabia and India. In Persia, where the Mogul dynasty of the family of Chengiz Khan had founded a vast empire

Mekka in consequence of which Salim, as servant of the two holy cities (a title which Ottoman Sultans still bear) is said to have become the Protector and the Suzerain of the Egyptian Sultans and Caliphs. Hammer, I, 791. See Snouck Hurgronje, *Mohammedanism*, Chapter III; and Marriott, *Eastern Question*, Chapter III.

* Thus the Arab rulers of Spain appointed Christian bishops and summoned Councils. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, II, 47, 140.

extending from the Indus to the Euphrates, and even for a time including Syria, the first rulers were heathens and Buddhists. They were doubtless partial to the Christians and Jews; but, in matters religious, on the whole they adopted an attitude of indifference, nay, almost of contemptuous tolerance. And yet they kept the supreme spiritual power well in their hands, and personally appointed high ecclesiastical dignitaries.*

Only in Egypt did the Caliphate continue; but more in name than in reality. Thus, in Islamic lands, with the different independent Sultanats different independent Churches grew up. But, be it noted, the temporal and spiritual power remained completely in the hands of one man—the Sultan. The vital principle of Islam, the indissoluble union of the spiritual and temporal power, one of the oldest and the most powerful of Semitic ideas, wherein lay the greatest strength of the Caliphate, continued unaffected. But while of yore the temporal power had been lodged in the person of the Spiritual Chief, now, in the altered state of affairs—though the spiritual and temporal power remained in the hands of one and the same person—it was lodged no longer, as in days gone by, in the High-priest of Islam, but in an avowedly temporal ruler—the Sultan. However outward this subordination of Religion to State—it marks an important stage in the history of Islamic civilisation.

This explains the theories of the later jurists, theories completely foreign to the original spirit of Islam, which regarded descent from the family of Quraish as no longer indispensable for the Imamat, and which permitted every bold adventurer who made good his claim to be treated as the legitimate head of the State. They no longer held, as before, that there could only be one head of Islam, but they conceded that several Imams might rule different countries at one and the same time. Finally they treated the Imamat no longer as a spiritual but as a temporal institution.†

* Arghun was a Buddhist. The solemn reception of a relic of Buddha which was brought to him proves this. Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane* I, 376. Also Halaku was a Buddhist. Journal Asiat. 1860, vol. xvi, 306. The Ilkhan Keidschatu was quite indifferent to religion. Of him the Armenian historian Haithon speaks thus: *Nullam habebat legem vel fidem*. Hammer, I, 400. The Ilkhane, naturally, with the acceptance of Islam, became a fanatic in matters religious. Ghazan, who was converted from Buddhism to Islam, wavered for some time between Orthodox and Shiite Islam. Hammer, II, 119, 153, 160, 173. He finally adopted the Sufi-Shiite view. Hammer, II, 68, 133, 135.

† Ibn Khaldun, *Prolég.*, I, 431. Mawakif, 296.

It would be an error to suppose that, with the gradual transformation of ideas relating to spiritual and temporal sovereignty, there was a corresponding change in the spirit and method of administration, or that the government itself became more tolerant or less susceptible to religious influences. In this respect, indeed, the Sultanate made no change at all. Such a change was only effected in the course of centuries, and was felt comparatively late.

The transition from the Caliphate to the Sultanat, attended as it was by violent convulsions, put back the hour-hand of progress.

The partition of the Caliphate into a number of almost independent dynasties (already an accomplished fact long before the Mogul invasion) had dealt a fatal blow at the moral and material conditions of the Muslim empire. Prosperity had declined, and with prosperity civilisation had sensibly and seriously suffered.

In the East the Turkish adventurers, in the West the Berber chiefs, as the supercilious vassals of the Caliph, had divided amongst themselves the richest and fairest lands of the Caliphate. Everywhere the Arab element receded into the background, and not until the foreign conquerors were *arabicised* and thereby civilised, did they offer a helping hand to letters.

When, with the conquest of Baghdad by the Moguls, and the disappearance of the last Abbasid Caliph, the small vassal princes were bereft of their feudal chief, their position became so insecure that they needed something else besides military force to render themselves safe. They therefore sought the help of that most influential class of the community—the theologians—who gave ungrudging support only to those who followed their lead and governed according to their views.

In the opinion of the Muslims Religion and Kingship are the two ideas which mutually complete themselves.* Just as men, says Ghazzali, must needs have a prince to rule them, so the Prince must needs have a law (*kanun*) to rule by. The theologian (*fakih*) knows this law, and he knows how to apply it when men come into collision with each other in matters of right. He, therefore, is the instructor and the guide of the Prince. According to an Arab proverb: Religion and Kingship are twinborn.† Ibn Khaldun himself emphasises the distinctive

* Ihya, I, 21.

† Rabi-ul-Abrar, p. 33.

feature of the Islamic State by saying that the spiritual and temporal powers in that State are one and indivisible ; while among other people the king is only a temporal ruler.* He only is a true prince who is at once the spiritual and temporal chief of his people.† Even as early as Bukhari the ulemas were regarded as the heirs of the Prophet‡, and a tradition (which obviously is a forgery, but which goes back to an early age) tells us that the ink of the ulema, on the Day of Judgment, will be of much greater worth and value than the blood of the martyrs.§ The need for reading the Qur'an, and reading it aright, and the need for learning the traditions of the Prophet, called forth in the first century a class of teachers who were held in high esteem ; and this, indeed, for the simple and obvious reason that the instruction they imparted stood in intimate relation to religion. Thousands of students flocked to the lectures of pious and renowned Shaikhs, and some of these savants, like the jurist Malik Ibn Anas, enjoyed almost a princely status|| In Islam law and administration of law were inseparable from religion. Thus the administration of justice passed entirely into the hands of the ulemas, who with it acquired immense influence and immense wealth. True, the Caliph Omar appointed judges who were paid by the State, but it must be remembered that along with their fixed pay they received fees (e.g. for delivering Fatwas) which far exceeded their emolument.¶ In the increasing degeneration of the Muslim empire the office of the judge was later sold to the highest bidder.**

There was therefore no more brilliant career for a promising youth than the study of law and theology.†† Soon the number of theologians was legion. In the 9th century A.D., in the southern suburb of the town of Cordova alone, there were no less than 4,000 theologians and students of theology. The lectures of the pious Abu Darda (d. 32 A.H. ; 652—3 A.D.), the first Kadhi of Damascus, were attended by 1,600 students (Ibn Asakir, fol. 4). Bukhari's lectures at Baghdad

* *Proleg.*, I, 469. † 1, 1, 319. ‡ Bukhari, 54. § Rabi-ul-Abrar, p. 15.

|| He lived at Medina which was the cradle of learning of the earliest Islam. Bukhari, 21-49.

¶ The income of a judge of Aleppo amounted to 100,000 Dirhams. Haneberg : *Schul und Lehrwesen der Araber*, p. 27. A Kadhi of Seville possessed a third of the landed properties of this town. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, IV, 8, 9.

** Von Kremer, *Aegypten*, II, 72.

†† Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, III, 110, says of the studies at the mosque of Cordova Thus the students who studied numbered thousands. The majority of them studied *fiqh*, i.e. theology and law, because this learning then led to most lucrative offices.

attracted an audience of 20,000 men. Even if this number be an exaggeration, it undoubtedly gives an idea of the number of the theologians and students of theology who in the golden period of Islam congregated in large towns such as Mekka, Damascus, Baghdad, Medina, Nishapur, Cordova, Seville, Kairowan, etc., etc. The great mosque of Azhar counts even now more than a thousand students. How imposing must have been their number during the period when the number of the inhabitants exceeded half a million!

One common purpose united the members of this great guild, and welded them into a vast brotherhood fired by one common party fervour. Their common course of study; their faith in the sacredness of their calling, and the sanctity of their order; the superstitious veneration accorded to them by the ignorant masses—all these inspired the theological guild, diffused as it was throughout the length and breadth of the Muslim empire, with the self-same thought of their dignity, and the self-same thought of their indispensability. Add to this the fact that, the theologians soon acquired immense incomes and extensive landed properties.

Even in the early days of Islam the practice of dedicating landed properties to religious uses had come into existence, and had crystallised into an institution. The income of the properties so dedicated was employed according to the direction of the founder.* In this institution the strong religious sense of the Arabs finds beautiful expression. Often, perhaps, fear of death and remorse of conscience, induced them, in the last hour of their existence, to give away a portion of their ill-gotten gains for religious uses; partly to atone for the past, partly to obtain admission into paradise. But often a much loftier motive called forth these endowments. Very many were such institutions in the first century of Islam, but information fails us.†

The Spanish Caliph Hakam III (350–366 A.H., 961–976 A.D.) deserves mention as one of the noblest benefactors of humanity of all times. After he had completed the construction of the great mosque of Cordova (which later he considerably extended), he endowed it with a fourth of the landed property which he had inherited from

* Bukhari: The Prophet said to Omar: "Divide the income without selling the property endowed."

† Already Muawiah made an endowment in favour of his kinsmen and all poor Muslims.

his father, with a direction that its annual income should be divided among the poor of Spain.* One other institution of this Prince calls for notice here. In his time primary schools were good and numerous in Muslim Spain. In Andalusia nearly every one could read and write, while in Christian Europe persons in most exalted positions—unless they belonged to the clergy—remained illiterate. Hakam, however, believed that instruction was not yet as widely diffused as it ought to be, and in his tender solicitude for the poorer classes he founded in the capital twenty-seven Seminaries, in which children of poor parents were educated gratuitously, the teachers being paid out of the Caliph's privy purse.†

Under the Fatimide Caliph Moizz (359 A.H., 969-970 A.D.) the great mosque of Cairo, Al-Azhar, was built and endowed. The endowment was considerably enlarged by his grandson, Hakim, the sixth Fatimide ruler of Egypt. He not only richly endowed the mosque of Al-Azhar with landed properties, but also three other mosques and the Academy of Learning founded by him. Out of the income of the endowed lands the mosques were maintained, and numerous theologians provided with stipends.‡ By reason of such endowments and legacies to pious uses the *ulemas* (into whose hands, as might have been expected, their administration passed) acquired immense landed properties and an immense income. Only a portion (as is the case to this day) was used for the purposes indicated by the founder; the bulk passing into the pockets of the Inspectors, Administrators, etc. (Nazir, Mutawalli). And this notwithstanding the efforts of the Government. In this connexion the Diwan-ul-Awkaf should be mentioned. It is an office still to be found both in Turkey and Egypt, and it existed under the Mogul rule in Persia, where the famous astronomer Nasiruddin Tusi (d. 675 A.H.; 1276-7 A.D.) held the post of the Inspector-General of Waqfs—an honourable and lucrative post.§

The Turkish Sultans entrusted the supervision of the pious endowments made by them to their great Wazirs, or Muftis, or to their *Kapu*

* Adhari, II, 250. Dozy's ed.

† Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, p. 455. See also Ibn Adhari, II, 256, about the University of Cordova. For further information, see Von Schack's *Poesie und Kunst der Araber in Spanien und Sicilien*, Vol. I, pp. 50 et seq.; Ibn Khal., Vol. I, 210-212.

‡ Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, III, 218.

§ Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, II, 154, 171, 181. Abul Faraj, 548.

Aghasi, or Kizlar Aghasi.* But private individuals preferred to entrust the administration to learned men (Ulemas), such as the Mufti, the two Kadhi Askar, the Kadhi of Constantinople or to the Mullas, Kadhis, or other ecclesiastics of the town where the waqf property happened to be.†

A cursory glance at oriental history shows how tremendously grew the tendency to make pious bequests, and this tendency was further fostered and encouraged by the fashion which arose in the fifth century of the Hijra; namely, to build and endow madrassahs, *i.e.* colleges, learned academies.

Such institutions soon spread over the entire Muslim world. Princes and Amirs, rich merchants, noble ladies and well-to-do savants vied with each other in founding madrassahs and thereby perpetuating their own memory. By their endowment with landed properties a sure and certain income was secured for these institutions. Out of it the professors were paid, even the students were maintained, and not infrequently a considerable amount was spent on books.‡

This tendency called into being a vast succession of endowments in favour of institutions for the study of the Qur'an and Hadith; for the establishment of cloisters (Ribat); place of shelter (Khanqah); hospitals; eating houses and fountains for public use.

The large incomes bequeathed for the maintenance of these institutions stood, as has been stated above, mostly under the administration of the Muslim priests, who were anything but scrupulous in the discharge of their duties. This suffices to prove how immense was the income which the Ulemas, standing at the head of the mosques and the madrassahs, had at their disposal—apart from the income that they made from such splendid offices as those of the judge (kadhi) and mufti. This makes it quite clear why all young people devoted

* *Kapu Aghasi* is the Head of the Palace Officials and *Kizlar Aghasi* is the Chief of the Eunuchs of the Seraglio.

† In Egypt to this day waqf properties are mostly under the control of the influential Ulemas. The jurist Kashaf, in his work on waqfs (Kitab-ul-Awkaf, Ms.; Vienna Library, p. 14), says: some old jurists maintained that it was best that the Kadhi should appoint the Mutawalli, but in later times when men came to know how the Kadhis longed for the income of the waqf properties, they differed from this view, and asserted that it was best to let the officials of the mosque appoint the Mutawalli by common consent.

‡ Von Kremer, *Aegypten*, II, 272. Haneburg: *Schul und Lehrwesen der Araber.*

themselves to the study of theology, to the exclusion of all other learning—a fact which called forth bitter regrets from Ghazzali.*

In no other sphere of intellectual activity, indeed, could one reach so quickly the goal which the majority of men strive after—wealth and esteem. In the history of Islam, we have instances, only in the most recent times, of rulers laying their hands on the property of the Muslim clergy.† The body of the Ulemas, forming a graded and rigidly confined hierarchy, was thus the dominating class of society from the moment when, under the Caliph Mutawakkil, the orthodox party succeeded in destroying the influence of the Mutazzalites and reconstructing Islam on its old, dogmatic foundation. Contemporaneously with this event took place the development of that pietistic mode of thought which, right up to modern times, became more and more the directing power of intellectual life permeating the entire culture of the Muslim world.

By pietism we do not here mean the genuine and spontaneous expression of religious feelings and sentiments, but outward religious practices—intended merely for show—without any inward importance and significance, which, we may notice, at all times and in every religion discrediting and destroying the true spirit of religion. It was pietism in this sense that henceforward began to play an exceedingly large and truly damaging rôle in the intellectual and spiritual history of Islam. Many things, to be sure, Islam did contain which encouraged this form of mentality. The rules of divine service, the most precise directions regarding the movements of the body at such service, and the general formality of the religious system of Islam—these could not but lead to far-reaching consequences.

The ascetic movement owed its origin to the union of religious enthusiasm with the fear of eternal punishment. But these very causes gave birth to asceticism on the one hand; to pietism on the other. Genuine religious men, always in a minority, fondly took to asceticism, but the great majority of those who thirsted for honours and wealth and sought the sweetest fruits of life, strove by mere outward conformity to the current standard of religion and morality, to pass for the devout and the religious. In no religion, indeed, has hypocrisy assumed so colossal a

* Ihya, I, 26.

† The only instance in earlier Islam, when the property of the church was confiscated, is mentioned by Dozy. See Eng. Tr., p. 567.

shape as it has assumed in Islam. Judaism, by its formalism and outward ceremonials, would have been led similarly astray; but it was early chastened by repressions and persecutions. Victorious Islam, however, soon slackened in its precepts—hypocrisy and pietism robbing it of the only true foundation of every religion—purity of heart. Morbid sentiments (rapture and ecstasy which had already become widely diffused at the time of Ghazzali) were the unfailing results. To pass for religious has always been in Islam the surest road to honour and dignity. It was essential, therefore, that one should act, or affect to act, and appear, what he was not.*

When Sufism called forth a reaction against the rule of the degenerate hierarchy, religious hypocrisy took possession of this field.

A time came—it was in the 5th or the 6th century of the Hijra—when it became a fashion to profess Sufism. These pretenders imitated the Sufis in their dress and in their demeanour. They gave up their silver and gold-embroidered dresses, and clothed themselves in patched garments and carried about their prayer-rugs with them. These people, Ghazzali exclaims, pretended to be Sufis.†

These words of Ghazzali very clearly indicate how very general was the tendency in those days to swim with the religious sentiments of the day. But even in the preceding century the very same ideas predominated. An eye-witness, the Spanish savant Tartushi, who travelled through Iraq in the second half of the fifth century A.H. (476 A.H.), and who for a long time resided in Baghdad and Basra, eloquently describes the services which the great Nizam-ul-Mulk rendered to religion. He devoted his fullest attention, we are told, to the votaries of religion. He built educational institutions (Dar-ul-Ilm) for theologians, Madrassahs for ulemas, founded cloisters (Ribat) for penitents and ascetics, for the pious and for fakirs; assigned them salaries, and gave them food and raiment, provided students with ink and paper, and even allowed them stipends. His beneficence extended over the whole empire, from Jerusalem to the borders of Syria, to Diarbekr, Iraq, Khorasan, and Samarqand which lies on the other side of the Oxus. In this whole empire—a hundred days' journey—there was no savant, no student, no devotee, no ascetic in his tent, who did not enjoy Nizam's benefaction. The amount annually spent by him on this account amounted to 600,000 Dinars.‡

* Ihya, III, 356. A most interesting passage.

† Ihya, III, 492.

‡ Seraj-ul-Muluk, fol. 127.

To secure the support of the ulemas and the orthodox party, Adad-ud-Daulah, a hundred years before, assigned to the clergy a fixed pay and rebuilt several mosques.* Extremely powerful always was the influence of the Ulemas and *faqahā* in the countries of Islam, and if they formed a party against the ruler, popular insurrection was absolutely inevitable. The dominant traits of this class were fanaticism and greed. Seeking their support the Sultan had to make terms with them, but it was by no means easy to do so, as they were always extravagant in their demands. True, this party could often secure peace at home, but against enemies abroad it was entirely helpless. In that case the military order was the only protection available. Indeed, soldiers were but too often necessary for the maintenance of peace at home. For in the disorganised condition of the Muslim States; in the constant appearance of pretenders to the throne, and religious enthusiasts and other agitators; an efficient army was indispensable. The Caliphate, by reason of the religious influence which it exercised, held together most of the Muslim dynasties under its spiritual sway, and gave to them the appearance of religious solidarity. With the fall of the Caliphate this was no longer possible. Now nothing existed but the rule of might—softened, no doubt, by the sense of common descent—most of the rulers then being of Turkish nationality.

In the Caliphate the foreign soldiery had already become a great power. The Abbasids obtained the throne with the aid of the Persian troops, mostly recruited from Khorasan. The practice soon grew up among the Abbasids of surrounding themselves with several thousands of strong body-guards, consisting mostly of purchased slaves, imported from the countries of Central Asia inhabited by the Turkomans. Relying upon the old Arab idea of the relation of *patron* and *client*, the Caliphs presented freedom to these slaves. Their number grew. They were given fiefs. They attained wealth and influence, and the Caliphs were lulled into the belief that they were surrounded by men, true and loyal to them. But the idea of the relation between *patron* and *client*, a purely Arab idea, was completely foreign to the Turkish slaves. As soon as prosperity had destroyed their original simplicity of life, they became rude and defiant. Every new Caliph, on his accession, had to secure their favour and support by lavish presents, by increase of salary, by

* Abul Faraj, p. 319.

grant of rich fiefs. Withal there always was the risk of losing life and throne.

In Spain the Mamluks, and later the Berbers, played precisely the same rôle as did the Turks in the East.* The Almovahid Sultans, who chose their troops chiefly from the Berber tribe of Zanatah and the Arab Beduins, shared later the very same fate. (Ibn Khaldun, I, 346.)

The leaders of these foreign troops, who were everywhere given large landed properties, gradually became a kind of feudal nobility, a military aristocracy; and the more their power grew the less they obeyed the Sultan.† Already in the 3rd century A.H. there had arisen in Persia the dynasties of the Tahirides, the Saffarides, and the Samanides. And immediately before the first crusade almost the entire Caliphate was in the hands of vassal princelets of Turkish origin.

The Seljuks, and after them the Khwarizm Shah, ruled the eastern lands.‡ Aleppo, Emessa, Damascus, Antioch, Samosata, Saruj, Harran, Mosul, Mardin, Tikrit, Sunjar, etc., were in possession of the Turkish amirs. In Asia Minor, the Seljukian dynasty maintained itself until overthrown by the Mogul rulers of Persia. The Turkish princes, standing in the relation of vassals partly to the Sultan of Iraq and partly to the Fatmide Caliph residing at Cairo, ruled Syria. But they were constantly at war with each other.§

Such was the position of affairs in the Caliphate when, at the end of the 11th century, the army of the crusaders marched through Asia Minor to Syria. The disunion of the Muslim princes made the conquest of Jerusalem easy. And thus, on the 15th of July, 1099 A.D., Jerusalem was conquered. While unbroken warfare was going on between Cross and Crescent for nearly two centuries, a tremendous danger had arisen in the East.

Chengiz Khan, the great Mogul prince, burst from Turkistan into the Muslim countries, destroying and flooding them with crimson streams (1218). His son Halaku continued the conquests, and with the capture

* Under Abdur Rahman III the number of slaves, who were partly soldiers and partly courtiers, was between 6 to 12,000. Dozy, III, 60, 61. Even many negroes were in the body-guard of the Spanish Caliphs. Ibid., II, 68.

† Wilken, *Gesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, I, 273.

‡ Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, pp. 176–178. "At one time the rule of the Khwarizm Shah was almost conterminous with the Seljuk empire, but this period of widest extent scarcely lasted a dozen years." For the Ilkhan of Persia, see Lane-Poole, p. 217.

§ Kremer, *Mittelsyrien und Damascus*, p. 42.

of Baghdad and the execution of the Caliph extinguished the Caliphate. Islam seemed lost: pressed on the one hand by the army of the crusaders, filled with religious fervour; and on the other by the wild plundering, ever-advancing cavalry of the Moguls. But Islam did not perish. In Syria it steadily supplanted the Franks: and in Persia, where a powerful Mogul dynasty had established a vast empire under the name of Il-Khan, the religion of the Prophet won a dazzling victory when Ghazan, the seventh ruler, accepted Islam and entered into friendly relations with the rest of the Muslim princes. Not by arms but by religious ideas did Islam vanquish the northern Conquerors. There must, indeed, be some tremendous power in these Semitic religions which enables them not only to weather world-shattering storms but to emerge out of them firmer, stronger, more vigorous than ever. In the war with the Franks, extending over more than a century, Islam passed through a tempering process. The rift that had opened, closed in fire and blood. Islam shook off its lethargy and gathered fresh strength. The Arab nation, which had long ceased to champion the religious ideas had that arisen and grown into maturity in their midst, now retired into the background, handing over the torch to a nation ruder but more powerful, whose empire soon embraced the entire Orient, and whose political power the older Caliphate never attained or equalled.

Almost about the time of the conversion of Ghazan the Franks lost Acre, their last stronghold in the Holy Land (1291). Then followed the fall of Sidon and Beyrut (1291).* Here, in Syria, Islam conquered by the sword; there, in Persia, by the Qur'an.

In Egypt and Syria ruled the first Mamluk Sultans. They were Turkish and Circassian slaves, and had their origin in the purchased body-guard of the Ayyubide Sultan Salih Ayyub.† The first of their line was a woman, Queen Shajar-al-Durz, widow of Salih; but a representative of the Ayyubide family (Musa) was accorded the nominal dignity of joint sovereignty for a few years. Then followed a succession of slave-kings, divided into two dynasties, the Bahri (of the River) and the Burji (of the Fort), who ruled Egypt and Syria down to the beginning of the 16th century.‡ In Persia the empire founded by Chengiz and Halaku soon fell to pieces, and was lost in small dynas-

* Wilken, *Gesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, VII, 771.

† Stanley Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dyn.*, pp. 80–83.

‡ Von Kremer, *Mittelsyrien und Damascus*, pp. 75–91.

ties.* Asia Minor was split up into a number of Turkish principalities. Ten States soon divided the Seljuk kingdom of Rum amongst themselves. The Karasi dynasty occupied Mysia; the families of Saru Khan and Aydin, Lydia; the Mantasha princes, Caria; those of Takka, Lycia and Pamphylia; Hamid, Pisidia and Isauria; Karaman, Lycaonia; Karmiyan, Phrygia; Kizil Ahmadli, Paphlagonia; whilst the house of Othman held Phrygia Epictetus. All these dynasties were gradually absorbed by the rising power of the Othmanlis, once the least among them. Karasi was annexed in 737 (1336); Hamid was purchased as a marriage dower in 783 (1382); and in 792 (1390) Bayazid (Bajazet I) annexed Karmiyan, Takka, Saru Khan, Aydin and Mantasha, in a single campaign, and completed his conquest by adding Karaman and Kizil Ahmadli in 794–5 (1392–3). Thus at the end of the 14th century, not a hundred years after the assumption of independence by Othman I, the arms of his great-grandson had swept away the nine rival dynasties.†

A Christian kingdom enjoyed a more or less precarious existence in Armenia until overthrown by the Egyptian Mamluks. In Africa, where the Almovahid dynasty had continued for a century and half, a similar process was repeated as in the East. Smaller dynasties arose out of the general ruin. These were the Banu Marin in Morocco; the Banu Zijan in the province known to-day as Algeria . and the Banu Hafs in Tunis. In Spain, with the fall of Granada, vanished the last trace of Muslim rule.

In India Kutbuddin Aybak founded the first Muslim dynasty which ruled exclusively in India; for up till then Muslim India had been an outlying province of the kingdom of Ghazna. ‡

With the exception of the African coast beyond Egypt, the entire Orient was in the hands of numerous dynasties of Turkish and Mongolian origin, who, according to their old traditional ways, were always at war with each other.

But a still more devastating inroad of the Central Asiatic hordes was yet to take place in the Eastern countries. About the time when the Turkish tribe which later under the name of Othmanlis rose to such great distinction, was securing and consolidating its power in Asia

* Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, II, 335; Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, pp. 123 et seq.

† Lane Poole, p. 184. ‡ Lane-Poole, p. 295.

Minor; nay, even extending it towards the south-east of Europe; countless hordes under Timur burst into the north-eastern provinces and thence proceeded in two directions: to India, where they overthrew the Pathan dynasty of Delhi, and to Iraq and Asia Minor, where they came into collision with the Othmanlis, and in the bloody battle of Angora destroyed the Ottoman army and took the Sultan Bajazet prisoner (1402). But with the death of Timur (1405) the vast empire founded by him in fire and blood went to pieces. A large number of Timuride dynasties came into existence—the last of which survived right up to modern times.*

But in the rise of Timur there is one distinctive feature. His was not an Anti-Islamic movement like the first inroad of the Moguls. Timur was simply a conqueror, but not in the Anti-Islamic sense. True, he inflicted upon the Islamic countries the most hideous barbarities, but he showed respect for religion and its exponents, the ulemas. Humanity has nothing to thank him for. Civilisation grievously suffered by his desolating wars, but Islam ran no risks. The Muslim theologians readily paid homage to their new sovereign, who in no way threatened their privileges or affected their position. Indeed Timur inclined to the Shiite faith, then predominant in Persia.

This is not the place to discuss the history of the numerous dynasties that sprang up after every fresh political revolution. The Timurides ruled Persia, Iraq, Adherbaijan and the eastern parts of Asia Minor† until the Safawis in Persia and the Ottomans elsewhere put an end to their power. Only in India did the Mogul dynasty founded by Baber continue, until overthrown by the English in modern times.

The development and gradual transformation of the dominant ideas of Islam under the influence of the Sultanate stand in too intimate a connexion with the history of the civilisation of the individual Islamic States and the manifold local causes and forces at work there.

How differently religious ideas shaped themselves in the extreme west, in Africa and Morocco, and, in the remote east, in India! We shall therefore confine ourselves here to the intellectual and spiritual forces which have exercised a decisive influence on the Ottoman power,

* The present Khan of Bukhara—over whose history Prof. Vambrey has thrown light—traces his descent from Timur. The last rulers of Delhi were Timurides.

† They soon lost Iraq and Adherbaijan to the Turkoman dynasty of Akkojunulu. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, p. I, 505.

and, with them, conclude the history of the dominant ideas of Islam.

The Turkish empire has undoubtedly, up till very recent times, been the most powerful expression of the later Islamic civilisation. True, Persia, India, Turkistan and Africa have each developed along their own intellectual line: still, from the standpoint of world-history not one of them can challenge comparison or enter into competition with Turkish Islam. They stand, indeed, very far behind Turkey. Since the fall of the world-dominion of Islam each individual nation has pursued its own particular way. Sufism, degenerating in the west, ended in a rude cult of saint-worship, and spread extensively in Persia and India. Holding a middle course between the two extremes, the Ottoman empire, embracing almost the whole of further Asia and a considerable portion of Europe and Africa, sought to revive afresh the glory of the old Caliphate. But the spirit moving and animating it was essentially different from that of the old Islam.

Asia Minor, the home of the Ottoman power, was occupied in the last period of the Caliphate by Turkish nomadic hordes. They were the individual streams of the great flood of the Turkish race-migration which in the 4th and 5th centuries of the Hijra had poured out of upper Asia into the culture-lands.

Whilst the family of the Seljuks settled down in Adherbaijan and Iraq and overthrew the Buwayhids and in their place stepped into the guardianship of the Caliphs, a Seljuk dynasty established itself in Asia Minor and named itself after its capital, Iconium—the Sultanate of Iconium.* At the very time when this dynasty had reached its highest splendour, namely, under its ninth ruler, Alauddin Kaikobad (d. 634 A.H., 1236-7 A.D.), the inroad of the Moguls took place in Persia. It ended the powerful empire of the Khwarizm Shah, which included the whole of Persia and the largest part of Iraq.

Shortly before this event that particular kind of poetry had come into existence in Persia which is indissolubly connected with Sufism, and which, under the name of mystic poetry, has preserved and immortalised one of the most alluring and charming sides of Persian culture.

* They ruled from 480-700 A.H. 1087-8 to 1300-1 A.D. See Freeman's *Ottoman Power in Europe*, Chapter IV.

† See Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 508-509. Von Kremer is evidently quite wrong here.

Then lived the great Farid-ud-din Attar † (b. 613 A.H., 1216 A.D.; d. about 719 or 732 A.H.), and the inspired singer of poetical pantheism Jalal-ud-din Rumi (d. 661 A.H., 1262–3 A.D.), and the world-renowned and world-pleasing Sadi (d. 691 A.H., 1292 A.D.).

These poets brought Sufism into prominence in Persia and with Sufism grew the various orders of dervishes.* From its peaceful meditation Persia was suddenly awakened by the tumult of on-rushing, devastating Mogul armies. Contemporaries have left us an account of the horror and alarm which the terrible news of cruelties in Balkh and Bukhara aroused among the people. Many managed to save themselves, but many more shared the fate of Farid-ud-din Attar, and fell by the Mogul sword. The fugitives spread all over the western lands of Islam. There were two courts especially where poets and savants were sure of a generous welcome: in Shiraz at the court of the Ataboks, and in Iconium at the court of the Seljukian Sultan, Alauddin Kaikobad. At the court of the latter a large circle of poets and savants assembled, and in his capital Persian literature found a congenial soil. Here Jalal-ud-din and his father received princely hospitality, and here rest the remains of the great Persian mystic, his father's and his beloved master's, Shamsh-ud-din Tabriz,—a spot that is the place of pilgrimage of his order of dervishes.† In the different towns of his kingdom, in Sivas, Iconium, Amasia, he built mosques, cloisters, madrassahs, caravansarais—so many seats of culture and exchange of ideas.‡ The influence that the dervish orders wielded on the populace is best shown by a dervish insurrection which took place under Ala-

By dervishes are meant, says Goldziher, those who follow the sufi manner of life. They cannot, however, all be classed under one head. We must distinguish between the earnest representatives of the love of God and ecstatic exaltation, who endeavour to perfect their souls by a life of self-denial and meditation, and the vagabond dervishes who in an independent dissolute beggar's life use sufism to cloak their idleness and to delude the masses; or the cloister brothers who, shrinking from work, use the exterior forms of the sufi life to obtain a care-free and independent existence. They too are full of the love of God, and pretend to be "walking on the way." But earnest sufis would hardly care to be identified with them; Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, pp. 180 et seq. The sufis are opposed to the usual theological book-learning. They have no sympathy with the Ulema and the Hadith searchers. These, so they say, simply perplex our times; Goldziher, p. 185. It was to be expected that the theologians by profession were not favourably disposed towards the sufis; Goldziher, p. 186. See also p. 187 for the relation between sufism and official Islam, also Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* II, pp. 394 et seq.

† Ibn Batutah has very interesting observations on this subject, II, 282, 283.

‡ Hammer, I, 53. See also his *Gesch. d. schönen Redekünste in Persien*, p. 139.

uddin's son and successor, at the head of which stood a dervish called Elyas Baba.*

Another dervish, Nur Sufi, managed to gather so large a following that he actually took possession of a fort in Cilicia; whereupon the Sultan of Iconium made terms with the dervish's son and granted the neighbouring country to him in fief. This dervish's son soon became the founder of a small dynasty, which gave much trouble to the Ottoman Sultans.†

In this respect nothing changed when the Persian princes of the family of Chengiz put an end to the kingdom of the Seljuks of Iconium and brought the country under Mogul rule. The influence of Sufism and of the dervishes, towards whom the Mogul princes were not unfavourably inclined, continued; nay, developed still more powerfully. That this was really so, is shown by the famous traveller Ibn Batuta, who, in the year 733 A.H. (1333 A.D.), travelled through Asia Minor. He found a network of religious brotherhood spread throughout the country. This brotherhood was composed of men of all classes of society, and its members called themselves *Akhy* (brothers). They established chapels and inns for dervishes all over the kingdom, where even strangers received a friendly and generous hospitality. The Arab traveller had a warm reception in more than twenty inns of this brotherhood. The description which he gives of these *Akhy* in their long *kafatan*, in their high, white felt hat, and of their religious practices, accompanied by songs and dances, leaves no doubt that these *Akhy* were no other than the predecessors of the Mewleys and Nakhsbandi of modern Turkey.

About forty years before Ibn Batuta's travels in Asia Minor—in the last decade of the thirteenth century A.D.—the chief of a Turkoman horde, the intrepid Ertoghril, was rewarded by the Seljukian Sultan, Alauddin, with fiefs for his military service, and was presented with robes of honour. This Turkoman chief‡ was given the province known as Phrygia Epictetus (henceforward called Sultan-oni, the centre of the Ottoman power) on the borders of Byzantine Bithynia, with

* Hammer, I, 55, Abul Faraj, 479, on the influence of the dervish under the Seljuks. Hammer, I, 49. Even later the influence of the dervish order was decisive on the question of succession to the throne. Hammer, I, 601.

† Hammer, I, 143, 149, 167. Ibn Batuta gives us an account of the third ruler of this House. He describes his residence Alaya and his country. II, 258.

‡ Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dyn.* 186.

the town of Sugut (Thebasion) as headquarters.* Ertoghril's son, Ottoman, waged successful war and extended his power in the bordering Byzantine lands. But he owed his success just as much to his army as to the religious ideas of his contemporaries. He married—so runs the popular legend—the charming Malkhatun, the daughter of a pious hermit, Sheikh Adab Ali, honoured throughout the country. When we recall to mind how, shortly before, the dervishes had stirred up a dangerous rebellion against Sultan Alauddin; how, by their support, the Karamayan dynasty had come into existence; and what the great Arab traveller says about the extraordinary influence and power of the *Akhy*-order—no room is left for doubt that Ottoman owed his success not merely to his arms but also to the support of the religious order—a support which would readily be given to him, to the fullest extent, as the son in-law of Shaikh Adab Ali.

True, that schism had not then come to light in Asia Minor, which later so often drove the orthodox party to the persecution of the sufis and the dervishes. Islam was still young there, and the Turkomans, its champions, were a rude and simple people who had no idea of the gulf that divided orthodox Islam from the ecstatic enthusiasm of the Persian sufis. Their clergy, mostly of Turkoman nationality, were not very learned, and therefore not very contentious. They were of easy-going temperament, of the type of village and country priests, who were quite content with the charity of the princes and populace, and who felt no need or inclination to pursue or punish heretics. Everywhere in his rambles Ibn Batutah found mosques, madrassahs, inns, chapels. He observes with pleasure the expressive manner in which children recited the Qur'an. He notes with satisfaction the pious and religious tendencies of the various Sultans who ruled the land; their regard for theologians who were given precedence at Court over the Amirs. On the occasion of the festival of Kurban-Bairam lawyers, ulemas, members of the then *Akhy* order—all dined at one table at the Court.† We are further told that many a professor of a well-endowed academy lived in princely luxury, surrounded by numerous slaves and servants.‡ The Qur'an readers were never absent from the Court.§ After this account we need not be surprised if we read in the oldest Ottoman histories that Ottoman built inns for dervishes and

* Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dyn.* 186.
† Ibn Batutah, II, 277.
‡ Ibid., 296, 297.
§ Ibid., II, 304, 307, 341.

established mosques; while his successor Orkhan founded in Brusa, the spot selected for the capital, chapels and cloisters for dervishes. Here, under the second ruler of the house of Ottoman, in continuation of the pious policy of Ottoman, rose similar institutions and establishments founded by the rich and influential officers of the Court.

When we consider these circumstances in their entirety, we are confirmed in the view set forth earlier in a general way, namely, that in the beginning the Sultanate rested mainly on two parties: the clergy and the army. To the interplay of these two powerful factors the Ottoman empire owed its exceedingly rapid growth and its later glorious political development.

These nevertheless carried within them the germs of decay and dissolution; for, on the one hand, as soon as political conditions settled down, the split between the orthodox party and sufism came glaringly to light, and, on the other, the army, invested as it was with large fiefs, was soon demoralised, and the Sultan's body-guard, the *Janisaries*, began to exercise a fateful influence over the Ottoman empire.

In fact the State more and more assumed a military character. The position of the ulemas continued to be one of respect and influence. They held judicial and educational offices. They commanded large incomes; but, in spite of this, they ceased to occupy the most powerful position, because secular interests prevailed.

Thus the old Arab hierarchical system was exchanged for an out-and-out military system, and under Mohamed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, the State was pre-eminently a military State. Uninterrupted wars maintained this system intact till the beginning of the XIXth century.

By the destruction of the *Janisaries*, which preceded the re-organisation of the army according to European pattern, the military tendencies acquired yet greater strength. But the various other reforms of Sultan Mahmud furnished proof that in accordance with the tendencies of modern times, even the Ottoman government subordinated the hierarchy to the State. In Egypt a much more far-reaching change took place. Similar tendencies manifested themselves in Persia, where, after the death of Fateh Ali Shah, and at the commencement of the reign of Mohamed Mirza (1250 A.H., 1834-5 A.D.), an attempt was made to set a limit to the encroachments of the Ulemas in the adminis-

tration of justice by establishing a Supreme Court of Justice (Diwan-i-Adalat).*

Thus, everywhere in the Orient, the edifice of the State, built on the foundation of the old Arab theocratic idea, crumbled down, and out of its ruins, under the influence of more modern ideals, arose younger creations, whose growth and development will be witnessed by future generations; for the periods of time within which great changes are wrought cannot be measured by a single lifetime.

But, from the short span of years within our own personal experience, we may draw one conclusion, namely, that humanity will steadily progress in the direction of spiritual perfection, according to the eternal laws which lie at the very root of life and are of its very essence.

* Cf. Weil, *Gesch. der islam. Völker*, p. 482.